043-NLR-NLR-V-20-THE-KING-v.-SIDDA-et-al.pdf
( 190 )
1918.
Present : Shaw J. and De Sampayo J.
THE KING v. SIDDA et al.
D. C. Colombo (Crim.). 4,764.
(Special Case.)
Confession of guilt by accusedbefore Police Magistrate—Retraction of
confession at the trial—Conviction based on retracted confession—
Evidence.
The accused in this case were charged with house-breaking andtheft. At the inquiry before the Police Magistrate they made thefollowing statement : *' I am gnilfy, and I beg for pardon. ”
At the trial in the District Court the accused pleaded ** not. guilty. ” and gave evidence denying that they had pleaded guilty.
The District Judge convicted the accused, remarking that therest of the evidence was of such a 'nature that he would not haveconvicted on it had it stood alone.
Held, that the conviction was right.
*' Under our law. confessions, whether judicial or extra-judicial,{are evidence against the person making them, so long as they arenot irrelevant under the provisions of sections 24 to 26 of theBvidence Ordinance, and, like all ■ other relevant evidence, aresufficient on which to base a conviction, even if uncorroborated byother proof. "
T^HIS case was referred to the Supreme Court by the learned. . Additional District Judge of Colombo (W. Wadsworth, Esq.),under section 353 of the Criminal Procedure Code.
Garvin, S.-G.. appeared for the Crown on notice from the Supreme. Court.—The statement of the accused does not cease to be a con-fession because it was made before a Magistrate. If it is a confessionit can be proved against him at the trial, even if he retracts. Con-fessions to the police are made inadmissible under our law. Butthere is no law which places confessions to the Magistrates on thesame footing. According to Taylor the admissibility of confessionsis not a question of law, but a question of prudence under thecircumstances of each case. Counsel cited Taylor. ss. 866 1o 86S '(p. 608); Queen Empress v. Gangia;1 Queen Empress v. Charna:2Queen Empress v. Raman; r> Queen Empress v. Marku Lai.1
Cur. atlr. vulf.
7. L. R. 23 Bom. 316.31. L. R. 21 Mad. S3.
I. L. R. 19 Bom. 728.41. L. R. 20^All. 133.
( 191 )
January 28, 1918. Shaw J.—
This case raises a point of law referred by the Judge of theAdditional District Court of Colombo for the opinion of the SupremeCourt.
Two accused were charged with house-breaking and theft. Atthe inquiry before the Police Magistrate the charge was read overand explained to the accused,, and their statements were recordedunder the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code. Eachaccused made the following statement:“ I am guilty, and I beg
for pardon.
At the trial in the District Court the accused pleaded *' notguilty. and gave evidence denying that they had pleaded guiltyin the Police Court.
The Magistrate who recorded their statements in the PoliceCourt, and who is a Sinhalese gentleman who understands thelanguage of the accused, was called in the District Court and gaveevidence that the statements were taken as the law directs, and thatthe accused made the statements in the words recorded.
At the trial in the District Court, in addition to the confessionsof the accused contained in their statements, there was only someslight circumstantial evidence of the guilt of the accused, which wasof such a nature that the District Judge says he should certainlynot have convicted on it had it stood alone. The Judge had somedoubt how far retracted confessions of this character could be takenas proof of the charges against the accused, or whether the retractedconfessions could be considered as additional evidence to the otherevidence placed before the court. He has, however, given weight tothe confessions as admissions of guilt, and has convicted the accused.
In my opinion the Judge acted correctly in giving weight to theconfessions as evidence of the guilt of the accused.
Under our law confessions, whether judicial or extra-judicial,are evidence against the person making them, so long as they are notirrelevant under the provisions of sections 24 to 26 of the EvidenceOrdinance, and, like all other relevant evidence, are sufficient onwhich to base a conviction, even if uncorroborated by other proof,and this appears also to be the law in England (see Taylor onEvidence, ss. 866 to 868). Confessions^ however, as pointed outby Taylor, section 862, should always be received with great caution,and this is specially so where the confession has been subsequentlyretracted by the person making it.
Under the provisions of our Criminal Procedure Code the state-ments of an accused made before the Magistrate are expressly madeevidence at the trial, and the fact that such'a statement is sub-sequently retracted can make no difference to its admissibility andrelevancy, although the circumstances and reasons given for theretraction may be such as to render it proper to regard the statementwith great caution.
1918.
The King v.Sidda
( 192 )
1918.
Shaw J.
The King tSidda
. In numerous Indian eases, of which I may cite as an exampleQueen Empress v. Gkarya,* it has been held that a retracted con-fession, if proved to be voluntarily made, can be acted upon alongwith the other evidence in the case, and that there is no rule of lawthat a retracted confession must be supported by independentreliable evidence corroborating it in material particulars. Theweight to be given to such a confession must, as stated by the Courtin its judgment in the case of Queen Empress v. Raman,2 dependupon the circumstances under which the confession wa6 originallygiven, and the circumstances under which it was retracted, includingthe reasons given by the prisoner for his retraction.
The two cases above cited were both cases similar to that underconsideration, where accused made statements amounting toconfessions before the Magistrate and subsequently retracted themat the trial.
In my opinion the conviction in the present case is justified by theevidence, and I would consequently affirm it.
De Sampayo-J.—I agree.
Aflirnied.
11.1, fi. 19 Bom. 728.
« /. L. R. 21 Mad. 88.