BASNAYAKJ3 J.—Thomas v. Ceylon Wharfage Co., Ltd.
1948Present :Basnayake J.
THOMAS, Appellant, and CEYLO'N WHARFAGE CO., LTD.,
S. C. 151—Workmen’s Compensation Appeal C 30/6102/46.
Workmen's Compensation—Appeal—Point of law only—Must point of law becertified t—Criminal Procedure Code, section 340—Workmen's CompensationOrdinance, sections 48 and 51.
The effect of section 51 of the Worknum’s Compensation Ordinance is tomake the provisions of section 340 of the (Criminal Procedure Code applicableto appeals under that Ordinance.
y^PPEAL under the Workmen’s Com] pensation Ordinance.
H. Wanigatunga. for the appellant.
W. Fernando, for the respondent.
Cur. adv, puli.
June 22, 1948. Basnayake J.—
This is an appeal under the Workmen's i Compensation Ordinance(hereinafter referred to as the Ordinance) by the injured, workman.Under section 48 of that Ordinance an appeal lies on a point of lay? only.Learned counsel for the respondent submits tbia t, in the petition of appeal,the point of law is not stated and certified :in. the manner required bysection 340 (2) of the Criminal Procedure Code (hereinafter referred toas the Code). He therefore asks that the appeal be rejected. Ifsection 340 (2) of the Code applies to an appeal under section 48 of theOrdinance, learned counsel’s contention is entitled to succeed.
Appeals to this Court under the Ordinance sire regulated by Part Xthereof. Section 48 (1) of the Ordinance g;ivas the right of appeal on apoint of law, but it does not say how that rig ht in to be exercised. Section49 contemplates the existence of a petition oif appeal, for it providesthat every petition of appeal should bear umcancelled stamps to thevalue of Rs. 5 and should be filed in the Supreme. Court within a peripdof thirty days reckoned from the date of the order against which theappeal is preferred. There is no special provision in the Ordinanceitself which prescribes how the petition o:f appeal should be drawn upand authenticated, but section 51 declares t hat- subject to the provisions-of Part X of the Ordinance, the provisio ns of Chapter XXX of theCode shall apply muXatis mutandis, in reg; ird to all matters connectedwith the hearing and disposal of an appeal p referred under section 48.
BASNAYAKE J.—Thomas v. Ceylon Wharfage Co., Ltd.
The question is whether the words “ in regard to all matters connectedwith the hearing and disposal of an appeal ’ ’ are wide enough to makesection 340 of the Code applicable. The words are in my view wide andfar-reaching. It would appear from the observations of Clauson L.J.in the case of University Motors Ltd. v. Barrington 1, that the word“hearing” is itself an expression susceptible of a very wide meaningin certain contexts. The remarks of Lord Sclbome in Green v. LordPenzance 2 illustrate the wide scope of the expression. He says :
“ There are various things to be done by him under the Act beforethe hearing and preparatory to it; orders as to evidence, ordersas to attendance of witnesses, notices, orders for the production ofdocuments. Technically those are not a part of the hearing, butI entertain no doubt whatever that those things and every otherthing, preliminary- and antecedent to the hearing, are covered byand are included in the authority to ‘ hear ’, which I consider meansto hear and finally- determine ‘ the matter of the representation ’which I consider to be equivalent to the cause,—the whole matter.Those antecedent things are in my- judgment within that authority,and the ‘ hearing ’ within the meaning of these words does not appearto me to terminate till the whole matter is disposed of; therefore itincludes not only the necessary antecedents, but also the necessary orproper consequences .”
In the present context the word “ hearing ” which by- itself is capableof including “ not only the necessary- antecedents, but also the necessaryor proper consequences ” is further enlarged by the words “ all mattersconnected with ”. These words have the effect of extending the scopeof the expression “ hearing ” 3. They are in my view designedly used bythe Legislature so as to apply all such provisions of Chapter XXX of theCode as ar e necessary for the proper presentation and hearing of an appealunder the Ordinance. Any other construction would be an unduerestriction of the scope of section 51. There is nothing in the Ordinanceto indicate that the Legislature intended that the lay appellant shouldperform the well-nigh impossible task of formulating, for the decision ofthis Court, points of law arising in his case. A petition of appeal undersection 48 of the Ordinance should in my opinon not only contain astatement of the matters of law to be argued but it also must bear acertificate by an advocate or proctor that such matter of law is a fitquestion for adjudication by the Supreme Court. An appeal under theCode on a matter of law- which does not comply with the requirements ofsection 340 (2) cannot be entertained unless the case is one that falls underthe proviso to the section. This appeal does not conform with therequirements of the Code and must therefore be rejected.
H1939) 1 All E. R. 630, at 632.*L. R.6 App. Cos. 657.
3 Re Davies (1932) 49 T. L. R. 5.