014-NLR-NLR-V-72-UPLANDS-TEA-ESTATES-LTD.-Appellant-and-CEYLON-WORKERS-CONGRESS-Respondent.pdf
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ALICES, J.~—Uplands Tea Estates Ltd. v. Ceylon Workers' Congress
1S68Present: Alles, J.
UPLANDS TEA ESTATES LTD., Appellant,and CEYLON WORKERS’
CONGRESS, Respondent
S. C. 70/07, 71/67, 72/07—Labour Tribunal CasesNos. K/3416, K/3417, K/3425
Labour Tribunal—Application, by dismissed workman for reins'a’cmcnl in 'service—,Jurisdiclion of labour tribunal to award compensation for past services—Industrial Disputes Act, ss. 3ID, 31C (l), 33 {!), 33 (-5).
"Whom, in an application under section 3IB of tho Industrial Disputes Act. aworkman souks roliof in rospoctof tlu> termination of his services by tho employerand prays for ruinstntmont in service, it is open to tho parties, by subsoquonfcagreement between thorn, to confor jurisdiction on tho labour tribunal to awardcompensation to bo paid to tho workman on tho basis of his past services, inliou of reinstatement..
jAtPrEAL from an order of a Labour Tribunal,
II. V. Perera, Q.C., with L. Kaditgamar, tor tho rcspondcnts-appollants.
N.Satyendra, for the j>Uiintiff-rcspondcnt.
Cur. adv. vail.
January 27, 19GS. Allks, J.—
Counsel for the rospondents-appcllants has submitted that the I’resident,acted without jurisdiction in ordering compensation to the worker inthis ease. The Union on behalf of the petitioner-worker made an appli-cation under Section 31B of the Industrial Disputes Act for relief inrespect of the termination of his services by tho employer and prayedfor reinstatement. On tho date of inquiry counsel for the cmploycodid not insist on reinstatement. Tho.record thereafter reads:
“The only question that is left is the quantum of compensation,if any, that.is to he paid for t he past services of these employees. ”
“ Both parties agree to leave the quantum of compensation to hegiven to the workers, if any, in the hands of the President.”
Tho- President thereafter, in view of the submissions of counsel, madeorder directing compensation to ho paid to the workers on tho basis oftheir past services.
Mr. Pcreia’s main contention is (hat it is only under Section 33 (5)of the Act that the President could make an order of compensation.Such an order could only he made at tho instance of the worker and in
Abusally v. Price Controller
lieu of making a decision for reinstatement. He submits that the presentapplication for reinstatement was not accompanied with any suchrequest and, thercfoio, the President acted without jurisdiction in orderingcompensation. Counsel for tho Union, however, submits that this is nota ease to which Section 33 (5) applies. The order that was made by thoPresident was one made with the consent of tho parties and was an orderthat could properly be made under Section 31 C (1) of tho Act. I aminclined to agree. Section 33 is permissive in nature and is only intendedto enlarge the scopo of tho President’s powers and enables the Tribunalto ine'ude in the order such decisions as may be necessary to give fulleffect to the order of the Tribunal. ’ Tho wording contained in the intro- 'ductory portion of Section 33 (1) makes this position clear. It is correct,as counsel submits, that the nature of tho payment maclo to the workerin this case is more akin to the payment of a gratuity than to compen-sation ; but it is abundantly clear from tho agreement between the partiesthat they intended that sume payment for tho past services of thoworker should be made the basis of a just and equitable order_._
I dismiss tho appeal.
Appeal dismissed.