TIKIRI BANDA DULLEWE, Appellant, and PADMA RUKMANI DULLEWE and another, Respond

067-NLR-NLR-V-71-TIKIRI-BANDA-DULLEWE-Appellant-and-PADMA-RUKMANI-DULLEWE-and-another-Respond.pdf


LORD HODSON—Dullewe v. Dullewe
280
[Privy Council]
1968 PresentLord Hodson, Lord Guest, Lord Upjohn,Lord Donovan and Sir Thaddeus McCarthyTIKIRI BANDA DULLEWE, Appellant, and PADMA RUKMANIDULLEWE and another, Respondents
Pbivy Council Appeal No. 24 of 1967
S. C. 391/63—D. C. Kandy, 5765/L
Kandyan Law Declaration and Amendment Ordinance (Cap. 59)—Sections 4 and 5—Deed of gift—Mode of renouncing the right to cancel or revoke the gift—Requirement of a special clause of renunciation—Effect of words "as agift irrevocable ”.– * –
Held (Lord Donovan dissenting), that where the right.to revoke a Kandyandeed of gift executed after the commencement of the Kandyan Law Declarationand Amendment Ordinance of 1939 is renounced by the Donor, therenunciation is not. valid unless the Deed expressly contains a special clauseof renunciation expressed in the particular manner stated in section 5(1) (d) ofthe Kandyan Law Declaration and Amendment Ordinance. There should- be a declaration containing a transitive verb as opposed to an adjectivaldescription of the gift as irrevocable. Accordingly, the words "as a giftirrevocable ” in a deed of gift do not satisfy the condition for irrevocabilityprescribed by the section ; such a gift is subsequently revocable by theDonor.
Punchi Banda tv Nagasena (64 N. L. R. 548) overruled.
.A.PPEAL from a judgment of the Supreme Court.
E. F. N. Oratiaen, Q.C., with D. C. Amerasinghe, for the defendant-appellant.*
8. Nadesan, Q.C., with John Baker, for the plaintiffs-respondents. .
Gur. adv. 'mU.
December 4, 1968.(Majority Judgment delivered by Lord Hodson)—
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court of Ceylondismissing the appeal of the appellant from the District Court ofKandy.
The case concerns a Deed of Gift (No. 183) dated 26th May 1941,whereby the Donor Tikiri Banda Dullewe made a gift of certain lands tohis son Richard.
25 – PP 006137 (98/08)
290
LORD HODSON—Dvllewt v. Dullewe
The material words following the recitals are :
“ Now know ye and these presents witness that the said Donor inconsideration of the love and affection which he has unto the said …Richard Dullewe (hereinafter sometimes called the said Donee) andfor diverse other good causes and considerations him hereunto speciallymoving doth hereby grant, convey, assign, transfer, set over andassure unto the said Donee as a gift irrevocable but subject to thecondition hereinafter contained.
All those premises in the Schedule hereto of the value of Rupees tenthousand (Re. 10,000/-) only.
To have and to hold the said lands and premises hereby conveyedunto the said Donee subject to the condition that the said Doneeshall not sell, gift, mortgage or otherwise alienate or encumberj thesaid premises (but may lease the said premises for a period not overfive years) and after his death the same shall devolve absolutely onhis legal issue and in the event of his dying without legal issue thepremises shall devolve absolutely on … Tikiri Banda Dullewe.”
It is to be noticed the gift of the lands effected by this deed wasexpressed to be irrevocable although subject to a condition as expressed.The gift was perfected by acceptance and was properly described as a“ Kandyan ” gift. No question arises as to its validity.
The Donor however by Deed No. 9048 dated 26th October 1943 didpurport to revoke the deed of gift in respect of the lands and on thesame date purported to convey them to the appellant.
The action was instituted by the first respondent appearing by her nextfriend the second respondent on 18th May 1959 praying for a declarationof title to the lands. Her claim restedipon the deed of gift of 26th May1941. The first respondent is the only child of Richard (the Donee) whodied in May 1943 and having come of age is the effective respondent to' the appeal.
The appellant’s claim rests on the deed of purported revocation executedby the Donor on 26th October 1943 and the conveyance to him by theDonor on the same date.
The Supreme Court, confirming the District Court, followed a previousdecision of its own in Punchi Banda v. Nagasena1. The effect of the latterdecision was that the use of the word “ irrevocable ” in a deed of giftwas sufficient to constitute an express renunciation of the right tt)revoke the gift.
1 (J963) 64 N. L. ft. 546.
291
LORD HODSON—Duttetm v. Dullewe
The determination of the question under appeal depends mainlyupon the true construction of the Kandyan Law Declaration andAmendment Ordinance (Cap. 69 of 1939) which so far as material readsis follows:
“ 4.(1) Subject to the provisions and exceptions hereinafter
contained, a donor may, during his lifetime and without the' consentof the Donee or of any other person, cancel or revoke in whole or inpart any gift, whether made before or after the commencement of thisOrdinance, and such gift and any instrument effecting the same shallthereupon become void and of no effect to the extent set forth in theinstrument of cancellation or revocation :
Provided that the right, title, or interest of any person in anyimmovable property shall not, if such right, title, or interest hasaccrued before the commencement of this Ordinance, be affected or.prejudiced by reason of the cancellation or revocation of the gift toany greater extent than it might have been if this Ordinance had not .been enacted.
No such cancellation or revocation of a gift effected after thecommencement of this Ordinance shall be of force or avail in lawunless it shall be effected by an instrument in writing declaring thatsuch gift is cancelled or revoked and signed and executed by theDonor or by some person lawfully authorised by him in accordancewith the provisions of the Prevention of Frauds Ordinance or ofthe Deeds and Documents (Execution before Public Officers)Ordinance.
6. (1) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 4 (1), it shall notbe lawful for a donor to cancel or revoke any of the following giftswhere any such gift is made after the commencement of thisOrdinance:
(а)any gift by virtue of which the property… shall vest in thetrustee … of a temple …
(б)any gift in consideration of .. . marriage .. .
any gift creating or effecting a charitable trust.. .
any gift, the right to cancel or revoke which shall have beenexpressly renounced by the Donor, either in the instrumenteffecting that gift or in any subsequent instrument, by a decla-ration containing the words * I renounce the right to revoke ’ orwords of substantially the same meaning or, if the language ofthe instrument be not English, the equivalent of those words inthe language of the instrument:
Provided that a declaration so made in any such subsequentinstrument shall be of no force or effect unless such instrumentbears stamps to the value of five rupees and is executed in
202
LORD HODSON—Duttewe v. Dutlewe
accordance with the provisions of the Prevention of FraudsOrdinance or of the Deeds and Documents (Execution beforePublic Officers) Ordinance.
(2) Nothing in this section shall affect or be deemed to affect
the revocability of any gift made before the commencement of this
Ordinance.”
, In order to construe the language of 5 (1) which relates to gifts madeafter the commencement of the Ordinance it is necessary to appreciatewhat the legal position of gifts was in Kandy before the passing of theOrdinance.
Their Lordships have been referred to the authoritative Treatise onthe Laws and Customs of the Sinhalese including the portion stillsurviving under the name Kandyan Law by the late Dr. Hayley.
From this it appears, and the contrary was not argued, that Sinhaleseconveyances of land had the curious characteristic of revocability. Thischaracteristic of revocability is not peculiar to the Sinhalese law: forexample in the laws of Babylonia the right to reclaim property alienatedwas well established.
Although exceptions to the general rule have been recognised indecisions of the courts the opinion Of Dr. Hayley was that it wouldseem that Sinhalese law proper, unaffected by European ideas or judicialdecisions knew nothing of renunciation but permitted revocation inevery case with the exceptions perhaps of dedications to religiousestablishments.
The Convention of 1815, by which the Kingdom of Kandy was joinedto the rest of Ceylon, did not contemplate any departure from the strictenforcement of the Kandyan customs and usages otherwise than underlegislative sanction.
A proclamation of 14th July 1821 recognised the existence of the rightto repurchase in some of the Kandyan provinces and declared that allsales of land should be final and conclusive, and neither the seller norhis heirs should have any right to repurchase unless an express stipulationto that effect were contained in the deed.
By abolishing the right of revocation in the case of sale alone the rightin other cases was impliedly preserved.
Prior to 1815 a clause of renunciation appears to have been rare ornon-existent. An examination of the actual grants contained in theCentral Province Gazeteer between 1620 and 1830 shows no -example%of a clause of renunciation as such. The existence of any rule of lawat that time based upon such a clause is therefore highly improbable.
LORD HODSON—Dullewe v. DuUewe
293
The limitation of the exception to a gift in favour of religiousestablishments to which Dr. Hayley referred was not universallyaccepted. According to Armour, one of the institutional writers, otherdeeds came within the exception and were irrevocable.
It was in dealing with exceptions that uncertainty was created byvarious decisions of the courts and in 1927 the Kandyan Law Commis-sion was appointed to deal with the matter in view of the doubts whichhad arisen.
This Commission in 1935 issued the report which their Lordships havelooked at in order to see what the position was leading up to the passingof the Kandyan Law Declaration and Amendment Ordinance (Cap. 59of 1939).
Paragraph 44 which dealt With the revocability of deeds of gift reads :“ Although the general rule was that all deeds of gift were revocable bythe grantor in his lifetime, this rule seems to have had certain exceptionsand it is in laying down what the exceptions were that great difficulty, notto say some confusion, has arisen owing to the very indefinite state intowhich the law drifted as a result of the construction of deeds of gift,the language of which lent itself to different interpretations.”
It was in the light of the findings in this paragraph that therecommendations which led to the passing of the Ordinance weremade.
It should be noted that this report is looked at not to ascertain theintention of the words used in the subsequent act but because, to quoteand adopt the words of Lord Halsbury L. C. in Eastman PhotographicMaterials Company v. Comptroller-General of Patents, Designs, andTrade-Marks l, “ no more accurate source of information as to what wasthe evil or defect which the Act of Parliament now under construction wasintended to remedy could be imagined than the report of thatcommission
An authoritative review of many of these early authorities iscontained in the recent case, decided in 1967, of W. f?. W. M. TikiriBandara and another v. P. Gunawardena2. This judgment of theSupreme Court given on appeal from a judgment of the District Court,Ratnapura, concerned a Kandyan deed of gift dated 1915 and accordinglynot governed by the Kandyan Law Declaration and AmendmentAct of 1939. The gift was in terms declared to be “absolute andirrevocable, which shall not be revoked at any time in any mannerwhatsoever ”.
» 1898 A. C. 571, 575.
* 11967) 70 N. L. R. 203.
294
LOBD HODSON—Dullewt v. Dtdlewe
Tambiah J. with whom Sirimane J. agreed concluded his judgment bythe words following :
"… the case law on this matter is of a conflicting nature, but fromthe medley of conflicting decisions a clear principle has emergedwhich has been enunciated by the Full Bench of this Court. Thisprinciple may be formulated as follows : If in a Kandyan deed ofgift it iB stated that the deed is irrevocable and the clause containingirrevocability is not dependent on any. condition, then such a deedcannot be revoked. This salutary principle, which has been laiddown by the Full Bench, had been followed in a long line of decisionsand should not be departed from in the interests of ensuring thevalidity of title based on Kandyan deeds of gift. It is settled principlethat a long established rule affecting title to property should not beinterfered with by this Court. In the instant case the deed of donationcomes within this rule. The deed clearly states that it will not berevoked at any time and for any reason.”
If the deed in the instant case fell to be construed in accordance withthe pro-1939 law it would no doubt properly be construed, notwith-standing the condition to which the description of the gift as irrevocableis subject, as equivalent to a renunciation of the right to revoke.
Similarly if there were a long line of decisions to the same effect inrelation to deeds subject to the Kandyan Law Declaration and Amend-ment Ordinance of 1939, it would not be desirable to depart therefrom forobvious reasons since many titles to property may be affected.
Since the passing of the Ordinance of 1939, however, it cannot besaid that there is a consistent current of authority , in relation to suchdeeds.
• In the instant case Punchi Banda v. Nagasena (supra) was followed bythe Supreme Court and in another case decided by the Supreme Court,Kuruppu v. Dingiri Menika (S. C. 161/62 (F)—D. C. Kandy 6442—S. C.Minutes of 5.12.1963) the same interpretation was given. On the otherhand in the District Court Kurunegala Case No. 10580 and in DistrictCourt Ratnapura Case No. 1317 the respective courts have held that theexpression “as a gift absolute and irrevocable ” does not constitute asufficient compliance with the requirements of the section. Both of thesecases were taken on appeal to the Supreme Court and the. appeals weredismissed without reasons given, the former on 11th October 1956 and thelatter on 16th September, 1960.—
The maxim “ contemporanea ezpositio est optima et fortisaima in lege ”gives no assistance in this state of the authorities and it is necessary toexamine the language of the Ordinance of 1939 with care for it is uponthe language of the Ordinance that the answer to the question whetherthe purported revocation of the deed of gift 26th May 1941 is bad
LORD HODSON—Dulietve v. Dullewe
285
and ineffectual in law depends. The Ordinance permits revocation of anygift when the light to cancel or revoke shall have been expressly renouncedby the Donor. These words recognise a pre-existing right to revoke andrequire an express renunciation either in the instrument effecting the giftor in any subsequent instrument. There is a further requirement that therenunciation must be effected in a particular way videlicet by a declarationcontaining the words “ I renounce the right to revoke ** or words ofsubstantially the same meaning. The inverted commas draw attention tothe words to be used. The exact words need not be used but if they arenot used, words of substantially the same meaning are required. Thisalternative leaves no room for departure from the essential requirementof a declaration containing a transitive verb as opposed to an adjectivaldescription of the gift as irrevocable which is apt to describe what hasbeen done already. Their Lordships cannot wholly agree with theanalysis of Sansoni J. with which L. B. de Silva J. agreed appearing inPunchi Banda?8 case {supra) at page 550. He set out the requirementsof the Ordinance as follows :
A renunciation of the right to revoke
which is express
made by the Donor in a declaration
containing the words “ I renounce the right to revoke ” or words of
substantially the same meaning.
He added however these words “ The fourth requirement seems tobe merely illustrative of the other three. ”
This would appear to be to place too little significance upon the fourthrequirement having regard to the long legal history of Kandyan deeds ofgift and the doubts which had arisen as to their revocability prior to theappointment of the Kandyan Law Commission.
An indication that the distinction between an express clause of renun-ciation and an unambiguous adjective such as “ irrevocable ” wasrecognised as a real one in the courts is to be found in an authoritymuch relied upon by the respondent namely Ukku Banda v. Paulis Singhoet al1. In this case, decided some years before the Kandyan Law Com-mission reported, the Supreme Court held that a Kandyan deed of giftwas irrevocable since it contained the words “ absolute and irrevocable ”attaching to the gift and a declaration that the Donee should have theproperty “ absolutely and forever
It was argued successfully by counsel in support of the irrevocability ofthe deed that there was no need for a special clause of renunciation.
Now, however, the words of the Ordinance do require that which mayfairly be described as a special clause of renunciation. The renunciationis to be expressed and not to be implied and a description of a. gift asirrevocable does no more than imply the renouncing-of an existing right
c. » (1926) 27 N. L. R. 449.
296
LORD HODSON—Dtdlewe v. Dtdlewe
to renounce. The requirement of an express renunciation stands in theway of the acceptance of an interpretation of the words used in this case,to all intents and purposes the same words as those used in the UkkuBanda case {supra), so as to produce the result that the Donor has alreadyeffectively renounced his right to revoke.
Prior to the passing of the Ordinance, gifts being treated as contracts,the courts looked at the intention of the parties as expressed in deedsby which the gifts were effected. ' Judicial decisions appear to have beeninfluenced in some cases by the English doctrine of consideration.
Now the position has changed.
In construing the Ordinance it is necessary to consider whether itsrequirements have been complied, with irrespective of the intention whichcan be found on a reading of the original document. The intention mayhave been to give up the right to revoke but this is riot the same asexpress revocation of an existing right. The requirements of theOrdinance have not, in the opinion of their Lordships, been compliedwith._
An alternative submission, not made in the courts below, was raisedin the appellant’s'* case and can be stated shortly. It was that therenunciation of the right of revocation was made by the Donor andaccepted by the original Donee alone. The first respondent wasaccordingly not intended to be benefited by the revoked gift and the giftto her as fidei commissary stands.
This argument depends on a severance of the gift so as to separatethe gift to the Donee as fiduciary from that to the fidei commissary.
This separation of gifts is not self-evident on the construction of thedeed of 1941.
*
Their Lordships express no concluded opinion on this alternativesubmission since the appellant did not pursue the point in argumenthaving regard to the judgment of the Board in United Marketing Go.v. Kara1. Their Lordships there expressed their adherence to theguidance given by Lord Birkenhead L.C. in North Staffordshire RailwayCo. v. Edge i.
Even where a bare question of law only is involved their Lordshipsare seldom ready to undertake decisions which may be of'the highestimportance without having received any assistance at all from the judgesin the courts below. In this case as in Kara’s case (supra) the alternativesubmission cannot be said to be so clearly right that the contrary viewis unarguable.—
Upon the ground of appeal to which their Lordships have previouslyreferred namely failure to comply with the Ordinance of 1939 they -willhumbly advise Her Majesty that the appeal be allowed, the Decrees ofthe Supreme Court of 3rd December 1965 and of the District Court of
(1920) A. C. 254, 263.
1 (1963) 1 W. L. R. 523.
LORD DONOVAN^DuBetoe v.Dulltw
PiMU vawj—x/uueuw v. isuucwe. ; * • j- V: v* ^•.
r-' -■>.». — :—■-■■ rrrr^T " ' "4?.V'’ . —■*-*/.:
: – ^ j -*j.*‘ji . rnLw*
9th September 1963 set aside and the respondenta* actiondismissed,. The'
respondent must pay the appellant’s -costs pf; this appeal land of; the.',proceedings inthe..TOu^;befow.;:. •,t: O'.v: ' '.'W"•'• ' yir: S,l A : *.
*•. pi. • • * p _• L 1. •
(Dissenting Judgment by Lord Donovan)
This appeal raises a short point of construction first of section 5 (1) (d)of the Kandyan Law Declaration and Amendment Ordinance of 1939,and secondly of the deed of gift of 26th May 1941;
Section 5 (1) (d) was enacted following a report of the Kandyan LawCommission in 1935 which referred to uncertainty in the existing law asto how a donor’s right to revoke a gift could be effectively renounced.Omitting immaterial words it reads:.
“ … it shall not be lawful for a donor to cancel or revoke anyof the following gifts where any such gift is made after the commence-ment of this Ordinance.
(a)(*)(c)(d) any gift the right to cancel or revoke which shall have beenexpressly renounced by the donor, either in the instrumenteffecting that gift, or in any subsequent instrument, by adeclaration containing the words * 1 renounce the right torevoke’ or words of substantially the same meaning/.;… ’’
The alternative thus indicated clearly connotes some words which are .not a repetition of the formula but the mearnng of which is ms ho materialsense different. Nor need they begin;■with the^ wor^ “T dec^m in .;order to be a “ Declaration ”—a term wfifch-mdudeh; s^teiheht -or' an Cassertion.'S- v‘>*::3r% :>V:. '.
The Deed itself is a gift of certain-lands ; and the DonoraVers fchathe v“ doth hereby grant, convey, assign, transfer, '8et';overj'^d’amuze-^^;-:.the said Donee as a gift irrevocable ” the said lands., ;;
The question is whether the words “ as a gift irrevocable; ’V^tisf^the.
The Supreme Court of Ceylon, affirming the decision of the District Courtof Kandy; has held that they do.
Various arguments were adduced against this view. The word“ irrevocable ” it was said was simply a statement of intention and nomore. In fact it is a statement of the kind of gift the Donor is presentlymaking, and he is proclaiming that it is of the kind that to be irrevocable.Next it was argued that the formula ^prescribed by section 5 (1) (d)
298
LORD DONOVAN—Dullewe v. Dullewe
contains a transitive verb (“ renounce ”j and an object of that verb(“ the right to revoke ”) and that other words cannot have substantiallythe same meaning unless they also possess these features. I find thisargument of no weight when the Ordinance itself sanctions the use of otherwords provided they are of substantially the same meaning. It wasfurther contended that if the Ordinance had intended to make effectivea simple statement in the deed of gift that it was irrevocable, it wouldsurely have done so. The implication to be drawn is that the legislatureintended some more different and more formal declaration. Thisargument is double-edged. One of the reasons for the Ordinancewas the previously existing confusion as to what words wouldamount to irrevocability and which would not. So that if adonor -did not use some expression containing the actual word“ irrevocable ”, arguments would still be open that the words he had usedmeant the same thing : and a provision such as is suggested might haveraised as many problems as it solved. I can well understand the legis-lature in these circumstances taking the alternative course of prescribinga set formula, and adduced that words of substantially the same meaningwould do. Furthermore, since there were decisions prior to the Ordinancein which a simple declaration of irrevocability was held by the SupremeCourt to be sufficient, the expectation is that had the legislature wished toprovide otherwise it would have said so.
The Donor here has expressly indicated that the lands were to be“ a gift irrevocable ”. The word “ irrevocable ” means “ not capable ofrevocation ” ; and the capacity to revoke obviously depends upon theexistence of a right to do so. One may therefore ask, “ Who couldrevoke the gift in the ordinary way ” or “ In whom would such rightordinarily exist ”? The answer of course is the Donor himself. Whentherefore he uses a word which indicates that the gift is not to becapable of revocation, he is saying that he shall not enjoy the rightto revoke which he would otherwise possess. In other words he isrenouncing that right. He is not using words which “ substantially ”mean the same thing as the prescribed formula, but exactly the samething. True, the Ordinance requires that whatever words are used theright shall be “expressly” renounced. The words “as a gift irrevocable”are express.
It follows that in my opinion the judgment appealed from iscorrect. But even if I had some doubt upon the matter I should beaverse from disturbing it, having regard to the legal history behind thecontroversy.
In Kirikenaya v. Jotiya1 a Kandyan deed of gift dated in 1908 containeda declaration by the Donor that “ I shall not revoke this deed of gift atany time . .. . ” In 1920, however, she purported to do so. I washeld by the Supreme Court of Ceylon in 1922 that by the words quoted shehad renounced her right to revoke.
1 [1922) 24 N. L.R.149.
LORD DONOVAN—DuUewc v. DuUewe
299
In Ukku Banda v. Paulis Singho et al. 1 a Kandyan deed of gift dated1905 contained a declaration by the Donor that he granted shares ofcertain premises unto the Donee “as a gift absolute and irrevocableIn 1923 the Donor purported to revoke the deed. It was again held bythe Supreme Court of Ceylon in 1926 that the words quoted , were anexpress renunciation of the power to revoke.
Later in 1926 the two foregoing decisions were challenged in theSupreme Court in the case of Bogahalande v. Kumarihamy2 but wereaffirmed by the Supreme Court.
In 1939 the Ordinance here in question was enacted without anyexpress disavowal of these decisions.
Thereafter in 1963 in Punchi Bandar a v. Nagasena3 it was held (againby the Supreme Court) that by the use of the single word “ irrevocable '*in a Kandyan deed of gift the Donor expressly renounced his right torevoke it. Continuity was thus given after the Ordinance to the abovequoted decisions to a similar effect which were pronounced before theOrdinance was enacted.
In Tikiri Banda v. Ounatoardena 4 Tambiah J. concluded his judgmentin these words :
“ The customary laws of the Kandyans, on which Hay ley wasrelying, have been developed and modified by case law which adaptedthe archaic system to suit modem conditions. They. are of littlesignificance on this point although on obscure points on which caselaw could throw little light, they could become an important sourceof Kandyan law.
As stated earlier, the case law on this matter is of a conflictingnature, bqt from the medley of conflicting decisions a clear principlehas emerged which has been enunciated by the Full Bench of thisCourt. This principle may be formulated as follows : If in a Kandyandeed of gift it is stated that the deed is irrevocable and the clausecontaining irrevocability is not dependent on any condition, then sucha deed cannot be revoked. This salutary principle, which has beenlaid down by the Full Bench, had been followed in a long line Of decisionsand should not be departed from in the interests of ensuring the validityof title based on Kandyan deeds of gift. It is settled principle thata long-established rule affecting title to property should not be inter-fered with by this court. In the instant case the deed of donation comeswithin this rule. The deed clearly states that it will not be revoked atany time and for any reason. For these reasons the judgment of thelearned District Judge is affirmed and the appeal is dismissed withcosts.”
The reasonable expectation is that on the basis of the decisions abovecited, some given before the Ordinance and some after it, there havebeen transfers of land which have been declared irrevocable in the manner
» (1926) 27 N. L. R. 449.• (1963) 64 N. L. R. 648.
• (1926) 8 Ceylon Law Recorder 91.4 (1967) 70 N. L. R. 203.
300The China Pacific Navigation Co. Ltd., Hong Kong
v. Messrs Jafferjee Brothers
held by the Supreme Court to be a renunciation of the right to revoke.This expectation is not diminished by any paucity of decisions since theOrdinance : on the contrary it is enhanced. In my view therefore thedecision of the Supreme Court in the present case ought not in anyevent to be disturbed unless it were plainly wrong. I thiiik however thatit is plainly right.'
I differ from your Lordships with regret: but would humbly adviseHer Majesty that the appeal should be dismissed.
Appeal allowed.