013-NLR-NLR-V-22-UMMA-et-al.-v.-ARUMUGAM.pdf
( 54 )
1920.
Present: Shaw J.
UMMA et al. v. ARUMUGAM.
354—0. R. Colombo, 70,462.
Lease—Provision that lease should terminate if Government ordered rice,
* business to be removed to a Government stores—Action for rent—
Evidence Ordinance, s.- 92,■
Plaintiff leased to defendant a boutique used as a rice boutique;at that time Government intended to concentrate the small ricebusinesses into a Government controlled spot for the purpose ofprevention of plague. . Consequently the following provision wasinserted: “ That if all the rice boutiques …. were to beordered tg, be shifted to Government granary stores at Colomboduring, the term of this lease, this lease shall be considered null andvoid.”
The defendant was ordered by Government to remove hisbusiness to the Manning Market. This order was made, notfor the purpose of the prevention of plague, but for the purposeof controlling the sale of rice in view of the rice shortage.
Held, that the defendant was not liable to pay rent after theremoval of the business to the Manning Market.
rj^HE facts appear from the judgment.
Cooray (with bimS. V.Jayemckreme), for defendant, appellant'—The lease definitely provides for a cancellation in case the sale of ricein the premises is prohibited. It is clear to what use the premiseswere to be put. If Government control of the rice trade preventedsuch use, the defendant was entitled to terminate the lease. Thecircumstances which necessitated such control are immaterial.
A. St. P. Jayaxvardene (with him Croos-Dabrera), for plaintiffs,respondents.—There is nothing in the deed of lease to show towhat use the premises were to be put. Section 92 of the EvidenceOrdinance does not permit oral evidence to he led to prove this.{Canthiah v. Muttiah Chetty.1) The provision in the lease was that
i (7915) 18 N. L. B. 264.
.( 65 )
1920.
Utnma v.Arurriugam
.Tune 25, 1920. Shaw J.—
In this ease the plaintiff claimed three months’ rent of a certainboutique in Gabo’s lane, Colombo, under a deed of lease of June 11,1917. The Commissioner has given judgment in favour of the plain-tiffs, and the defendant appeals. The lease was a lease of a boutiquewhich was at the time of the lease used as a rice boutique, and thelease was for three years from June 11,1917. At the time that thelease was granted it appears to have been in the contemplation ofthe parties .that the Government might prohibit the sale of ricein private boutiques, the idea being that Government intended toconcentrate the small rice businesses into a Government controlledspot for the purpose of prevention of plague. Consequently, aprovision was inserted in the lease intending to provide that thelease should Some to an end if the Government directed the riceboutiques to be closed and the business to be transferred to aGovernment controlled spot. The provision is as follows : “ Thatif all the rice boutiques along with the said premises situated at2nd Gabo’s lane were to be ordered to be shifted to Governmentgranary stores at Colombo during the term of this lease, this leaseshall be considered null and void.”
Perhaps this is not a very well worded provision, but it is onewhich can be well understood when its purpose is considered. Thedefendant remained in occupation of the boutique, using it as a ricestore, until early in the year 1919. At that time they were directedto remove their business to a place built by the Government calledthe Manning Market, and they accordingly so removed it, andafter April, 1919, no rice has been sold by the defendant at thepremises leased or anywhere other than at the Maiming Market.They gave notice to the plaintiffs of what had happened, and thatthey should no longer require the use. of the boutique under thelease, and at the end of June they quitted possession, and the keywas offAed back to the second plaintiff. I am not sure that it wasactually left in his possession, but that does not appear to ine to bematerial. The claim in the action is for rent for the months of May,June, and July, 1919. The defendant now admits that he owesthe rent up to the end of June, when he returned the key, but deniesthat he is liable for rent of the premises subsequent to that date..The Commissioner has based his judgment mainly on the groundthat although the Manning Market was built for the purpose ofplague, the order under which the defendant’s business was removed
it was to be null and void if the rice boutiques were shifted to theGovernment granary stores. As a matter of fact, the rioe businesshas been ordered to be removed to a place'not contemplated by theparties, viz., Manning Market. The Manning Market is not a rioestore, and cannot be said to come under the term “ Governmentgranary stores.”
( 56 )
1920.
Shaw J.
Vmmav.
Arumugam
was not made for the purpose of prevention of plague, but was madein consequence of the shortage of rice, in oonsequence of which itwas thought desirable by the Government and the Municipalitythat all sales of rice should be under the control and supervision ofthe Government authorities. The Commissioner, therefore, thoughtthat the order for the removal of the business was not such an orderas was contemplated by the provision in the lease, and that theManning Market was not a Government store within the meaningof that provision. I am unable to agree with the decision of theCommissioner. It is proved in evidence, and indeed admitted, thatthe Manning Market was built by the Government for the verypurpose which the parties had in contemplation when the provisionwas inserted in the lease, and for the purpose of bringing into oneplace all the dealers in rice. It does not appear to me to matterwhat was the object which the parties thought Government hadin view at the time that they inserted this provision. What theyprovided for was any removal of the business to a Government storeunder the orders from the'authorities, and that is what has takenplace in this case. It may be that had the present shortage of ricenot arisen, the collection of the businesses in the Manning Marketand the order upon the defendant to remove his business there,might not have been given at so early a date. Apparently, theManning Market was incomplete at the time the defendant wasdirected to remove his business, and had it not been for the riceshortage, the boutique in Gabo’s lane might have been allowed tobe occupied as boutiques for a time.longer, but that does not appearto me to have any bearing upon the case. The Commissioner alsois of opinion that the Manning Market is not a “ store ” withinthe meaning of the provision, and, therefore, the business has notbeen ordered to be shifted to a Government store, and he thinks thatthe only building to which the section can refer is the ChalmersGranaries. Such a construction of the provision would reduceit to an absurdity, because the provision is referring to someplace under the control of Government to which it was thought thedefendant might be directed to remove "his business. Obviously,this could not be a store in the sense of the Chalmers Granaries,but it directly points to some Government building, such as theManning Market, which has been built for the purpose of collect-ing the small rice businesses. The appeal must, therefore, succeed,and the judgment of the Commissioner must be varied. Theplaintiffs are entitled to the rent for the months of May and June,amounting to Rs. 100, less a sum of Rs. 35*38 which is admittedlydue from the plaintiffs to the defendant for rice supplied. Thejudgment for the plaintiffs will, therefore, be for Rs. 64*62 and costson that soale. The appellant is entitled to the costs of this appeal.
Appeal allowed.