043-NLR-NLR-V-73-THE-WOODEND-K.-V.-CEYLONRUBBER-AND-TEA-COMPANY-LTD-Appellant-and-THE-COMM.pdf
Woodcnd (K. V. Ceylon) Rubber and Tea
Company Ltd. v. Commisn'oixr of Inland Revenue
241
[Pkivy Council]
1970 Present: Lord Hodson, Lord Guest, Lord Donovan, Lord Wilberforceand Sir Gordon WiJlmerTHE WOODEND (Iv. V. CEYLON) RUBBER AND TEA COMPANYLTD., Appellant, and THE COMMISSIONER OFINLAND REVENUE, RespondentPrivy Council Appeal No. 39 of 196S
S.C. 3166—Income Tax Case Stated, BRA 1333
Income lax—Non-resident company—Remittances sent abroad by such company—Imposition of extra 33} per centum tax thereon—Validity—Double taxationrelief agreement of 1050 between United Kingdom and Ceylon—Articles I, VI,XVIII, XXI—Double Taxation (Relief) Act, No. 26 of 1950 (Cap. 244)—Scopeof rule Genornlio specialibus non derogant—Income Tax Ordinance, asamended by Act No. 13 of 1050, Chapter VIII A, ss. 53B (I), 53B(3),53C (1), 530(2), 53 D (1), 53 D (5), 53 D (6).
Tho provisions of section 53C (1) in Chapter VIIIA of the Income Tax Ordin-ance (as amended by Act No. 13 of 1939), in so far as thoy impose an additionaltax of 33} por centum on remittances sent abroad by a non-rosident companywhoso hoad office is in the United Kingdom, are not a broach of Articlo VI oftho doublo taxation relief agreement which was concluded between the UnitedKingdom and Ceylon in 1950 and confirmod by the Doublo Taxation (Relief)Act No. 20 of 1950. The additional tax cannot bo said to be “ taxationchargcnblo in connoction with or in liou of tho taxation of dividends ” or a“ tax in the nature of an undistributed profits tax on undistributed profits oftho company ” within tho moaning of thoso expressions in Article VI.
Although the additional tax is “ other taxation ’’ within the meaning ofArticlo XVIII of tho 1950 doublo taxation roliof agroomont and, thorofore,soction 53C of tho Income Tax Ordinance, ns amended by Act No- 13 of 1959, ispro tanto in conflict with tho 1950 agreomont, tho rulo Generalia specialibus nonderogant is not applicablo to tho interpretation of tho Inter 1959 Act. “ ThoirLordships aro unablo to find in tho 1959 Act or in the circumstances which boarupon tho presont problem any ovidenco sufficient to justify tho conclusion thatwhile soction 53 C usos tho goneral expression ‘ non-resident company ’ it mustnovortholoss bo construed as ombodying tho vory important oxclusion of thosenon-resident companies who wero within tho scopo of tho 1950 agroomont. Itsooms to thorn that tho gonoral words must rocoivo thoir full meaning. "
-A-PPEAL from a judgment of the Supremo Court reported in
(1067) 70 N. L. R. 294.F. N. Graliaen, Q.C., with //. ]V. Jai/ewardcne, Q.C., John A.Baker and Marcus-Jones, for tho assesscc-appcllant.
II. II. Monroe, Q.C., with P. Rowland and S. Pasupali, for therespondent.
Cur. adv. vuH.
lxxth—11
!• J 15927—2,255 (8/70)
242 I>ORD DOXOVAX—]Voodcnil (K. V. Ceylon) Rubber anti Tea
Company Lid. v. Commissioner of Inland Revenue
April 29, 1970. [Delivered by Lokd DoxovaxJ—
The appellant Company carries on and derives profit from anagricultural undertaking in Ceylon. The operations are, however,controlled from the United Kingdom where the company’s head office issituate. For the purpose of Ceylon income tax the company is thereforetreated in Ceylon as a non-resident-
Assessments to income tax were made upon it in Ceylon for the yearsof assessment 195S/59 to 1961/62 inclusive. Being aggrieved by theseassessments the company appealed against them to the Commissioner ofInland Revenue (" the Commissioner ”). He dismissed the appeal.
The company next appealed to the Board of Review which reversedthe Commissioner. He thereupon required t lie Board of Review to statea ease for the opinion of the Supreme Court of Ceylon. This being donethe case came before that Court in September 19G7 ; and in December 19G7judgment was delivered allowing the Commissioner’s apppeal. Againstthat decision the Company now appeals to the Board.
On 26th July 1950 the Governments of the United Kingdom andCeylon concluded a written agreement having as its object “ the avoidanceof double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respectto taxes on income”. This agreement (“the 1950 agreement”) wasof familiar pattern. It was designed to afford a measure of relief fromincome tax to residents of each of the contracting parties who might haveincome arising in the territory of the other. But for the agreementsuch residents might find themselves liable to income tax in full on thesame income in both countries. The precise way in which relief wasaccorded under the 1950 agreement is not material to this case. Normallyhowever one country allows its own subjects to set off against their taxbill the tax paid by them in the other country on the same income. The1950 agreement was to continue indefinitely, but either Governmentcould give written notice to terminate it but not before 30th June 1954.Article XXI provides that each country should take steps to give theagreement the force of law in its own Territory. Ceylon did this by theDouble Taxation (Relief) Act No. 26 of 1950 (“ the 1950 Act ”)'.
The following is an extract from the judgment of the Supreme Courtagainst which this appeal is brought:—
“ After the Kaldor Report was adopted with modifications inCeylon, the basis of taxation underwent radical changes. Profitstax was abolished and the simple provisions governing income tax,applicable both to persons and companies, gave way to a more sophis-ticated method of taxation and the Income Tax Ordinance (Cap. 242)was accordingly amended by Act No. 13 of 1959. So far as personsare concerned, the computation of taxation is based on family units:The husband, the wife, and four children are given certain units and theincome tax is based on slabs ranging according to the units. So far as
LORD DONOVAN—Woodcnd (K. V. Ceylon) Rubber and Tea 243
Company Ud. v. Commissioner of Inland Revenue
companies are concerned, the profits tax and all the provisions of theIncome Tax Ordinance under which companies were taxed earlier,were repealed and Chapter VIII A of the Income Tax Ordinance wasintroduced by the amending Act of 1959. ”
It is the appellant company’s case that the provisions of this amendingAct of 1959 (“ the 1959 Act ”) in so far as they relate to certain additionaltaxation imposed on non-resident companies such as itself, are a breachof either or both of two articles in the 1950 agreement, and arc thereforeto this extent contrary to the 1950 Act; that the assessments under appealwhich purport to be made under the authority of the 1959 Act andwhich impose this additional taxation upon it are accordingly excessive,and should be reduced.
The articles of the 1950 agreement alleged to be so infringed areArticles VI and XVIII. They read as follows :—
“ Article VI
Where a company which is a resident of one of the territories derivesprofits or income from sources within the other territory, there shallnot be imposed in that other territory any form of taxation on dividendspaid by the company to persons not resident in that other territory, orany form of taxation chargeable in connection with or in lieu of thetaxation of dividends, or any tax in the nature of an undistributedprofits tax on undistributed profits of the company, whether or notthose dividends or undistributed profits represent, in whole or In part,profits or income so derived.
Article XVIII
The residents of one of the territories shall not be subjectedin the other territory to any taxation or any requirement connectedtherewith which is other, higher or more burdensome than the taxationand connected requirements to which the residents of the latter territoryare or may be subjected.
The enterprises of one of the territories shall not be subjectedin the other territory, in respect of profits attributable to theirpermanent establishments in that other territory, to any taxationwhich is other, higher or more burdensome than the taxation towhich the enterprises of that other territory, and, in the case ofcompanies, to which enterprises of that other territory incorporatedin that other territory, are or may be subjected in respect of thelike profits.
In this Article the term ‘taxation’ means taxes of every kindand description levied on behalf of any authority whatsoever. ”
The remainder of the Article is not relevant to the present issues.
244 LORD DOXOVAX—IYoodcnd (K. V. Ceylon) Rubber and Tea
Company Lid. v. Commissioner of Inland Revenue
The provisions of the 1959 Act which are alleged to bo a breach ofthese two articles are contained in section 53C (l) which reads asfollows :—
“ 53C. (1) In respect of any year of assessment commencing on orafter April 1, 1958, the tax to which a non-resident company shall beliable—
shall, where there are remittances of such company in the
year preceding such year of assessment, consist of a-sum equalto 45 per centum, and an additional 6 per centum, of the taxableincome of such company for such year of assessment and asum which shall, if the aggregate amount of such remittances isless than one-third of such taxable income, be equal to 33} percentum of such aggregate amount, and, if such aggregate amountis not less than one-third of such ta xable income, be equal to 33.}per centum of one-third of such taxable income ; and
shall, where there are no such remittances, consist of a sum
equal to 45 per centum, and an additional 6 per centum, ofsuch taxable income. ”
Remittances are defined in subsection (2) of the section in the followingterms:—
“ (2) In sub-section (1), ' remittances with reference to a non-resident company, mean—
sums-remitted abroad out of the profits of that company,
such part of the proceeds of the sale abroad of products
exported by that company as is retained abroad, and
in respect of any products exported by that company and not
sold in a wholesale market or not sold at all, such part of theprofits deemed under section 38 to be derived from Ceylon as isretained abroad. ”
No objection is raised by the appellant company to the tax equal to45 per cent; of its taxable income, nor to the additional tax of 6 per cent,thereof. (The latter tax was preserved in the 1950 Agreement, since theshares of companies such as the appellant Company would not be movableproperty situate in Ceylon for the purposes of Ceylon Estate Duty.)The dispute is confined to the additional tax of 33} per cent, which ispayable when there are remittances in the j-ear preceding the year ofassessment. This further tax is alleged to be a tax “ in lieu of the taxationof dividends, or any tax in the nature of an undistributed profits tax onundistributed profits of the company " and its imposition a breach ofArticle VI of the 195Q agreement.
LORD DOXOVAN— Woodend (K. V. Ceylon) Rubber and Tea
Company Ltd. v. Commissioner oj Inland Revenue
245
Further, or alternatively, this additional tax is alleged to be other,higher or more burdensome than the taxation to which the enterprises ofCeylon aro subject, and its imposition a breach of Article XVIII of the1950 agreement.
To understand these contentions it is necessary to explain what incometax is imposed on resident companies in Ceylon. The relevant provisionsare also to be found in the 1959 Act. So far as here material they readthus :
'* 53B.(1) In respect of any year of assessment commencing on
or after April 1, 195S, the tax to which a company resident in Ceylonin the year preceding such year of assessment shall be liable 6hallconsist of—
(а)a sum equal to 45 per centum of the taxable income of such
company for such 3rear of assessment, and
(б)a sum equal to 33£ per centum of the aggregate amount of
the gross dividends distributed by such company out of theprofits on which the taxable income of such company iscomputed for such year of assessment:
53B.(3) In sub-section (I), 'amount of the gross dividends’ of a
company means the amount of the dividends before such deductionsa3 the company is entitled to make under this Ordinance for tax aremade from the dividends.
53D.(1) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (2) and sub-
section (3), every resident company shall be entitled to deduct, fromthe amount of any dividend which becomes payable during any yearof assessment commencing on or after April 1, 1959, to any shareholderin the form of money or of an order to pay money, tax equal to 33£per centum of such amount.
53D.(5) Every person who issues a warrant, cheque or other
order drawn or made in payment of any dividend which becomespayable by a resident company during any year of assessmentcommencing on or after April 1,1959, shall annex thereto a statementin writing showing—
the gross amount which after deduction of tax thereon
corresponds to the net amount actually paid ;
the sum deducted as tax ; and
tho net amount actually paid.
J 15927 (8/70)
240 LORD DOXOVAX—Woodcnd (K. V. Ceylon) Rubber and Tea
Company Ltd. v. Commissioner of Inland Revenue
(6) Where the assessable income of a person includes a dividendfrom a resident company in the form of money or of .an order to pay• money, he shall bo entitled, on production of a statement relating tosuch dividend made in accordance with sub-section (5), to a set-o/Tagainst the tax payablo by him of the amount of tax shown on suchstatement: ”
The company’s allegation of a breach of Article VI is met on theCommissioner’s behalf by an argument which may be summarised thus:There is no income tax in Ceylon charged on dividends declared bycompanies resident in Ceylon. Accordingly the additional tax payableby non resident companies when there have been remittances abroad isnot a tax “ in connection with or in lieu of the taxation of dividends ”for there is no Ceylon tax of which it could be "inlieu Nor is theadditional tax a tax on dividends or a tax in the nature of an undistributedprofits tax.
The rival contentions thus raise a question of the true construction ofthe provisions of. the 1959 Act set out above. Since those provide for(a) payment of additional tax when a resident Ceylon company declares-a dividend: (b) for the recoupment of that tax by the company by:.deduction at source on payment of tho dividend : and (c) for a set-off .',by the taxpayer against his own liability of tho tax so, dpdupte«J. it; is Veasy to regard the whole arrangement as the levying of tax on thedividends, and collection of that tax at source from the payer. This is,indeed, how the apjwllant company wishes the relevant legislation to bevconstrued : for Counsel on its behalf prayed in aid tho language used by-*Lord Simon in Allchin v. Coullhard x. In that case the liability to United.;Kingdom incomo tax on interest was concerned ; and the provisionswhereby the payer of interest deducted tho tax at source, and .in one way or another accounted for it to tho Crown wero treated *simj>Iy as machinery for tho easier collection of the tax. But inthe United Kingdom Income Tax legislation a direct charge to taxon interest is imposed on the recipient: and wero this so unders. 53B of the 1959 Act as regard dividends- declared by a Ceylon .resident company, the decision would bo in point. It is, however,not so. The extra tax of 33£ per cent, is a tax to which, thecompany is made liable when dividends have been distributed and is, asa matter of construction, a further tax on its profits additional to tho 45per cent. The dividend, in a sentence, is not the subject matter of theextra tax : but tho condition of its being levied; and this is so despite theprovisions for recoupment by the company of the tax, and the set-off bytho taxpayer. True it is, that tho financial effect of the whole operationi3 the same as it would have been if tho charge to tax had been directlyupon tho dividend, and the section had made this tax collectible by thocompany. But the financial effect of an operation is not necessarily
1 (1913) A. O. p. 607 at page 619.
liORD DONOVAN—TYoodcnd (K. V. Ceylon) Rubber and Tea 247
Company Ltd. v. Commissioner oj Inland Revenue
its legal effect. In their Lordships’ view' the legal effect is as aboveexpounded; and leads to the conclusion that the extra tax paid by anon-resident company in Cey-lon where it has made remittances abroadcannot be said to be '* taxation chargeable in connection with or in lieu ofthe taxation of dividends
Nor, in their opinion is it a " tax in the nature of an undistributed profitstax on undistributed profits of tho company Here again the languageof section 53C (1) makes it clear that the additional tax in question isnot a tax “ on ” tho remittances as such but on the company’s taxableincome whether distributed or not, albeit that the additional tax ismeasured according to the remittances. And, for what it is worth, thedefinition of “ remittances ” in s. 53C (2) shows that they may consistof other things than taxable profits.
It may well bo tho case that this additional tax was provided for havingregard to the circumstance that tho Ceylon legislature could not effectivelylevy a tax in respect of dividends received by non-resident shareholders ;but the arguments raised by the appellant company' in relation to ArticleVJ of tho 1950 agreement must be tested against tho true constructionof the relovant sections in the 1959 Act. Their Lordships’ conclusion isthat so tested the arguments fail.
Coming to Article XVIII, it will be convenient to consider first whetherthe additional income tax now in dispute is “ higher or more burdensome ”than tho taxation to which resident companies are subjected. TheSupreme Cour* of Ceylon treated this as raising a question of quantum ;and looked at agreed figi res showing what tax the appellant companywould have paid following tho distribution of the dividends it actuallypaid in the relevant years, had it been a company resident in Ceyloninstoad of being non-resident. On that footing the dividends would haveled to the company paying a further Rs. 159,5S0'00as tax upon its profitsfor the years of assessment under appeal. In fact as a non-resident'company the remittances it made led to an extra tax for these years oiRs. 35,893-00. Their Lordships see nothing wrong or unreasonable iatesting the matter in this way. The result is to negative the appellantcompany’s argument on this part of Article XVIII.
Is the additional tax of 33J per cent, which is leviable when remittancesare made by a non-resident company nevertheless “ other taxation ”within the meaning of that Article, bearing in mind that it defines“ taxation ” for the purpose of tho Article as meaning “ taxes of everykind and description…" Hero tho Supreme Court accepted theargument for the Commissioner that the extra tax levied on anon-resident where there had been remittances was still income tax andnothing else : that the resident companies were subjected to income taxand nothing else : and that accordingly there was no “ other taxation ”in sight, despite any differences in the measures of liability which theremight be as between residents and non-residents.
2<S LORD DONOVAN'— Woodcnd (K. V. Ceylon) Rubber and Tea
Company Ltd. t). Commissioner of Inland Revenue
This argument succeeded in the Supremo Court, but their Lordshipshave come to the conclusion that it involves too narrow a construction ofthe Article.
The first Article of the 1950 agreement provides that the taxes whichare its subject matter are income tax (including surtax and the profits tax)levied in the United Kingdom and income tax and profits tax levied inCeylon. Profits Tax was ended by section 33 of the 1959 Act as fromApril let 1958; and thenceforward the Ceylon tax with which the 1950agreement was alone concerned for the purposes of relief was income tax.To speak in tins context of “ other ” taxation must, so it would seem totheir Lordships, at least include some income tax other than the incometax to which resident companies are subjected. Resident companies arenot subjected to additional income tax simply because they make remit-tances abroad. Non-resident companies are so subjected; and it seemsto their Lordships more appropriate to the purpose of the 1950 agreementto construe this additional tax which is special to non-resident companiessb “ other ” taxation within the meaning of Article XVIII. It followsthat in their view section 53C of tho 1959 Act is pro lanlo in conflictwith the 1950 agreement.
What consequence follows ? For the appellant company it is said thatthe 1950 Act must prevail. Generaiia specialibus non derogant. For the‘ Commissioner it is contended that the proper conclusion to be drawnis that any part of the 1950 Act which is inconsistent with the 1959 Actmust be regarded as being impliedly repealed by the latter. The rulefor resolving Buch a conflict i3 well settled.
“ . . . where there are general words in a later Act capable ofreasonable and sensible application without extending them to subjectsspecially dealt with by earlier legislation, you are not to. holdthat earlier, and special legislation indirectly repealed, altered, orderogated from merely by force of such general words, without anyindication of a particular intention to do so.”
(Per Lord Selbome in The Vera Cruz 10 A. C. 59 at p.68.)
If, however, " the provisions of a later enactment are so inconsistentwith or repugnant to the provisions of an earlier one that the two cannotstand together, the earlier is abrogated by the later ” (Maxwell onInterpretation of Statutes 12th edition, p. 193, et seq. and cases therecited).
The rule is more easy to state than it is, on occasions, to apply : for inalmost all cases the later statute will contain general words inconsistentwith the words of the special statute—otherwise there would be noproblem. In Sinclair v. Cadbury Bros.1 a statute of Charles II exemptingcertain lands from all manner of taxes thereafter to be .imposed by1 18 Tax Cases 1S7; 140 L. T. 412.
LORD DOKOVAN— Woodervd (K. V. Ceylon) Rubber and Tea
Company Ltd. v. Commissioner of Inland Revenue
249
Parliament or otherwise was treated as prevailing against theall-embracing language of the later Income Tax Acts which laid a taxupon “ the property in all lands tenements hereditaments and heritages inthe United Kingdom Indeed this was admitted by the InlandRevenue : though it is difficult to conceive an instance where a laterenactment was more " inconsistent with or repugnant to ” theprovisions of an earlier.
In the present case the 1950 agreement prohibits “other taxation, etc.”.The 1959 Act imposes such “ other taxation ” under section 53C. Againthe inconsistency or repugnancy could not be more complete. Are therohowever other considerations which, when taken into account, tilt thebalance in favdur of the view that the 1950 Act should neverthelessprevail ? The agreement to which it gave the force of law was to“ continue in effect indefinitely If either of the contracting•Governments wished to end it, it was to give written notice to the otherbefore 30th June in any calendar year not earlier than the year 1954.(Article XXI.) This procedure was not followed in 1959. The 1950agreement concerned Ceylon and the United Kingdom alone : and theirLordships were informed at the Bar that there were other countries withwhom in 1959 there were no similar agreements. So that the generalwords of the Act of 1959 could be given effect by confining them to thenon-resident companies in Ceylon whose residence was in those othercountries. The 1950 Act was expressly repealed in Ceylon but not till1963.
On the other hand, in a radical change of the taxation system such astook place in Ceylon in 1959, under which resident companies, in additionto the 45 per cent, tax on their profits, became liable to a further taxthereon equal to 33$ per cent., of the gross dividend distributed, it is notsurprising to find an additional tax also laid on the profits of non-residentconcerns if they made remittances abroad. What would perhaps besurprising would be an intention to exempt from this additional tax thenon-residents of one country with extensive commercial interests inCeylon.
A similar problem was considered by the House of Lords in InlandRevenue Commissioners v. Collco Dealing Ltd.* There a double taxationrelief agreement had been concluded between the United Kingdom andthe Republic of Eire, and was confirmed by the Income Tax Act of 1952.By a later enactment—Finance (No. 2) Act, 1955, section 4 (2)—repayments of income tax were denied to “ a person entitled under anyenactment to an exemption from Income Tax ” where certain definedcircumstances existed. A company resident in Eire claimed thatnotwithstanding the existence of such circumstances in its own case, itwas entitled to repayment of tax under the Income Tax Act of 1952, on
1 {1962) A. O. I.
250 LORD DOXOVA24—Woodend (K. V. Ceylon) Rubber and Tea
Company Ltd. v. Commissioner of Inland Revenue
the ground that the later enactment must bo regarded as leaviilg suchentitlement unaffected. The House of Lords held otherwise,': LordRadcliflfe saying:-r
” The only one of the appellant’s contentions that appeared; to moto have any plausibility was that which sought to restrict the apparentrange of section 4 (2) of the Finance (No. 2) Act, 1955, by the argumentthat, if applied to persons enjoying exemption as being resident inEire but not also in the United Kingdom, it would contradiet theprovisions of the inter-govcrnracntal agreements about double taxationbetween the two countries. It is no doubt true that statutory .wordsapparently unlimited in scope may be given a restricted field ofapplication if there is admissible ground for importing 6uch arestriction: and the consideration that, if not construed in someunlimited sense, they would amount to a breach of international lawis well recognised as such a ground. But a supposed intention not to-depart from observance of the comity of nations is a much vaguercriterion by which to determine the range of a statute ; and when thedeparture consists in no more than a provision inconsistent with aninter governmental agreement about taxation, which by its own termsis subordinated to the approval of the respective legislatures of thecountries concerned and persists only so long as its terms aremaintained in force by those legislatures, I think that there is no-useful aid at all to be obtained from this principle of interpretation.The principle depends wholly on the supposition of a particularintention in the legislature, and I do not think that in the case before-us there is any reason to make the supposition which is suggested.”
The fact that in this case the later enactment was passed in order tofrustrate the abuse represented by “ dividend stripping ” can make no.difference to the question of construction.
Their Lordships have not found this question easy to resolve in' thepresent case. In the end it is whether the Ceylon legislature must,have-intended the expression “ non-resident company ’’ in section 53C (i) ofthe 1959 Act to apply to all non-resident companies or to be exclusiveof those to whom the 1950 agreement applied. In reaching a decisiontheir Lordships have borne in mind that, as already stated, the 1959 Actwas a Statute of very comprehensive character introducing a number ofradical changes in the taxation laws of Ceylon. It is unlikely that inthe course of preparing 6uch a measure agreements such as the 1950-agreement would have been completely overlooked: and it may well be-that the legislature considered that the provisions of the 1959 Act.ifgiven their full literal meaning would not be repugnant to the 1959 Act—’as indeed the Supreme Court have held in this case.
Such a view would, of course,, have, a bearing on the legislature’s,intention. But leaving aside all speculation on this point, their Lordshipsare unable to find in the 1959 Act or in the circumstances which bear
Namasivayam v. Httn Banda
2S1
upon the present problem any evidence sufficient to justify the conclusionthat while section 53G uses the general expression “ non-residentcompany ” it must nevertheless bo construed a3 embodying the veryimportant exclusion of those non-resident companies who were withinthe scope of the 1950 .agreement. It seems to them that the general wordsmust receive their full meaning.
An argument was addressed to the Board by junior Counsel for theCommissioner to the effect that the 1950 Act upon its true constructionnever at any time gave the force of law to Articles VI and XVIII of the1950 agreement since these articles did not provide “ for relief fromincome tax or profits tax or for charging the profits or income arisingfrom sources in Ceylon to persons not resident in Ccj lon ” (Sec section2 (1) 1950 Act.) This argument, which was not advanced in the SupremeCourt of Ceylon, was based upon an interpretation of the two Articleswhich their Lordships find altogether too superficial. Thc3r accordinglyreject it.
In the result however they will for the reasons earlier indicated humblyadvise Her Majesty that the appeal should bo dismissed. The appellantmust pay the costs of the appeal.
Appeal dismissed.