126-NLR-NLR-V-48-THE-KING-v.-STEPHEN.pdf
DIAS J.—The King v. Stephen.
383
[Assize Couht.]
1947Present: Dias J.
THE KING v. STEPHEN.S. C. 25—M. C. Gampaha, 35,199.
Criminal Procedure Code—Accused in prison clothes—Prejudice—Reasonablecause—Section 289 (1).
Where an accused who was undergoing a sentence of imprisonmentwas produced in Court, for his trial, in prison clothes—
Held, that he was likely to be prejudiced in his trial and that this wasreasonable cause within the meaning of section 289 (1) of' the CriminalProcedure Code for granting a postponement of the trial.
^“'lASE listed for trial before a Judge and Jury.
Ananda Pereira, C.C. (with him Premaratne, C.C.), for the Crown.
Nihal Gunasekera (with him E. A. G. de Silva and Titus Goonetilleke),for the accused.
July 24, 1947. Dias J.—
Mr. Nihal Guntesekera on behalf of the accused applies for a postpone-ment of this trial, on the ground that his client has been produced inprison clothes. The question I have to decide is whether under section289 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Code, there is “ reasonable cause ” for-granting Mr. Nihal Gunesekere’s application.
1 (1931) 33 N. L. X. 83.
48/31
384
DIAS J.—The King v. Stephen.
The Fiscal’s officer in Court informs me that this prisoner does notcome from Fiscal’s custody as he is a convict undergoing a sentence ofimprisonment in jail, and that, therefore the accused is not in the Fiscal’scustody.
I find that in rule No. 223 made under the Prisons Ordinance, Chapter44, appearing in Volume 1, pages 408 to 409 of the Subsidiary Legislationof Ceylon, this case has been provided for. The relevant portion of therule reads as follows : “ and provided further that all convicted prisonerswhen produced in a court of law shall be dressed in civil clothes of a typeappropriate to the clothing scale under which they are classified inprison ”. Therefore, there has been a breach of this rule and I agreewith learned Counsel for the accused that prejudice is likely to be causedto his client by the accused appearing in the dock in clothes bearing thebroad arrow mark. Therefore, I think, there is reasonable cause withinthe meaning of section 289 (1) to grant the postponement asked for andit is hereby allowed.
Let a letter forthwith be sent to the Commissioner of Prisons andProbation Services to explain why there has been a breach of this ruleand why the Government and the tax-payer has to pay for the unnecessaryexpenses of this abortive trial. Had I power under section 289 to awardcosts I would have directed the defaulting prison officer personally to paycosts. Let the explanation when it is received be submitted to me inorder to see what further action is necessary.
Postponement granted.