035-NLR-NLR-V-45-THE-KING-v.-KALU-BANDA.pdf
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KEUNEMAif J.—The King o. Kalu Banda.
d9$3Present: Keuneman and Jayetileke JJ.THE KING v. KALU BANDA.
38—D. G. (Crim.), Kandy, 166.
Attorney-General—Authorityto conduct prosecution before the District Ciiart- –
Writing not required—Criminal Procedure Code, s. 201.
The authority given by the Attorney-General to a pleader to prosecutebefore the District Court, required by section 201 of the Criminal Proce-dure Code, need not be in writing. Where a telegram from the Attorney-General is produced it is prima facie evidence of general authority.
A
PPEAL from an order of acquittal entered by the District Judg^ ofKandy.
Jansze, C.G., for Attorney-General.
November 10, 1943. Keuneman J.—
The Attorney-General in this case appeals against an order of acquittalentered by the District Judge under peculiar circumstances. When thecase was called on this particular date Mr. Gunewardene appeared ana
KEUtTEMAN J.—The King v. Kalu Banda.
1JL7
said that he appeared for the prosecution. He produced a state telegramsigned by *' AyG " clearly referring to the Attorney-General. In thattelegram the Attorney-General has said:
You also have my general authority to conduct prosecutions in allcases committed for trial before the District Court of Kandy until Iinform you to the contrary.
The telegram is dated May 11, and the proceedings in this case tookplace on May 17. The only point which the judge made was that he didnot regard the telegram itself as an adequate document upon whichhe could act. On examination of section 201 of the Criminal ProcedureCode it seems clear that a written authority is not demanded. Thesection rims as follows: —
" In every case before a District Judge the prosecution shall beconducted by the Attorney-General or the Solicitor-General or aCrown Counsel or by some pleader generally or specially authorised bythe Attorney-General in that behalf. ”
There is no reference to the authority being given in writing by theAttorney-General. In this ease the telegram itself was produced, and1 think it was prima facie evidence that general authority of the Attorney-General was given to Mr. Gunewardene to conduct the prosecution.No doubt there may be eases where the judge is in doubt as to whether-special or general authority has been given. In such cases it would perhapsbe advisable to adjourn the trials until the matter is settled. In thisparticular instance there is no room for doubt that Mir. Gunewardeneon that date was authorised to appear on behalf of the Attorney-General.Tn the circumstances, I set aside the order of acquittal, and send the caseback for trial in due course before the District Judge.
-Jayetileke J.—I agree.
Set aside and sent back.