035-NLR-NLR-V-59-V.-KAILAYAR-Appellant-and-K.-KANDIAH-et-al.-Respondents.pdf
SIN24ETAMBY, J.—Kailayar v. Kandiah
117
1957Present : Sinnefamby, J.
V. KAILAYAR, Appellant, and K. KANDIAH et al., RespondentsiS. C. 25S—G. R. Point Pedro, 1,640
Compulation of time—Consent decree—Act to be done within a period from a certaindate—Hfeaning of words “ within ” and “from ”.'
Where a consent decree awarded certain rights to the plaintiff if he depositeda sum of money “ within a period of four weeks from today ”—‘, –
Held, that where an act is to be done within a specified time from a certain'date, the day or that date has to be be excluded for the purpose of computationof time….
^^LPPEAL from a judgment of the Court of Requests, Point Pedro. _
V. Arulambaiam, for the plaintiff appellant..’
. K. Siuasubramaniam, for the defendant respondent.", *
March 27, 1957. Siknetajiby, J.—-.:-
This appeal relates to the correct interpretation that should be placed •on a consent order entered in this case. The plaintiff had sought topre-empt a certain share of land sold by the 1st and 2nd defendants tothe 3rd and 4th. Judgment was entered by consent in the followingterms.-
118'_. SINNETAMBY, $.-^-Kailayar v._Kandiah___
“ Judgment for the plaintiffs, declaring them’entitled to pre-empt al/24t-h share of the land sold and conveyed by the 1st and 2nd defend- -ants to the 3rd.and 4th defendants on 'payment of the market value vEs. 200. The amount of Rs. 200 should he deposited within" a period •of 4 weeks from today i.e., 25.4.66, and if the amount of Rsw 20dis not so deposited the plaintiff’s action "will stand dismissed with costs, ;but if the amount is deposited within this period of 4 weeks,";the deed -referred to is set aside and the conveyance is to be entered in' favour ofthe plaintiff and the costs of such conveyance will be home by the 1stand 2nd defendants~ V
These are the relevant portions of the consent order. This judgmentwas entered on the 25th April, 1956. The plaintiffs deposited the sumof Rs. 200 on the 28th May, 1956. The 23rd, 24th, 25th, 26th and 27tliwere public holidays.. . ‘.•-•
If the day on which the order was made, namely the 25th April, isexcluded the last day on which payment had to be made was the 23rdMay, but that being a public holiday it was conceded that payment onthe 28th would have been within time, but if the 25th April was to beincluded in computing the 4 weeks, it was said that the plaintiffs wereone day too late.
The question that arises for decision is “what is the meaning to beattached to the words ‘ to be deposited within a period of 4 weeks fromtoday ’ ”. The relevant words are “ within ” and “ from today ”.
The learned Commissioner of Requests, having considered the meaningattached to the words “ within ” in the case of Imperial Tea Cmpany v.Aramady1, came to the conclusion that the 25th April should he includedin computing the 4 weeks. He held, and with that finding I agree, thatthe Interpretation Ordinance has no application.
In my view, however, he misunderstood the effect of the judgmenthe purported to follow. That was a tenancy case and it is well settledlaw that where a tenancy commences at the beginning of a month, noticeto be valid must have the effect of terminating the tenancy on the lastday of the- month. • In that particular case, the parties proceeded totrial on the basis that the tenancy commences from the first of a month.The landlord gave notice on the 28th February, requiring the* tenantto vacate the premises let with in one month from the said date. Thelearned judge who decided that case held that the words “ withina month ” meant not later than a'month and that the tenant had the .whole of the last day of the month witlrin which to leave the premises.Obviously, therefore, in computing the period, the 28th February, which .was the day on which notice was given, was excluded. That case,therefore, does not support the view taken by the learned judge.
Quite apart from that, however, there are other authorities whichsupport the contention that when the words “from and “within”are used, they exclude the day from which the period is to commence.Wharton’s Raw Lexicon., 193S Edition, at page 440 makes the followingobservations “‘From’ ordinarily excludes the day from which timeshould be reckoned ” and refers to the case of Soulh Slrajfordshirc etc.
1 {1023) 25 N. h. 11. 327.
WEERASOORtYA, J.—CheUiah t>. Selvanayagam
119
Co. v. Sickness etc. Association l. In that case, the plaintiff, a TramcarCo., effected with the defendant an insurance for personal injury in respect. of accidents caused by vehicles “ for 12 months from November 24th, '1887 On November 24th, 1SSS injuries were caused and the claim. was made for damages. It was decided that the word “from ” excluded• November 24'th, 1SS7 and that the Insurance Co. was liable.
– In Stewart v. Chapin 2 it was held that the ride in regard.to computationof time was that where an act was to be done within a specified time froma certain date, the day of that date was to be excluded.-
Having regard to these authorities, the learned Commissioner of Requestshas in my view erred in holding that the deposit was not within time.
I accordingly set aside the order appealed from dismissing the plaintiff’saction. The plaintiff will be entitled to the rights reserved to him bythe consent order of the 25th April, 1956. The appellant will be entitledto costs both here and in the Court below.
Appeal allowed.