THE QUEEN v. K. SIRISENA and another

052-NLR-NLR-V-59-THE-QUEEN-v.-K.-SIRISENA-and-another.pdf

I3S
PAS NAY A ICE, C.J.—The Queen v. Sirisena
[In the Court of Criminal Appeal]
– 1957 Present: Basnayake, C.J. (President), Pulie, J., andL. W. de Silva, A. J. .
THE QUEEN v. K. SIRISENA and another
. Appeals Nos. 131 and 132 of 1957 with ApplicationsNos. 153 and 154
S. C. 19—M. C. Horana, 20,919
Court of Crintinal Appeal—Grounds of appeal not stated in notice of appeal—Courtcannot consider them—Remedy of appellant—Courts Ordinance, a. 36—CriminalProcedure Code, s. 355—Court of Criminal Appeal Ordinance, No. 23 o) 1633,es. 2 (7), 3 (1), 20, 21—Rule 17.
It is not competent for the Court of Criminal Appeal to entertain grounds ofappeal that are not specifically set out in tho notice of appeal. Tho Courtof Criminal Appeal does not have powers similar to tho power of revisionvested in tho Supreme Court..
The provisions of sections 20 and 21 of the Court of Criminal Appeal Ordi'nance and section 355 of tho Criminal Procedure Code afford adequate remedywhen there is a good ground of appeal which merits a decision and which thoCourt of Criminal Appeal, is precluded from considering owing to tho failureof tho appellant to specify it in his notice of appeal.
i^^-PPEALS, with applications for leave to appeal, against twoconvictions in a trial before the Supreme Court..
Colvin JR. de Silva, with M. L. de Silva and M. H. Amit (Assigned),for Accused-Appellants..
V. T. Thamotheram, Senior Crown Counsel, for tho Attorney-General.
Cur. adv. vult. . ,
November 18, 1957. Basnayake, C.J.—'
The appellants are respectively the 1st and 2nd accused persons whowere tried with two others on. an indictment containing two counts.All were charged on the first count with having on 15th February 1957committed murder by causing the death of one Hapuarachige Don Baron .Gunatileke and the 1st appellant only on the second count under section316 of the Penal Code with causing grievous hurt to the mistress ofDon Baron Gunatileke, named Vithanage Agidahamy. Both appellantswere convicted of murder and the 1st on the second count. Onthe second count the 1st appellant was sentenced to two years’ rigorousimprisonment. The two co-accused of the appellants were acquitted.
No grounds of law were taken in the notice of appeal and at the argu-ment before us learned counsel for the appellants stated that of the fourgrounds in the notice of appeal ho would confine himself to the second,
BASXAYAKE, C.J.—The Queen v. Sirisen(f
199
namely, that the verdict was unreasonable and could not be supported. by the evidence led in the case. He said he was not in a position to-submit that the verdict against the 1st appellant was unreasonable butpressed on us strongly that the conviction of the 2nd appellant should be.set aside.
The only eye witness in the case is Agidahamy. According to her thedeceased left his home at about 11 a.m. on the day in question on a visitto his son. About five minutes afterwards she saw the appellants andtwo others going in the direction in which the deceased went. Shesaw the 1st appellant earring a knife and the other three ivere armedwith clubs. In view of the fact that owing to litigation between thedeceased and the father of the 1st appellant she feared that the deceasedwould be set upon by these persons. She then ran in the same directionand saw the 1st appellant deal a stab blow on the back of the deceasedwho then began to run, whereupon the 2nd appellant chased him andfelled him to the ground by striking him witjj a chib and followed it upby stabbing him with a knife. The 2nd appellant thereupon ran away.The 1st appellant who still remained at the spot again approached thedeceased who was fallen and began to strike him with a club in the courseof which she received three injuries one of which fractured her rightupper arm. She assigned no active part to the co-accused of the-appellants.-
For the cries raised by Agidahamy a crowd of persons collected amongwhom were three whose names are on the list of witnesses on the backof the indictment. They are Don James, a vel vidane, R. A. BabuSingho and David Singho. These witnesses were not called to giveevidence at the trial, although according to Agidahamy she mentionedat the spot itself to these persons how the deceased and she were injured.
At 1.20 p.m. on the same day some information had been receivedat the Kalutara Police Station regarding the incident, but the contents■of this information were not revealed at the trial. Agidahamy went tothe Station at 2 p.m. where her statement was recorded at some lengthby the witness C. D. Gunasekara. She was despatched to the GeneralHospital, Colombo, where she had a visit at 3.10 a.m., the same night fromthe sub-inspector of Police investigating the crime. She made a second■statement to him. The two statements were brought out in evidenceand they were used apparently for both attacking her credibility and forcorroborating her under section 157 of the Evidence Ordinance.
Dearned counsel for the defence presumably were unaware of the con-tents of either statement. The record of the first statement was handedover by the learned trial Judge'to counsel for the defence at the close ofthe examination in chief of C. D. Gunasekara. It was perfectly clearthat Agidahamy who knew the 2nd appellant very well by his name,Piyasena, did not implicate any person by the name of Piyasena in that .statement. She implicated two persons bearing the name Sirisena,namely, the 1st appellant who was described as “ Sirisena son of Haram'aniswho is known as Vevadeniya Sirisena and another Sirisena son of Kirinelis J•of Godigamuwa. ”
200
-BASNAYAKE, C.J.—The Queen v. Sirisena
She referred to two persons, unknown to her, who were associated with)the Sirisenas, and alleged that when the deceased lay fallen he was-assaulted with clubs by the two unknown persons as well. In the re-examination of Gunasekara portions of the statement favourable fromthe prosecution point of view were elicited but who this Sirisena, son.of Kirinelis of Godigamuwa, was remained unexplained until Agidahamywas recalled. She saidtliatby a mistake she described the 2nd appellantas Sirisena and that.she corrected herself when the sub-inspector of Police-questioned her at hospital at 3.10 a.m. on 16th February. Accordingto her one Kirinelis of Godigamuwa had tliree sons. The questions putto her by the court and the answers on this point are recorded as follows :—
" Q. Do you know the names of those three sons ?
A. I know that one is Carolis. I do not know the names of others.
Q.You know that on^ is Carolis. Do you know the names of anyothers ?
A. One is Martin.
Q. What is the name of the other ?-
A. He is Piyasena. ”•
She had to admit that the statement she made to Gunasekara and re-peated in the Magistrate’s Court that at one stage the appellants andtheir two companions assaulted the deceased with clubs was factually,,to say the least, incorrect.
The principal submission on behalf of the 2nd appellant was that the-jury was unreasonble in acting on the sole testimony of Agidahamy-Sho had falsely implicated the persons who were acquitted by the juryby coming out with a story of assault by clubs on the deceased which,did not bear scrutiny in the light of the medical evidence which showedthat the deceased had received only one club injury and that injury was-post-mortem. It was said that during the interval between the incidentand her visit to the Police Station she had been tutored by the nephew ofthe deceased, the vel Vidano, to implicate persons who were not partici-pants in the attack on the deceased. It was further submitted that thestory of the part alleged to be played by the 2nd appellant is unreal andinherently improbable for the reason that, if he was armed with a knifehe should first strike the deceased with a club. It was strongly commen-ted that Agidahamy’s statement to persons who came on the scene imme-diately after the crime would have been one of the best ways of testing-the truth of her story as to the part played by the 2nd appellant but noneof the tliree witnesses who came on the scene was called to testify towhat she said to them although they were in attendance at the trial. Itwas argued that the evidence of the sub-inspector who visited Agidahamyat the General Hospital was so manifestly unsatisfactory as to raise thosuspicion that she was tutored to say that one of the two Sirisenas she>had described to Gunasekara was Pij-asena, the 2nd appellant.
BASXAYAKE, C.J.—The Queen v. Strisena
201
Although no matters of law were taken in the notice of appeal it was•contended that the evidence of the sub-inspector, as to the reasons whyhe thought it necessary to question Agidahamy about the two Sirisenasmentioned by her to Gunasekara, imported hearsay into the ease. Itwas argued that the sub-inspector’s evidence was in effect that witnesseswhom he'had questioned prior to questioning Agidahamy had told himthat Piyasena, the 2nd appellant-, was one of the assailants. Again it, was submitted that the contents of the two statements made by herwere al lowed to be led in ertenso not merelj' for the purpose of contradictingher evidence at the trial but also to corroborate her. It may here bementioned that no objection was taken on behalf of,the defence to the-admission of these statements.
A third point taken related to the Judge’s summing-up in which heput to the jury that if they came to an adverse finding against the 1stappellant they had perforce to come to a finding against the 2nd appellant.also. He said :
,c …. if you hold that the act was committed by the 1st and2nd accused or either of them—it is really difficult for you to find thatthe 1st accused only was involved in this incident because the evidenceagainst the 1st and 2nd accused comes from the same source andyou cannot accept the evidence against one and not against the other. ”
It was submitted that while no doubt the evidence came from the same-source the quality of the evidence as against each of the appellants wasdifferent and that it was a non-direction amounting to a misdirectionnot to have drawn the distinction in that particular context that whileAgidahamy in her statement had implicated the 1st appellant by nameshe had failed to do so in the case of the 2nd appellant and that the cir-cumstances in which she implicated the latter at the General Hospitalwere of a suspicious character.
On the grounds of fact urged we find ourselves unable to uphold thesubmission that the verdict is unreasonable. There remain only thepoints of law not specified in the notice of appeal, and the question that-arises for consideration is whether it is competent for this – Courtto entertain them..'
The attention of learned counsel for the appellants was drawn to thefact that these points were not- specified in the notice of appeal and thathe was precluded from arguing them. He .relied on the authority ofQueen v. Gnnaicardena 1 and said that it was his duty to bring the mattersto our notice-.
Whc-n we indicated to him that this Court had no power to entertain-grounds of appeal not specified in the notice he submitted that the pro-nouncements of this Court as to the right of counsel to argue points oflaw not specified in the notice of appeal were not clear and invited us to-clarify the position. In our view the decisions of this Court leave noroom for doubt; but we propose to amplify what has been said before.-
1 (19-5-5) 57 N. L. R. 126.
202
BASNAYAKE. C.T.—The Queen v. Sir/sc net
In King v. Bello Singho 1 this Court refused to allow counsel for the-appellant to raise a point of law not taken in the petition of appeal. Indoing so it said
"The law on the subject seems to be fairly clear. Section 8 (1)of the Court of Criminal Appeal Ordinance, No. 23 of 1938, provides,that where a person convicted desires to appeal under this Ordinanceto the Court of Criminal Appeal, or to obtain the leave of that Courtto appeal, he shall give notice of appeal or notice of his application for'leave to appeal, in such manner as may be directed by rules of Court,within 14 days of the date of conviction, Rule 3 of the Court of Cri-minal Appeal Rules, 1940, provides that the forms set out in the Sche-dule to the Rules, or forms as near thereto as circumstances permit,shall be used in all cases to which such forms are applicable. The formsrelevant to appeals on questions of law and tc applications for leave-to appeal on the facts are Nos. IV and VI. They show that the grounds-inusb be fully set out.”
After referring to previous decisions of this Court and to some decisions-of the English Court of Criminal Appeal the Court went on to say :
" These decisions show that the practice of raising points -whichare not set out in the notice, which, I regret to say, seems to be growing,has been condemned in no uncertain terms.”
The Court affirmed its adherence to the following pronouncement ofDarling J. in Rex v. Wyman i 2, cited with approval by. the Lord ChiefJustice of England in Rex. v. Cait-n-s 3 :
• “ The Court wishes it to be understood that in future substantialparticulai’S of misdirection or of other objections to the summing upmust always be set out in the notice of appeal or sent to the Registrarof the Court of Criminal Appeal with the notice of appeal, even if thetranscript of the shorthand note of the trial has not then been obtained.Such particulars must not be kept back until within a few days of theof the hearing of the appeal. If counsel has a genuine grievanceregarding a summing up he knows substantially what it is as soon asthe summing up is finished, and can certainly’- specify’- his generalobjection when he settles the notice of appeal. ”
In the next case on this point, Regina- v. Pinlheris el al. 4, this Court,after an examination of previous decisions both here and in England,reiterated that grounds not included in the notice of appeal will not beentertained. That case, following the decisions in Cosmas v. Commis-sioner °S Income Tax5, North Western Blue Line v. K. B. L. Per era 6, -Goldman v. Eade 7, and Re Shanoff v. Glanzer 8, applied the importantprinciple that a rule governing procedure is mandatory and not directoryand must be strictly complied with. ' Where the i-ight of this Court-
i (1947) 48 N. L. It. 542at 548.s(1938)39 N. Li. R. 457.
13 Cr. App. R. 163 al 165.*(1943)44 24. L. R. 523.
3 20 Cr. App. R. 44.7(1945)1 All E. R. 154 (England).
(1955) 57 N. LiR. 49.•(1949)1 D. L. R. 414 (Canada).
BASXAYAKE, C.J.—The Qveen v. Sirisena
203
to exercise its jurisdiction rests on compliance by the appellant •with themandatory provisions of the Ordinance which gives him the right ofappeal, it has no power to admit an appeal that does not comply withthe legal requirements of the enactment which confers the right of appeal{Stone and another v. Dean *). Both here and in England there have been,no doubt, instances in which the Court, while affirming the rule that aground of appeal not set out in the notice will not be entertained, hadproceeded to deal with the point as a matter of indulgence, although theCourt had no power to do so. The subsequent case of the Queen v. China-tvardene 2 affirmed the principle of Pinlheris’s case {supra) in the followingwords :—‘
“ Although no appellant or applicant for leave to appeal may claim* as of right to make submissions except on grounds particularised in
compliance with the terms of the Ordinance ”,
and went on to state,
“ this does not mean that the Court itself is powerless, when disposingof an appeal or application, to set aside a conviction on any other groundwhich is sufficiently substantial to justify a decision that the verdictunder appeal should not be allowed to stand. ”
We have since reconsidered the above observation which assumes thatthis Court has powers similar to the power of revision vested in theSupreme Court, and we havo formed the conclusion that we have no suchpower. It is so stated expressly in the case of King v. JYat nasi vayam 3.
A right of appeal from the decisions of a Court being a right that doesnot lie unless expressly conferred by statute, its exercise is entirely regu-lated by the statute that confers it and the appellant must comply withits reqirements before he can claim a hearing in the appellate tribunal.{Attorney-General v. Sillem4). We therefore think that this Court wasconstruing its powers too widely when it stated that it had power to acton grounds not taken in the notice. We have searched in vain for aprecedent or a principle on which the proposition can be founded and nonewas cited to us. Wo have therefore come to the conclusion that thedictum in Gunawardene’s case (supra-) should not hereafter be acted on.The Court of Criminal Appeal is a court of limited authority created bystatute as would appeal- from the words of section 2 (7) of the Ordinance.
“ The Court of Criminal Appeal shall be a superior court of record,and shall, for the purposes and subject to the provisions of this Ordi-nance, have full power to determine, in accordance with this Ordinance,
any questions necessary to be determined for the purpose of doingjustice in the case before the court. ”
We wish to emphasise the words underlined. Our power to determineany questions necessary to be determined for the purpose of doing justicein the case before us is regulated by the Ordinance. In our desire to do 1
' (1S5S) 27 L. J. Q. B. 319.' 3 {1948) 49 N. L. Jt. 289 at 298.''
3 (1955) 57 Ar. L. It. 126.* 10 H. B. C. 703, li E. R. 1200. ' ‘
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BASXAYAKLE, CJ.J.—.The Queen v. Sirisena
justice "ire are not free toexceed the powers conferred on the Courtby the enactment constituting it and regulating its procedure. The factthat the-Judges of the Supreme .Court are also Judges of the Court ofCriminal Appeal does not invest it with any greater power. The rulegoverning statutory courts of limited authority which is thus stated inCraies on Statute Law; (5th Edn) p. 246 endorses this view :
“ "When a statute confers jurisdiction upon a tribunal of limitedauthority and statutory origin, the conditions and qualificationsannexed to the grant must be strictly complied with. ”
In Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes we find that much the sameprinciple is expressed in these words :
“ If for instance, an appeal from a decision bo given with pro-visions requiring the fulfilment of cortain conditions, such as givingnotice of appeal and entering into recognisances, or transmitting docu-ments within a certain time, a strict compliance would-be imperativeand non-compliance would be fatal to the appeal. ”
. . '•(Maxwell—10th Edn., p. 379).
When we turn to section 8 of the Ordinance which prescribes the mannerin which the right of appeal granted by section 4 may bo exercised wefind the following provision :—
•“ Where a person convicted desires to appeal under this Ordinance tothe Court of Criminal Appeal, or to obtain leave of the Court to appeal,lie shall give notice of appeal -or notice of his application for leave toappeal, in such manner as may be directed by rules of court, withinfourteen days of the date of conviction. ”
It should be noted that notice of appeal must be given in such a manneras may be directed by rules of Court within fourteen days of the date ofconviction: .The relevant rule of Court is Rule 17 which reads :
" A person desiring, under the provisions of the Ordinance to appealto the Court of Appeal against his conviction or sentence, shall com-mence his appeal by sending, to the Registrar a notice of appeal or noticeof application for leave to appeal or notice of application for extensionof time within which such notices shall be given, as the case may bo,in the form of such notices respectively set forth in the Schedule, andiii the notice or noticos so sent) shall answer the questions and comply•with tho requirements set forth thereon subject to the prolusions ofrule 23. ”.-
The rule requires that the appellant shall send to tlio Registrar notice ofappeal or any cf the other notices prescribed therein in tho form of suchnotices respectively set fjort-h iu.’the Schedule.- The form of notice of
UASN’AYAKE, C.J.—The Q Uteri v. Sirisenn
205
-appeal in the Schedule carries the following instructions as to the grounds•of appeal:—.'
** These must be filled in before the notice is sent to the Registrar.You must here set out the grounds or reasons you allege why yourconviction should be quashed or jour sentence reduced. You canalso, if you wish, set out, in addition to your above reasons, your caseand argument fully. ”
Porm No. XXXIII is attached to this Judgment. The Schedule is asmuch a part of the rules as the rules themselves. –
There is a tendency to assume that the Court of Criminal Appeal hasthe same power as the Supreme Court under section 36 of the CourtsOrdinance, viz, “ the correction of all errors in factor in law ” committedby subordinate courts. It is not so. Its powers are confined to thoseexpressly granted. The rule that grounds not taken in a notice of appealwill not be entertained is one that is observed by Appellate Courts in-oilier parts of the Commonwealth. It would appear from the observations-of Lord Birkenhead in Wilson v. United Counties Bank Limited 1 thatthis rule has a wider application and is observed by Courts other than•those whose powers are strictly governed by statute :
" I think it necessary to point out that, unless the circumstancesare wholly exceptional, appellants must be strictly held to the groundsof appeal which they think proper to set forth in the formal documentswhich are demanded from them. The object of indicating in detail■the grounds of appeal, both to the Court of Appeal and to jrour Lord-ships’ House, is that the respondent jiarfies may be accurately andprecisely informed of the case which they have to meet. Their efforts-are naturally directed to the contentions which are put forward by theappellants. They are entitled to treat as abandoned contentionswhich are not set forth. If in exceptional cases parties desire to addnew grounds to those of which they have given notice, it will usuallybe convenient, bjr a substantive application, to apply to theindulgence of the Court which is to hear the appeal. In the presentcase, both in the Court of Appeal and before Your Lordships, entirelynew contentions have been submitted on behalf of the defendants.The practice is extremely inconvenient and ought in my judgment'to be discouraged in every possible way. ”
It has become an all too frequent occurrence in this Court for counselIn the course of an argument on a ground specified in the notice to arguegrounds not taken at the trial and not specified in the notice of appeal.
This practice should in our opinion be discouraged. This is not peculiarto Ceylon. If wo may judge from the decisions of the Courts in otherCommonwealth countries it would appear that they too are endeavouringto discourage it. They have indicated in no unmistakable term.s that-argument of grounds not specifically set out in the notice of. appeal willnot be permitted. It will be sufficient for the present purpose if we were
1 {1920) A. O. 102 at 106.
206
BASNAYAKE, C.J.—The Queen t>. Siriscnu
to quote some of their dicta. Ia the Scots case of Reilly <Si another t>_.H. M. Advocate 1 the Court observed.:■
“ As your Lordships know, the time allowed for marking a criminalappeal is short, and what frequently happens is that the original noteof reasons of appeal is either put in by the appellant himself or isput in somewhat hastily by his solicitor, and it generally containssketchy and sometimes quite inadequate and unsupportable groundsof appeal. The practice—Boyd v. H. M. Advocate, (1939), S. L.. T.,p. 60—has arisen of counsel submitting supplementary reasons of• appeal which they ask us to substitute for the original reasons. Withregard to that I think I ought to say two things. The first is that,even inside the ten daj-s which is allou ed, there ought to be more satis-factory reasons stated than there frequently are. It is not necessaryin all cases for the appellant to wait for the notes of evidence, parti-cularly if a case has been conducted by counsel—he ought to knowpretty well at the conclusion of the trial what the points are he wantsto make. Iso doubt, there may be exceptional cases where some funda-mental matter has been overlooked at the trial, but, broadly speaking,the function of the Court of Appeal is to deal with issues which werelive issues at the trial and not with issues which are disinterred from thenotes of evidence and the Judge’s char ge by the subsequent ingenuityof counsel. ”
It should not be overlooked that even where the time for appealingis ten days—in Ceylon it is fourteen days—the Courts insist on strictcompliance with the rules and forms. When we turn to cases in Englandwe find the position was clarified so long ago as 1909 in the case of JosephStoddarl 2. There the Court said (p. 24-5) :
“ We cannot part from this caso without making some observations'which may, we trust, be of service with reference to the practice of thisCourt. As appears from the judgment which has just been delivered,the case for the appellant was conducted by making a minuteand critical examination, not only of every part of the summing-up,but of the whole conduct of the trial. Objections were raised which,if sound, ought to have been taken at the trial. ”
“ Every summing-up must be regarded in the light of the conduct ofthe trial and the questions which have been raised by the counsel forthe prosecution and for the defence respectively. This Court does notsit to consider whether tliis or that phrase was the best that might havebeen chosen, or whether a direction which has been attacked mighthave been fuller or more conveniently expressed, or whether othertopics which might have been dealt with on other occasions shouldbe introduced. ”-
We think we have said enough to clarify the position in law in regardto grounds of appeal not specified in the notice. It might be asked whatlegal remedy is available to those having a good ground of appeal whofail to specify it in the notice. The answer to that question is to bo found. –
(1950) Scots Law Times, />. 240.
2 Cr. App. R. 217.
BASXAYAKE, C.J.—The Queen v. Sirisena
207
in sections 20 and 21 of the Ordinance and the powers conferred by section355 of the Criminal Procedure Code both on the trial Judge and on theAttorney-General. In our opinion those provisions afford adequate meansof bringing before this Court a point of real importance which merits adecision and which this Court has been precluded from considering owingto the failure of the appellant to specify it in his notice. There is notime limit for invoking the aid of those provisions and our Reports bearample testimony to the fact that before the constitution of this Courtsect ion 355 of the Criminal Procedure Code was availed of for the purposeof correcting wrong decisions of law by the Supreme Court in its originaljurisdiction. Those same Reports show that the Judges and theAttorney-General have not been slow to state cases when matters of realimportance had been brought to their notice. In the result the appealsare dismissed and the applications refused.
Convictions affirmed.
FORM XXXIII*
IN' THE COURT OF CRIMINAL, APPEAL
Criminal Appeal jSTo of 19
Regina v
(Supreme Court Circuit, 19
Case No:of 19.')
NOTICE OF APPEAL OR APPLICATION FORLEAVE TO APPEAL AGAINST CONVICTIONOR SENTENCE
To the Registrar of the Court of Criminal Appeal.
1Theft, Murder,
Forgery, <fcc.
* If not in custody h« rcset out your address in full.
3Jf you admit that youare guilty, or only desireto appeal against yoursentence cross out thewords " against my con-viction and
* If you only desire toappeal against your con-viction and not againstyour sentence cross out thewords “ and against mysentence
5 This notice must bosigned by the Appellant.If he cannot write he mustaffix his mark In thepresence of a witness.The name and address ofsuch attesting witness mustbe given.
Name of Appellant :
Offence of which convicted 1 : !
Sentence :1
Date when convicted :
Date when sentence passed :
Name of Prison 2
X the above-named Appellant hereby give you noticethat I desire to appeal to the Court of Criminal Appealagainst my conviction 3
and
against my sentence *•
on the grounds hereinafter set forth on page 2 of this notice.
(Signed) or (>fark) 5
(Appellant). *
Signature and address of witness attesting mark.
• If this notice is signed Dated this *
more than fourteen days
after the conviction or' « „*
sentence appealed against’*
the Appellant must obtain
and nil In Form IX and* '
cend ft with this notice.
* See page 205
day of… > 1 9
{supra), line S.
208
Halahakons v. [Fernando.
The Appellant must answer the following questions :—, • "
Question. •-; .-Answer.
" Did the J"udge before whom you were tried■
• grant you a Certificate that it was a fit
caso for Appeal T *_. .
* ' * * . –
Do you desire the Court of Criminal Appeal
.to assign you legal aid ? -. .
If your answer to this question is “ Yes ”
– then answer the following questions :— ■ .
What was your occupation and whatwages, salary or income were youreceiving before your conviction ? . .
Have you any means to enable you
to obtain legal aid for yourself ?. .
Is any Proctor now acting for you fIf so, give his name and address ..
Do you desiro to be present when the Court
considers your case f '..
Do you desire to apply for leavo to call any
witnesses on your appeal 1. .
If your answer to this question is“ Yes ” you must obtain. Form XXVI,fill . it up, and forward it with
this notice.-
Grounds of Appeal or Application
Xheso must be filled in before thenotice is sent to the Registrar.
. You must here set out the groundsor reasons you allege why yourconviction should be quashed oryour sentence reduced.
You can also, if you wish, set out,• in addition to your above reasons,your case and argument fully.