095-NLR-NLR-V-69-THE-SOLICITOR-GENERAL-Appellant-and-THANGAMANI-PITCHAI-Respondent.pdf
442
ALLES, J.—Solicitor-General v. Thangamani Pitchai
1965Present:
THE SOLICITOR-GENERAL,
PITCHAI, Respondent
S. C. 331/1965—M. C. Balangoda, 97419
Price Order for a particular area—Maximum price according to the price in Colombo“for the time being”—Interpretation of the words “for the lime being"—Control of Prices Act, ss. 3 (2), 4, 8 (1) (6).
Where a Price Order applicable to Ratnapura District fixed the maximumprice of a commodity at a certain rate above the price which “ for the timebeing ” had been fixed by Price Order for the Colombo Municipality—
Held, that the Price Order of Ratnapura contemplated not only the PriceOrder of the Colombo Municipality which was in existence on the date whenthe Ratnapura Order came into operation but also any Price Order fixingthe price of the commodity for the Colombo Municipality which was in forcesubsequent to that date.
Alles, J.
Appellant, and THAN GAM AN I
A PPEAL from a judgment of the Magistrate’s Court, Balangoda.
N.Tittawela, Crown Counsel, for the Solicitor-General.
No appearance for the Accused-Respondent.
Cur. adv. vult.
October 15, 1965. AhhES, J.—
The accused in this case was charged in the Magistrate’s Court ofBalangoda with the following offence :—
“ That he did on the^6th day of November, 1963, at Thumbagoda,Balangoda, within the jurisdiction of the Magistrate’s Court ofBalangoda being a place within the Balangoda Urban Council area ofthe Ratnapura District in which Food Price Order R/30/1962 madeby the Deputy Food Controller of Prices (Food), Ratnapura District,under section 4 read with section 3 (2) of the Control of Prices Act,
ALLES, J.—Solicitor-Qeneral v. Thanrjumani Pitchai
443
No. 29 of 1950, and published in Ceylon Government Gazette Extra-ordinary No. 13,308 of 19.9.62 read with Food Price Order No. C. 378made by the Controller of Prices (Food) under section 4 of the Control ofPrices Act, No. 29 of 1950, and published in Ceylon Government GazetteExtraordinary No. 13,808 of 1.11.63 were in operation fixing themaximum retail price above which cummin seed shall not be sold inthat area, sell to K. L. Jayaweera, Food and Price Control Inspector,17, Barnes Place, Colombo 7, J lb. of cummin seed for 28 cents, aprice in excess of the maximum controlled retail price of 24J centsfor the said J lb. of cummin seed and thereby committed an offenceunder section 8 (1) of the Control of Prices Act, No. 29 of 1950, punish-able under section 8 (6) of the aforesaid Act as amended by section2 (2) of the Control of Prices (Amendment) Act No. 44 of 1957.”
No evidence was led at the trial and the Magistrate felt himself boundby his order in a connected case (M.C. Balangoda Case No. 97418) andacquitted the accused. In doing so, the Magistrate took the view thatPrice Order R/30/1962 published in Government Gazette ExtraordinaryNo. 13,308 of 19.9.62 could not be read with Food Price Order No. C 378published in Government Gazette Extraordinary No. 13,808 of 1.11.63since the latter order was subsequent in time to the order of 19.9.62. Heagreed with the submission of the defence that there was no valid PriceOrder in operation relating to cummin seed at the time of the allegeddetection and therefore acquitted the accused.
From the order of acquittal the Solicitor-General has appealed, andCrown Counsel submitted on his behalf that the learned Magistratehad misdirected himself on the law and urged that the order of acquittalshould be set aside and the accused re-tried according to law.
Food Price Order R/30/1962 published in the Government Gazetteof 19.9.62 (hereinafter referred to as the Ratnapura Order) fixed withimmediate effect the prices above which several commodities includingcummin seed could not be sold within the Ratnapura District. TheDeputy Controller of Prices (Food), Ratnapura District, fixed the pricesfor the Ratnapura District by relating the prices which for the timebeing had been fixed by Price Orders under the Control of Prices Actfor the Colombo Municipality, increased by a certain amount which wasreferred to in the Schedule to the Order. There were several such PriceOrders since 1962 and the Price Order in existence at the time of thedetection of the offence was Price Order C. 378 of the ColomboMunicipality (hereinafter referred to as the Colombo Order) publishedin Government Gazette of 1.11.63. This Order permitted an increase of-03 cents per pound over the Colombo Price.
444
ALLES, J.—Solicitor-General v. Tkangamani Pitchai
The question that arises for determination in this appeal is whetherthe Colombo Price Order of 1.11.63 can be applied for the purpose ofascertaining the retail price of cummin seed per pound above which thiscommodity could not be sold within the Ratnapura District. CrownCounsel submits that this was the Order which for the time being hadfixed the price of cummin seed for the Colombo Municipality and stressesthe fact that at the time of the sale and the detection of the offence(6.11.63), the relevant Colombo Order which was in operation was theOrder of 1.11.63 referred to in the charge. The words ‘ which for thetime being had been fixed ’ in their ordinary and natural meaning canhave reference only to the time which was in contemplation when thedetection was made in contravention of the Ratnapura Order. Aspointed out by Kindersley, Vice-Chancellor, in Ellison v. Thomas (1862)l Ch. 867 at 869
“ The words ‘ for the time being ’ are capable of different interpre-tations, according to the context : for example, they might be usedwith a context shewing clearly that they were intended to point toone single period of time ; and a case was put of a person intending togive a promissory note to a company, and giving it to the secretary‘ for the time being ’ meaning clearly the person who appeared to bethe secretary at the particular time when the note became payable.It might be, according to the context, that the same words wouldapply to a succession of periods. Take the common case of a petitionfor payment of dividends to the rector of a certain parish ‘ for the timebeing ’, which, of course, would point, not to a single period, but asuccession of periods.”
In the context in which the words are used in the Ratnapura Order of19.9.62, it contemplated not only the Price Orders of the ColomboMunicipality which were in existence on the date when the RatnapuraOrder came into operation but any Price Orders fixing the price ofcommodities for the Colombo Municipality which were in force subsequentto that date. The Magistrate has misdirected himself in relating theRatnapura Order not to the time at which the sale in question and thedetection was made but to the date on which the Ratnapura Order waspublished in the Gazette, on which date the Colombo Order was obviouslynot in operation.
I am therefore of the view that the appeal is entitled to succeed. Iset aside the order of acquittal and direct that the accused be re-triedaccording to law.
Acquittal set aside.