039-NLR-NLR-V-12-THE-KING-v.-GIRIHAGAMA.pdf
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Present: Mr. Justice Grenier.
THE KING v. GIRIHAGAMA.
D. 0. (Grim.), Kandy, 1,974.
Penal Code, ss. ISO and 208—Information to Superintendent of Police—“ Institution of criminal proceedings."
Where the accused gave information to the Superintendent ofPolice that certain persons had set fire to a house belonging to him,and such-information was found to be false,—
Held, that the accused was guilty of offences under sections 180and 208 of the Penal Code, and that he was liable to punishmentunder both sections.
The giving of information to a police officer of a cognizableoffence against a specified person amounts to ‘ the institution ofcriminal proceedings ’ within the meaning of section .208 of thePenal Code.
Queen Empress v. Nanjunda Rau1 and Karim Buksh v. QueenEmpress * followed.
T
HE accused was convicted of offences under sections 180 and208 of the Penal Code, in that he gave information to the
Superintendent of Police that certain persons had set fire to ahouse belonging to him knowing the same to be false, and he wassentenced to two years’ rigorous imprisonment.
In appeal—
Bawa (with him Tambayah), for the accused, appellant.
Walter Pereira, K.C., 8.-G., for the Crown.
Cur. adv. wit.
May 19, 1909. Grenier A.J.—•
The facts formed by the District Judge are, in my opinion, veryclear, and point to the conclusion that the appellant knew that theinformation he gave the Superintendents Police was false, and thatthere was no foundation for the-charge of arson that he made againstEtteriwatte and five others. The District Judge has given hisreasons for holding that the information given by the appellant wasfalse and false to his knowledge, and they appear to me satisfactoryand reasonably conclusive. The fact that tells very strongly againstthe appellant is that he did not call in his defence the witnesses onwhose information he professed to act in preferring the charge ofarson. There are no grounds therefore on which I can interfere withthe verdict of the District Judge on the facts.
It was urged by Mr. Bawa that the appellant should not have beenconvicted and punished on both counts of the indictment, as thefacts are the same, and relate to the same transaction. I find that
R. 20 Mad. 79.* I. L. R. 17 Q<d. 5U-
1909.
May 19.
13-
1909.
May 19.
Grenier
A.J.
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the offence charged in the first Gount is quite distinct from that whichforms the Subject of the second count, and although they may havebeen committed in the course of one transaction, they are, in myopinion, separable and independent of each other. I am bound bythe judgment of the Full Court in the case of the King v. ArnolisAppu et al.,1 where it was held that theft and house-breaking bynight with intent to commit theft are two distinct offences, and twoseparate sentences may be passed under section 17 of the CriminalProcedure Code.
In the present case the appellant gave false information to theSuperintendent of Police, which constituted an offence under section180, and in giving such information with intent to cause injury heinstituted or caused to be instituted a criminal proceeding against thepersons I have mentioned, which constituted quite a different offenceunder section 208. As regards the question whether the giving ofinformation to a police officer is tantamount to the institutionof a criminal proceeding, I find there are conflicting decisions ofthe High Court in India on the point. I am inclined to take theview of the Madras High Court in the case of Queen Empress v.Nanjunda Rau,4 which followed the decision of a Pull Bench of theCalcutta High Court in the case of Karim Buksh v. Queen Empress.3In the Madras case Collin C.J. said : “ We are Unable to find anywarrant for holding that the words ‘ the institution of criminal pro-ceedings ’ should be limited to the bringing of a charge before theMagistrate, or to action by tlie Magistrate or Police against theperson charged. It seems to us that when, as in this case, a chargeof a cognizable offence is made to the Police against a specified person,criminal proceedings within the meaning of the section have beeninstituted just as much as if the charge had been made before theMagistrate.”
I have, therefore, little or no hesitation in holding that the secondcount of the indictment is sustainable in law. Here too, as in theMadras case, the offence was a cognizable one; and although,perhaps, the powers of the Indian Police are larger than those ofCeylon Police, the same principle or rule in regard to arrests withouta warrant, in the case of cognizable offences, equally applies.
Another point raised by Mr. Bawa was that the Magistrate hadwrongly excluded certain evidence relating to the information thatthe appellant had received from the person who professed to haveseen the house being set fire to. The District Judge has I findrecorded the material parts of the information so given, and I haveconsidered the evidence in arriving at a conclusion on the whole case.
The conviction and sentence must be affirmed.
Appeal dismissed.
t 2 Balasingham 31.1 /. L. R. 20 Mad. 79.
> 1. L. R. 17 Oal. 574-