105-NLR-NLR-V-31-VANDERSMAGT-v.-SANGARAPILLAI.pdf
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Present: Akbar J.
V ANDERSMAGT v. SANGARAPILLAI71—C. Colombo, 5,S63.
Jurisdiction—Offence under section 13 (1) of the Housing and TownImprovement Ordinance—Power of Municipal Court.
The Municipal Court has no jurisdiction to entertain a chargeunder section 13 (1) of the Housing and Town Improvement Ordinance.
A
PPEAL from a conviction under section 13 (1) of the Housing• and Town Improvement Ordinance.
H. V. Perera (with Tissaverasinghe), for appellant.
Hayley, K.C. (with Choksy), for respondent.
1 4 X. L. R. 70. a 1 De 0. <fc J. at P. 23
1930
> 28 N. L. R. 321.
c 368 )
1980 March 15, 1930. Akbar J.—
Vandersmagt“ an aPP6liI from a conviction under section 13 (1) of the
#. Sangara- Housing and Town Improvement Ordinance, No. 19 of 1915. TheP*ttai only point taken by the appellant’s Counsel was a question of law.He argued that a prosecution under section 13 (1) cannot be broughtin a Municipal Court and that such a prosecution can only be lodgedin a Police Court. Under that Ordinance the words “ PoliceMagistrate ’’ are defined under section 2 as including a MunicipalMagistrate, unless the context otherwise requires a different inter-pretation. Section 13 (1) contains no reference to the wordB “ PoliceMagistrate. ” This sub-section merely states that a person whocommits a breach of the provisions of the sub-section will be liableon summary conviction to a-certain punishment. But sub-section (2)of that section refers to “ the ” Police Magistrate and goes on tostate that a chairman may apply for a mandatory order.
The Supreme Court has held in Anthonisz v. Fernando 1 that theproceedings under sub-section (2) of section 13 must be initiatedseparately and cannot be continued as part of the proceedings undersub-section (1). Mr. Havley, for the. Municipality, argues that theword “ the ” in sub-section (2) clearly implies that a prosecutionunder sub-section (1) could be launched before a “ Police Magistrate, ”and as a Police Magistrate includes a Municipal Magistrate, aprosecution under sub-section (1) could be brought before a Muni-cipal Magistrate. He has cited the case of Cullen v. Trimble* thatsuch an interpretation must be adopted by implication. It willbe. seen under the English statute that no reference is made to anyCourt, and the .Court of Appeal held that a jurisdiction was impliedlyconferred upon justices to deal summarily with the offences underthe act. Under section 13 (1) of the local Ordinance the wordsused are on “ summary conviction, ” and by section 8a of OrdinanceNo. 21 of 1901 these words are only appropriate to a case institutedbefore a Police Magistrate and the extended definition of thewords “ Police Magistrate ” appearing in Ordinance No. 19 of 1915cannot be applied to the Interpretation Ordinance, No. 21 of 1901.It is not necessary to speculate on the intention which thedraughtsman presumably had when he drafted sub-sections (1) and(2) of section 13. I have only to interpret the two sub-sectionsas they stand, and it is not possible to adopt the interpretationsuggested by the respondent’s Counsel. I must, therefore, hold thatthe Municipal Court had no jurisdiction to entertain a charge undersub-section (1) of section 13. If the Municipality desires to bringsuch offences within the jurisdiction of the Municipal Court, it conbe done by the Governor and the Executive Council undersub-S(«tion (2) of section 54 of the Municipal Councils Ordinance,No. 0 of 1910. I set aside the conviction and acquit the accused.
Set aside.
1 1 O. W. B. 58.
* 41 L. J., Magistrates Cases.