013-NLR-NLR-V-79-2-VELAUTHAN-ELLAYATHAMBY-Respondent-Petitioner-and-RAMALINGAM-KANDASAMY-an.pdf
MALCOLM PERLKA, J—EUagatharnby v. Katiausamy
97
1978 Present : Malcolm Perera, Z. and Tiiiawella, J.
VELAUTHAN ELLAYATHAM3Y, Respondent-Petitioner
and
RAMALINGAM KAN DAS AM Y and ANOTHER,Compiainants-Respondents
S.C. 551/75—Li.C. Mannar ■3672
Administration of Justice Lavs. No. 44 oj 1973. section 62—Scope andmeaning of the words “ dispute affecting land”—Inquiry as towho was in possession on date of issue of notice—Not necessarywhere parties agreed.
Held : (1) That a dispute between parties over the running ofa business which is run in premises in respect of which the complaintis made to the Magistrate's Court is a “ dispute affecting land ”within the meaning of section 62 of the Administration of JusticeLaw, No. 44 of 1973.
(2) That there was no need to hold an inquiry as to who wasin possession of the land on the date of issue of notice undersection 62(1) where the parties were agreed as to who was inpossession of the land.
Cases referred to :
Kanugasabai v. Myivaganam, 78 N.L.'R. 2S0.
Dilworth v. Commissioner of Stamps, (1899) A.C. 99 : 79 L.T. 473;15 T.L.R. 61.
/^PPLICATION to revise an order of the Magistrate’s Court,Mannar.
V. S. A. Pullenayagam, with S. C. Chandrahasan and Mrs. S.Gnanakaran, for the petitioner.
Ranganathan, Q.C., with G. F. Sethukavalar, K. M. B.Ahamed and R. Sirinivasa, for the respondents.
Cur. adv. vult.
February 14, 1978. Malcolm Perera, J.
Two points have been raised by the learned attorney for thepetitioner in the application. They are :
Firstly, that the learned Magistrate had no jurisdiction toproceed under section 62 of the Administration of Justice Law.No. 44 of 1973, in as much as, the subject matter of the disputebetween the parties was not one affecting “ land ” but a build-ing.
Secondly, that the learned Magistrate did not hold an inquiryas to who was in possession of the land on the date of issue ofnotice under section 62(1).
1*—A 446S0 (79/09)
98JUA1..C0-LM l’KKKKA, JV—ISllauallmmby v. Kttndasamy
Briefly the facts are as follows :
The business of Nagapooshani Vilas was being carried on inpremises Nc. 22, Bus Stand Road, Mannar. Petitioner had rentedout the premises from one Kachu Mohamed about 30 years ago,and had carried on a business of an hotel and a plantain andbetel shop under the business of Nagapooshani Vilas.
Some years later, Mohamed had donated the premises inquestion to his son-in-law M. Ratnam, the 2nd complainantrespondent.
The petitioner then became the tenant under Ratnam. Due tohis ill-health the petitioner had given over the business of thehotel to one Kandasam^ the 1st complainant-respondent, to runthe same on basis of a monthly commission. However theplantain and betel shop continued to be run by the petitioner.
In or about September 1974 the petitioner noticed the 1stcomplainant-respondent to hand back the business but, the latterfailed to do so, and stopped paying the aforementioned commis-sion, as from November 1974.
There thus arose a dispute between the petitioner and the 1stcomplainant-respondent, over the running of the business, ofthe eating house, run in the said premises.
I have to decide whether this dispute is one that relates to“ land ”. Section 62 (4) reads as follows :
“ In this section, “ dispute affecting land ” includes any disputeas to the right to the possesion or to the boundaries of any landor part of the land, or as to the right to the crops’ or produceof any land, or as to any right in the nature of a servitudeaffecting land”.
The use of the word “includes" indicates that the definitionis not an exhaustive one. “‘Include’ is very generally used ininterpretation clauses in order to enlarge the meaning of wordsor phrases, occurring in the body of the statute, and when it isso used, these words and phrases must be continued as compre-hending not only such things as they signifv according-to theirnatural import, but also those things, which the interpretationclause declares that they shall include ”. Lord Watson in thecase of Dilworth v. Commissioner of Stamps. (1899). A.C. 105-106.
Under our law, a building accedes to the soil, and it becomesa part and parcel of land upon which it stands. The buildingthus loses its independent existence. Therefore a dispute inrespect of a building is one that necessarily involves the landon which it stands.
Perera c. Abeyraine
W
In the case of Kanagasabai v. Mylvaganam, 78 N.L.R. 280,Sharvananda, J. held that “ land in our Law includes houses andbuildings, and when the legislature employs the term ‘land’in any statute, the word is presumed to include houses andbuildings. The language of section 62 does not repel such aninclusive meaning ”
I therefore hold that a dispute in respect of a building on aland is a <! dispute affecting land
With regard to the second point raised by Mr. Pullenayagam,it is clear from the admissions made before the Magistrate bycounsel on both sides, that the land in question was in thepossession of the 1st complainant-respondent, on the date ofthe issue of notice under section 62 (1). In view of this admission,the parties were agreed, as to who was in possession of the land.Thus there was good reason for the Magistrate, to have held thatthe 1st complainant-respondent was in possession of the land.
For the reasons I have set out I do not assent to the twosubmissions made by learned attorney for the petitioner.
I accordingly refuse the application ‘of the petitioner.
The petitioner will pay a sum of Rs. 300 to each of the twocomplainant-respondents, as costs of the application to thisCourt.
Tittawella, J.—I agree.
Application refused.