VINAYAGAMOORTHY, ATTORNEY-AT-LAW (ON BEHALF OF WIMALENTHIRAN) v. THE ARMY

018-SLLR-SLLR-1997-V-1-VINAYAGAMOORTHY-ATTORNEY-AT-LAW-ON-BEHALF-OF-WIMALENTHIRAN-v.-THE-ARMY-.pdf


VINAYAGAMOORTHY, ATTORNEY-AT-LAW(ON BEHALF OF WIMALENTHIRAN)v.
THE ARMY COMMANDER AND OTHERS
SUPREME COURT.
AMERASINGHE, J„
WIJETUNGA, J. ANDANANDACOOMARASWAMY, J.
S.C. APPLICATION NO. 26/94NOVEMBER 25TH, 1996.
Fundamental Rights – Articles 13(1) and 13(2) of the Constitution – Arrest andDetention – Emergency Regulations 17. 18 and 19.
The detenu was arrested by the Army, without a warrant in the Kotahena areaunder Regulation 18 of the Emergency Regulations. He was then detained underRegulation 19(2) at the Panagoda Army Camp for the prescribed periodThereafter he was detained at the Panagoda Army Camp under Regulation 17(1),from where he was handed over to the Criminal Investigation Department wherehe continued to be detained.
Held:
In deciding whether the arrest was in accordance with 'procedureestablished by law’ the matter in issue is not what subsequent investigationsrevealed, but whether at the time of the arrest the person was committing anoffence, or that there were reasonable grounds for suspecting that the personarrested was concerned in or had committed an offence.
The detenu was arrested on some vague, general suspicion, hoping thatsome evidence would turn up that might provide justification for the arrest and noton any reasonable grounds of suspicion. Hence the arrest was not in accordancewith the procedure established by Regulation 16(1). Coflbquently, the arrestingofficer could not have been able to give the detenu the reason for his arrest. Thearrest was. therefore, violative of Article 13(1) of the constitution.
The detenu was arrested on 2.10.93 and not on 23.10.93 as stated by therespondents. He was not handed over to the nearest police station as required byRegulation 18(1), but detained at the Panagoda Camp which was not anauthorized place of detention in terms of Regulation 19(4). The Secretary was notIn fact satisfied that the detention under Regulation 17(1) was necessary butacted mechanically in issuing detention orders. The respondents failed toproduce the detenu before a Magistrate within the time prescribed by regulation19(3). His detention was, therefore, violative of Article 13(2) of the Constitution.
Per Amerasinghe, J.
*ln order to prevent or minimise 'disappearances or abuses*, it is ol paramountimportance that the requirements laid down by the regulations should be strictlyobserved. They were not intended for merely cosmetic purposes, but for the sakeof fulfilling the basic obligation of the state to ensure the personal security andliberty of all persons'.
Cases referred to:
Dumbelt v. Roberts (1944) 1 ALL ER 326.
Mutthusamy v. Kannangara (1951) 52 N.L.R. 324.
Faiz v. Attorney-General (1995) 2 Sri L.R. 372.
Faurdeen v. Jayatileke S.C. Application 366/93, S.C. Minutes 8 September,1994.
Chandra Kalyani Perera. v. Siriwardena and Others (1992) 1 Sri L.R. 251,260.
Joseph Perera. v. Attorney-General and Others (1992) 1 Sri L.R. 199, 235.
Kumara. v. Rohan Fernando and Others S.C. Application 22/90 S.C. Minutes21 July 1994.
Anura v. Rohan Fernando and Others S.C. Application 23/90 S.C. Minutes21 July 1994.
Mahinda v. Rohan Fernando and Others S.C. Application 31/90 S.C. Minutes21 July 1994.
(a) Peiris and Others v. Attorney-General (1994) 1 Sri L.R. 1.
(b) Secretary of State v. Tameside 1976 3 ALL ER 665.
Fernando v. Silva and Others S.C. Application 7/89 S.C. Minutes 3 May 1991.
Hirdaramani v. Ratravale (1971) 75 N.L.R. 67,
Sasanasiritissa Thera v. De Silva and Others (1989) 2 Sri L.R. 356.
Leelaratne v. Cyfa-lerath S.C. Application 145/86 S.C. Minutes 9 March1987.
Weerakoon v. Weeraratne S.C. Application 42/92 S.C. Minutes 16 November1992.
APPLICATION for relief for infringement of fundamental rights.
R. K. W Goonesekera for petitioner.
V. K. Malatgoda, S.S.C. for respondents.
Cur. adv. vult.
December 20.1996AMERASINGHE, J.
The petitioner, an Attorney-at-Law, filed an application underArticle 126 of the Constitution on the 31st of January 1994 on behalfof Vijayam Wimalenthiran, alleging that the said Wimalenthiran'sFundamental Rights under Articles 11, 13(1). 13(2), 14(1 )(g) and14(1)(h) of the Constitution had been violated by the 1st, 2nd and 3rdrespondents.
On the 8th of February 1994, the Court directed that theapplication be referred to the Human Rights Task Force for inquiryand report in terms of the Monitoring of Fundamental Rights ofDetainees Regulations 1991. The Court directed the Task Force tomake an appropriate order under Regulation 9 and required the TaskForce to report to Court on or before the 25th of March 1994. Thedirections of Court were communicated by the Registrar by his letterdated the 11th of February 1994.
The Project Director of the Task Force in a report received by theRegistrar on the 24th of March 1994 reported as follows:
‘Officers of the HRTF have visited the CID 4th Floor andinterviewed the detainee. He has been unable to identify or givenames of any army officer who had inflicted bodily harm on him ortreated him in a degrading manner as he says he was blindfolded.However our officers have reported that at present he appears tobe in good health and he has no complaints].
With regard to the arrest and detention of the petitioner the ArmyIntelligence Unit has been unable to give a plausible explanation.The petitioner has been in detention for 142 days without beingproduced to a Court of Law. We were therefore obliged to directthe Secretary, Ministry of Defence to revoke the detention orderand release the petitioner from custody."
When the report of the Task Force was considered by the Court onthe 29th of March 1994, the petitioner was represented by the
Attorney-at-Law who had filed the application on his behalf, Mr. A.Vinayagamoorthy, and the respondents were represented by Mr. S.Rajaratnam, State Counsel. The Court made the following order:
"The Human Rights Task Force has reported that the ArmyIntelligence Unit has been unable to give a plausible explanationfor the arrest and detention of the petitioner. State Counselundertakes to revoke the detention order and to release thepetitioner if no indictment is sent to an appropriate High Court on orbefore 15.05.94; and in any event if such indictment is sent StateCounsel undertakes that the respondents will revoke the detentionorder and release the petitioner if he is acquitted or discharged or ifa suspended sentence is imposed on him in the High Court. Inview of that undertaking Counsel for the petitioner does not wish topursue this application even in respect of Article 11.
The petitioner claims to have been blindfolded continuously fortwo months from 2nd October 93 till 11th December 93, and alsokept in solitary confinement at a house, which. Counsel says,belongs to the Army Intelligence Unit situated behind the BritishHigh Commission, close to the sea beach at Colpetty. He wasthereafter detained at the 4th Floor of the Criminal InvestigationDepartment.
The Human Rights Task Force is directed to forward a report to thisCourt on or before 26th April 1994 as to whether these two placeswere visited by officers of the Human Rights Task Force during theperiod 2.10.93 to 24.3.94, whether those places were inspectedand the persons detained there were given an opportunity to makecomplaints or representations in terms of Regulation 2 (a) of theHuman Rights Task Force Regulations."
The Registrar conveyed the directions of the Court to the Task Forceby his letter dated the 18th of April 1994. In this report dated the 20thof April 1994, the Project Director of the Human Rights Task Force(HRTF) reported as follows:
"The HRTF has had no knowledge of any house belonging to theArmy Intelligence Unit which is situated behind the British High
Commission. I wish to further respectfully submit that the HRTF hasnot received any complaints of persons being held at the givenpremises. As such no visits had been made to this premises.
The 4th Floor of the Criminal Investigation Department has beenvisited by officers of the HRTF quite frequently and on a number ofoccasions during the period 02.10.93 to 24.03.94.
The 4th Floor of the Criminal Investigation Department has beeninspected periodically by officers of the HRTF. The personsdetained at the 4th Floor of the Criminal Investigation Departmenthave been given access to meet officers of the HRTF and they aregiven the opportunity to make any complaints or representations toour officers in terms of Regulation 2(a) of the HRTF Regulations."
In an undated communication received by the Registry of theSupreme Court on the 17th of June 1994, Mr. S. Rajaratnam, StateCounsel for the Attorney-General, stated as follows:
‘I respectfully wish to inform Your Lordships’ Court that anundertaking was given in the above Application on 29th March.1994 that an indictment would be forwarded against the Petitioneron or before 15th May, 1994.
This undertaking was given following a confession made by thepetitioner stating that he was a member of a suicide squaddirected by the LTTE to assassinate the late President RanasinghePremadasa.
Whereas subsequent to the above undertaking, a dossier hasbeen forwarded to the Attorney-General regarding theinvestigation in respect of the assassination, which reveals anetwork consisting of many persons who have been independentof each other, assigned the task of assassinating the late Presidentin a suicide attack;
Most of the suspects forming part of this conspiracy have beenarrested, but there are others who are still at large and therefore,the investigations have not been completed;
In the circumstances, the Attorney-General is not in a position toforward indictment against the Petitioner until persons who wereinvolved in the said assassination plot are arrested.”
Although the petitioner had been willing to abandon his applicationin view of the undertaking given by learned State Counsel on the 29thof March 1994, having regard to the failure of the State to satisfy theconditions upon which such abandonment was proposed, thepetitioner, with notice to the Attorney-General, on the 24th of June1994 moved as follows:
*l most respectfully request that the Court be pleased to call thisapplication in open Court on 5.7.1994 to enable me to request thatI be allowed leave to proceed with this application.
In view of the report sent to this Court by the Project Director,Human Rights Task Force, I expected Vijayam Wimalenthiran to bereleased. The Director Human Rights Task Force has said in hisreport that he has directed the Secretary, Ministry of Defence torevoke the detention order and release him from custody. This hasnot been done so far. He has not been indicted as well."
On the 5th of July 1994 the motion was considered by the Court.Mr. Vinayagamoorthy appeared for the petitioner, and Mr. A. B.Meddegoda appeared for the Attorney-General. According to thejournal entry in the record of the case, the Court decided as follows:
“Although the State Counsel gave an undertaking on 29.3.94 thatthis petitioner would be released if an indictment was not sent tothe High Court before 15.05.94, State Counsel informs court thatsubsequently the Attorney-General’s Department became aware ofmaterials suggesting the petitioner’s involvement in offences otherthan those of which he was originally suspected. He states that itwas under those circumstances that the petitioner was notreleased.
Counsel for the petitioner moves that he be permitted to supporthis application for leave to proceed. He submits that the Stateshould in these proceedings produce the relevant DetentionOrders, and that he has no objection to any material, which is of aconfidential nature, being disclosed by the respondents only tocourt.
Support on 28.07.94.”
When the application was supported on the 28th of July 1994, theCourt granted the petitioner leave to proceed “for the allegedviolation of Articles 13(1) and 13(2) only”. Hearing was fixed for the10th of November 1994. However for the various reasons that are setout in the journal, hearing was postponed on several occasions, forwhich no blame could be attached either to the Court or to any of theparties. Eventually the Court heard the arguments of counsel on the25th of November 1996,
As we have seen, the petitioner was permitted to proceed withhis application only in so far as it related to the alleged violation ofArticle 13(1) and Article 13(2) of the Constitution.
Article 13(1) of the Constitution provides as follows:
“13(1) No person shall be arrested except according to procedureestablished by law. Any person arrested shall be informed of thereason for his arrest,”
There are two versions of the facts, The petitioner in his applicationand affidavits on behalf of Vijayam Wimalenthiran, and confirmed bythe affidavit of Wimalenthiran dated 3rd December 1994, set out hisaccount of the events that took place as follows:
Vijayam Wimalenthiran, aged twenty-three, was taken into custodyon the 2nd of October 1993 at about 3.30 a.m. at a lodge at No. 56Old Moor Street, Colombo 12, by army officers, including Khan andJayasuriya. He was blindfolded and taken to a house. He wasdetained in that place, blindfolded, till the 11th of December 1994. Atfirst, the exact place of detention was not known. Later, however, hecame to know that it was a building behind the Indian HighCommission. He was detained in that building with one Arulappu
Jude Arulrajah. Pictures of the building are to be seen in the report ofAmnesty International of February 1994 entitled “Secret detention inColombo. The case of Arulappu Jude Arulrajah." The report statesthat Arulrajah was arrested on 2nd October 1993 from his lodge inBambalapitiya. In another report of Amnesty International of February1994 entitled “Balancing human rights and security; abuse of arrest anddetention powers in Colombo", the following observations are made:
Some Tamil people have been arrested by groups of armed men inmilitary or civilian dress, blindfolded and taken to secret places ofdetention where they have been held for at least a week … Itappears that the army, and possibly other sections of the securityforces, have held people in different secret locations in and aroundColombo. Amnesty International believes that one secret place ofdetention is an army camp located by the sea, off Galle Road,Kollupitiya, behind the Indian High Commission and the AmericanInformation Center … Arullappu Jude Arulrajah was arrested on2nd October 1993 at about 1.30 a.m. at his lodge inBambalapitiya, by armed men in civilian dress. He wasblindfolded, handcuffed and driven to the army camp behind theIndian High Commission, referred to above. It is alleged that hewas held at this location until being transferred on or about 10thDecember to Panagoda Army Camp, which also does not appearto be in the list of authorized places of detention gazetted in June1993. On or about 15th December he was transferred to the CIDon the Fourth Floor, Colombo Police Headqaurters …"
The reports of Amnesty International were referred to byWimalenthiran in his affidavit and produced by him and marked asP3.
On the 11th of December, Wimalenthiran’s blindfold was removedand he was taken to the Army Camp at Panagoda. On the 15th ofDecember 1993, he was handed over to the Criminal InvestigationDepartment and remained in Police custody. Wimalenthiran did notcommit any offence nor was he concerned in the commission of anyoffence and there were no reasonable grounds for his arrest anddetention. He emphatically denies the allegations made by SeniorSuperintendent of Police Hemachandra that he was a member of the
LTTE and that he was in close touch with LTTE members. He was notinformed of the reasons for his arrest. He was produced before aMagistrate on the 23rd of April 1994 and detained on the orders ofthe Magistrate. He was released on Bait on the 22nd of September1995.
On the 29th of November 1994, the respondents filed an affidavitfrom Mr. O. K. Hemachandra, Senior Superintendent of Police, datedthe 21st of November 1994. That affidavit sets out the respondents’version, which is as follows:
Wimalenthiran was taken into custody on the 23rd of October 1993by the army at an army check point at Kotahena at 1730 hours. Hewas taken into custody “as there were reasonable grounds forsuspecting him to be concerned in or to be committing or to havecommitted offences punishable under the Emergency (MiscellaneousProvisions and Powers) Regulations No. 1 of 1993,” and he was soinformed at the time of his arrest. In support of the circumstances ofthe arresf, a statement of Sergeant K. Gunadasa of the Army whomade the arrest was filed of record marked 2R1. Wimalenthiran wasdetained at the Army Camp at Panagoda pending furtherinvestigations in pursuance of a detention order (2R2) made underRegulation 19(2). "Consequent to further investigations and materialrevealed thereby", Wimalenthiran was further detained at the ArmyCamp, Panagoda, in pursuance of detention order 2R3 issued underRegulation 17(1). He was handed over to the Criminal InvestigationDepartment (CID) by the Sri Lanka Army on the 14th of December1993, and thereafter detained at the CID in pursuance of a detentionorder issued under Regulation 17(1) marked as 2R4. He was furtherdetained at the CID in pursuance of a detention order issued underRegulation 17(1) marked as 2R6. Wimalenthiran was producedbefore a Magistrate of Colombo on the 23rd of April 1994 andremanded to fiscal’s custody. "Consequent to investigationsconducted … the evidence against him clearly establishes that hewas an active member of the LTTE … Further investigations …revealed that around January 1993 he had been assigned the task ofcollecting information relating to the movements of the late PresidentPremadasa and had been introduced to other LTTE cadres including… Babu who had been assigned the task of assassinating thePresident … In accordance with the evidence available it has beenclearly established that Vijayam Wimalenthiran was closely associatedwith all the persons who had been entrusted with the task ofassassinating the President and that he had collected and suppliedinformation relating to the movements of the late President…"
As we have seen, Article 13(1) of the Constitution provides that noperson shall be arrested except according to procedureestablished by law. The respondents maintain that Wimalenthiranwas arrested in terms of regulation 18(1), inter alia, provides that"… any member of the armed forces may… arrest without warrant,any person who is committing or has committed or whom he hasreasonable ground for suspecting to be concerned in, or to becommitting or to have committed, an offence under anyemergency regulation…".
In decidng whether the arrest was in accordance with ‘procedureestablsihed by law", the matter in issue is not what subsequentinvestigations may have revealed, but whether at the time of thearrest the person was committing an offence, or that there werereasonable grounds for suspecting that the person arrested wasconcerned in or had committed an offence. Accepting, for the timebeing, the version of the respondents that Wimalenthiran wasarrested at a check point by Sergeant Gunadasa of the Army, therewas no evidence placed before the Court that the arrest was madeeither while Wimalenthiran was committing an offence, or that theSergeant had any information that the person he was arresting hadcommitted any offence, or that Sergeant Gunadasa had anyreasonable ground for suspecting Wimalenthiran to be concerned in,or to have committed, an offence under any emergency regulation.The suspicions of Sergeant Gunadasa and his fervent hope, or evenconfident and honest assumption, that some evidence mayeventually turn up to make his suspicions appear to be reasonablewas not sufficient; Article 13(5) of the Constitution provides that“Every person shall be presumed innocent until he is proved guilty",and for that reason it is of importance that no person should bearrested under regulation 18(1) except on grounds in which the
particular circumstances of the arrest justified the entertainment of areasonable suspicion. (Cf. per Scott LJ in Dumbell v. Roberts <,)Ifollowed in Mutthusamy v. Kannangaram, Faiz v. Attorney-General™: Faurdeen v. Jayetilleke™). I am not suggesting thatSergeant Gunadasa should have had clear and sufficient proof of thecommission of an offence under the Emergency Regulations, or thathe ought to have had information that provided anything like a primafacie basis for conviction: Sergeant Gunadasa could, in terms ofregulation 18(1), have arrested Wimalenthiran although he had noclear and sufficient proof of the commission of the offence which hesuspected Wimalenthiran to have been concerned in or to havecommitted. However, Sergeant Gunadasa ought to have hadreasonsbie grounds, taking into account the circumstances,including the prevailing situation at the relevant time, (e.g. seeChandra Kalyani Perera v. Siriwardena and Others(S), Joseph Pererav. Attorney-General and Others™) objectively regarded, that shouldhave induced him to reasonably suspect that Wimalenthiran wascommitting, or had committed, or was concerned in the commissionof, an offence under the Emergency Regulations. (See Kumara v.Rohan Fernando and Others <7), Anura v. Rohan Fernando andOthers ™, Mahinda v. Rohan Fernando and Others,9)).
In paragraph 6 of the affidavit of Senior SuperintendentHemachandra it is stated that Wimalenthiran "was taken into custodyas there were reasonable grounds for suspecting him to beconcerned in or to be committing or to have committed offencespunishable under the Emergency (Miscellaneous Provisions andPowers) Regulations However, no evidence was placed beforethe Court to support that bald assertion: It is necessary that the Courtshould be furnished with the relevant material so that the Court maybe able to objectively determine the reasonableness of the suspicionthat led to the arrest. In the absence of such evidence, one mightwith justification, as I do In the matter before me, conclude thatWimalenthiran was arrested by Sergeant Gunadasa and ordered tobe detained by the Deputy Inspector-General of Police who made theDetention Order dated the 23rd of October 1993, on some vague,general suspicion, hoping that some evidence would turn up thatmight have provided justification for the arrest The arrest of a personon a speculative basis is insufficient to comply with the procedureestablished by Regulation 18(1). In arresting Wimalenthiran merely onvague grounds of suspicion and not on reasonable grounds ofsuspicion, the officer making the arrest was not acting in accordancewith the procedure established by Regulation 18(1) and wastherefore acting in violation of Article 13(1) of the Constitution. (SeePeiris and Others v. Attorney-General(,°’, followed in Kumara v. RohanFernando and Others (supra)). As we have seen, in its order of the29th of March 1994 relating to the case before us, the Court tooknotice of the fact that the Human Rights Task Force had reported thatthe Army Intelligence Unit had even at that date been ‘unable to givea plausible explanation" for the arrest and detention of Wimalenthiran.What then were the reasonable grounds Sergeant Gunadasa had inOctober 1993 – either on the 2nd or 23rd day of that month – formaking the arrest? He had none. Consequently, he could not havebeen able to give Wimalenthiran a reason for the arrest as requiredby Article 13( 1) of the Constitution.
The Detention Order dated the 23rd of October 1993 conveys theimpression – it is not clearly expressed – that Wimalenthiran wasbeing held in custody as a person who “had committed" "an offencein contravention of Regulation/s 25 read with 34 and 37" or that theofficer issuing the detention order had ‘reasonable ground forsuspecting" the person ordered to be detained as a person‘concerned in or to be committing or to have committed an offencein contravention of Regulation/s 25 read with 34 and 37 of the saidGazette Extraordinary (sic.)…" However, the respondents did not,either through the affidavit of Hemachandra or in their submissions,claim that Wimalenthiran was arrested while he was committing anyoffence. The Detention Order issued on the 23rd of October 1993 isin a standard form previously prepared into which other information,whether true or false, appropriate or inappropriate, has been routinelyinserted. In any event, had the person detained been furnished with acopy of the Detention Order, could he have understood why he wasbeing detained? If he had been given a copy of the EmergencyRegulations as well, he could have found that Regulation 25 providesthat:
“Whoever (a) commits any offence punishable under Sections 114,115, 116 or 117 of the Penal Code; or (b) commits the murder orconspires to murder or attempts to murder, or wrongfully confinesor conspires or prepares to wrongfully confine, the President or aMember of the Parliament, or a police officer or a member of thearmed forces, or a public officer with the intention of inducing orcompelling the President, Member of Parliament, police officer ormember of the armed forces or public officer to exercise of refrainfrom exercising in any manner any of the lawful powers of thePresident, Member of Parliament, police officer, member of thearmed forces or public officer; or (c) in any manner overawes,influences, coerces, prepares or conspires or attempts to overawe,influence or coerce, any person with the intention of inducing orcompelling the Government of Sri Lanka, the President, a Memberof Parliament, a police officer, a member of the armed forces orpublic officer, shaft be guilty of an offence…”
What was it the person detained had done?
According to file Detention Order, Wimalenthiran was detained forcontravening Regulation 25 “read with” Regulations 34 and 37.Regulation 34 provides that:
‘No person shall knowing or having reasonable cause to believethat any other person is guilty of an offence under any emergencyregulation give such other person assistance with the intentthereby to prevent, hinder or interfere with the apprehension trial orpunishment of such person for the said offence.”
What was the knowledge of the person detained? Who was theperson detained seeking to protect? What was the offence such aperson was supposed to have committed? No evidence wasadduced by the respondents on these matters.
Regulation 37 provides:
“(a) Whoever becomes aware of an intention or an attempt or apreparation to commit, or the commission of an offence under any
emergency regulation shall forthwith give information thereof to thenearest Grama Niladhari or to the officer-in-charge of the nearestpolice station; (b) any person who willfully fails or refuses to givethe information referred to in paragraph (a) shall be guilty of anoffence.”
What was the information that the person detained had and failed todisclose?
The Detention Order dated 1st January 1994, is in terms similar tothat of the Odrer issued on the 29th of October 1993, except that itlists the names of 122 persons, including the name of Wimalenthiran.The Detention Order issued on the 8th of April 1994 lists the names of121 persons including the name of Wimalenthiran.
The treatment of persons detained, was, as it were, on a wholesalebasis. This is evident from the Detention Orders dated the 1st of“January 1994 and the 8th of April 1994. Such an approach does notenable the Secretary to discharge his duty under Article 13(1) of theConstitution to give a person he has directed to be arrested anddetained the reasons for doing so, if his only method ofcommunicating his reasons was the Detention Order. Nor does itenable a person detained to make a case for his release to theAdvisory Committee appointed under Regulation 17(4); for he mustknow the grounds upon which he is supposed to be a person who islikely to act in a manner prejudicial to the national security or themaintenance of public order.
Neither the officers who made the arrest, nor the police, nor thepersons issuing the Detention Orders seem to have had any clearidea why Wimalenthiran was detained. Nor was their position muchbetter at the time the Fundamental Rights application was filed. Infact, as we have seen, learned State Counsel in his memorandum toCourt stated that it was decided to indict Wimalenthiran “following aconfession made by the petitioner stating that he was a member of asuicide squad directed by the LTTE to assassinate the late PresidentPremadasa.” That 'confession' was obtained after the filing of theFundamental Rights application. The Attorney-General, who hadsometime after State Counsel’s undertaking given on the 29th ofMarch 1994 to indict or release the prisoner, received a ’dossier' fromthe police, was not in a position to issue indictment even on the 17thof June 1994 for lack of sufficient information.
The Detention Orders issued under Regulation 17 on the 29th ofOctober 1993, the 1st of January 1994 and the 8th of April 1994 failto give reasons for the detention: They merely state that "being ofopinion and with a view to preventing the person specified andresiding at the place mentioned in Column I of the Schedule to thisorder from acting in any manner prejudicial to the National Securityor to the maintenance of public order, it is necessary so to do’,the person concerned is ordered to be detained. All that theperson detained was told were the general objects and purposes ofthe detention as set out in Regulation 17(1). Whether a person isarrested under Regulation 18(1) or ordered to be detained underRegulation 17(1), he or she must be given the grounds – thematerial facts and particulars – for his arrest and detention. It is onlywhen a person has such information that he or she will have theopportunity to rebut the suspicion entertained by the person makingthe arrest or show that there was some mistake as to identity. It is onlywhen a person has been given the grounds for his or her detention,that meaningful steps could be taken to apply to the AdvisoryCommittee to obtain release from custody. In failing to state thegrounds for arrest and detention, Wimalenthiran's fundamental rightto such information guaranteed by Article 13(1) of the Constitutionwas violated.
Where was Wimalenthiran arrested? According to him, he wasarrested at a lodge at No. 56, Old Moor Street at which he wasresiding. On the other hand, Mr. Hemachandra, SeniorSuperintendent of Police, states in his affidavit that the arrest wasmade at an army check point at Kotahena. The Director of theCriminal Investigation Department in Annexure ’A’ to his letter datedthe 8th of September 1994 addressed to the Attorney-General with acopy to the Registrar of the Supreme Court, which has been filed ofrecord, states that ‘The corpus was taken into custody at NavarajLodge, Colombo 13 by Sergeant K. Gunadasa of the Sri Lanka
Army.’ Discrepancies of this nature cast doubts on the credibility ofthe respondents’ version.
At least this much is undisputed and clear: the arrest was made inColombo and not in an administrative district within the Northern andEastern Provinces, and therefore, the procedure established by lawfor the arrest and detention of Wimalenthiran must be that which wasapplicable to a person arrested outside the Northern and EasternProvinces. This has an important bearing on the proceduresestablished by law which the persons making the arrest had to follow.
Nor is it in dispute that the relevant law is that which was set out inthe Emergency (Miscellaneous Provisions and Powers) Regulationsof 17th June 1993 made by the President under Section 5 of thePublic Security Ordinance and published in Gazette ExtraordinaryNo. 77/16 of 17.06.1993.
Regulation 18(1) states that “Any… member of the armed forcesmay… arrest without warrant, any person who is committing or whomhe has reasonable grounds of suspecting to be concerned in, or tobe committing or to have committed, an offence under anyemergency regualtion… Provided however that any person arrestedor detained in any administrative district outside the Northern andEastern Provinces by a member of the armed forces shall forthwith,and in any event before the end of the period of twenty-four hoursfrom such arrest or detention be handed over to the custody of theofficer-in-charge of the nearest police station.’’
According to paragraph 13 of the affidavit of Wimalenthiran, andparagraph 3(e) of the affidavit of the Attorney-at-law who filed theapplication on behalf of Wimalenthiran, Wimalenthiran was handedover to the CID on the 15th of December 1993. However, SeniorSuperintendent Hemachandra in paragraph 9 of his affidavit statesthat Wimalenthiran was handed over to the CID on the 14th ofDecember 1993. If Wimalenthiran and Arulrajah were dealt with, asfar as detention was concerned, in the same way, the AmnestyInternational report supports the version of Wimalenthiran and that ofthe Attorney-at-Law.
Even if it is assumed that the arrest was made on the 23rd ofOctober 1993 and not on the 2nd of October 1993, there was afailure to comply with the mandatory requirement of Regulation 18(1)that the person arrested should have been handed over to the police“forthwith" and in any event, not later than twenty-four hours after thearrest. The safety of the citizen is better secured by ensuring that thecustody of a person arrested should be with the civil, namely thepolice, rather than the military authorities; and it is best secured whencustody is under judicial authority in an approved prison: Forapproved prisons are governed by laws, regulations and rulesdesigned to protect persons admitted to them and are administeredby trained personnel who are equipped to deal with incarceratedpersons. Moreover, unlike the police, prisons officers have no interestin the success or failure of a prosecution and would, therefore, beless like to treat persons in custody without restraint for the purposeof eliciting information. Clearly the intention of Regulation 18(1) is thatthe person arrested should, as expeditiously as possible, beremoved from the custody of the armed forces and placed in thecustody of the appropriate civil authorities. In the circumstances, thepropriety of the Deputy Inspector-General of Police, directing in hisDetention Order of the 23rd of October 1993 that “VijayanWimalenthiran” (sic.) be detained for seven days at the ArmyCamp, Panagoda, rather than at a place of detention over which thePolice had control, seems questionable. By detaining Wimalenthiranfor more than twenty-four hours in military custody, the armyofficers failed to act in accordance with procedure established by lawand thereby contravened the provisions of Article 13(1) ofConstitution.
Moreover, the duty of the army officers making the arrest was tohand him over to “the officer-in-charge of the nearest police station."If, as Senior Superintendent Hemachandra states in paragraph 5 ofhis affidavit, Wimalenthiran was arrested at a check point atKotahena, he should have been handed over to the officer-in-chargeof the Kotahena Police Station and not to the Criminal InvestigationDepartment. Senior Superintendent Hemachandra states inparagraph 9 of his affidavit that Wimalenthiran was handed over bythe army to the Criminal Investigation Department. That was not what
Regulation 18(1) required, and therefore, the army officers wereacting contrary to the procedure established by law and therebytransgressing the provisions of Article 13(1) of the Constitution.
The new regualtions of June 1993 introduced several safeguardsto ensure the security of persons who are arrested and detainedunder the Emergency Regulations. In order to prevent or minimize'disappearances' and abuses, it is of paramount importance that therequirements laid down by the regulations should be strictlyobserved. They were not intended for merely cosmetic purposes, butfor the sake of fulfilling the basic obligation of the State to ensure thepersonal security and liberty of all persons.
Regulation 18(7) provides that when an arrest is made underRegulation 18(1) it shall be the duty of the arresting officer, where thearresting officer is a member of the armed forces, to report to theCommanding Officer of the area within which the arrest is made,within twenty-four hours of such arrest. It shall be the duty of suchCommanding Officer to "forthwith’’ notify the Human Rights TaskForce of such arrest, setting out all the information relating to suchoffence in the form prescribed for such purpose by the Secretary.
Regulation 18(7) provides that where any person is taken intocustody under the provisions of Regulation 18, it shall be the duty ofthe arresting officer to issue to the spouse, father, mother or any otherclose relative, as the case may be, a document in such Form asspecified by the Secretary, acknowledging the fact of the arrest.
Regulation 19(4) casts two imperative duties on the Secretary of theMinistry of Defence, namely, (1) to cause to be published in theGazette a list of all places authorized by him as places of detention forthe purposes of Regulations 17 and 19; and (2) to notify the existenceand the address of such places of detention to the Magistrate withinwhose jurisdiction such places of detention are located.
Regulation 19(5) requires the officer-in-charge of any placeauthorized by the Secretary as a place authorized for detention forpurposes of Regulations 17 or 19 to furnish once every fourteen daysto the Magistrate within whose local limits of jurisdiction such place ofdetention is located a list containing the names of all personsdetained at such place. The Magistrate shall cause a list to bedisplayed on the notice board of the Court.
Regulation 19(6) requires the Magistrate within whose jurisdictionany such authorized place of detention is situated, to visit such placeof detention at least once in every month and it shall be the duty ofthe officer-in-charge of that place to secure that every persondetained therein, otherwise than by an order of a Magistrate, isproduced before such visiting Magistrate.
Mr. Vinayagamoorthy in his affidavit of the 4th of December 1994specifically states that the respondents failed to comply with theprocedures established by law by (a) not handing over Wimalenthiranto the Kotahena Police immediately after his arrest; (b) failing to notifythe Human Rights Task Force; and (c) failing to inform the relatives ofthe person arrested. I find myself in agreement withMr. Vinayagamoorthy. Indeed, I go further in holding that there is noevidence that the requirements of Regualtions 18(7), 18(8), and19(4), 19(5), 19(6) were complied with in this case.
Regulation 19(2) states that “Any person taken into custody inpursuance of the provisions of Regulation 18 may for the purpose ofinvestigation of the offence in relation to which such person wasarrested be kept in detention upon an order made by a police officernot below the rank of a Deputy-Inspector-General of Police … in aplace authorized by the Secretary …". Regulation 19(4) provides that“The Secretary shall cause to be published in the Gazette a list, withthe addresses of all places authorized by him as places of detentionfor the purposes of Regulations 17 and 19 …". At the relevant time,the authorized places of detention were those published in GazetteExtraordinary No. 773/8 of June 29th, 1993. There were 343authorized places including, prisons, police stations and certain armycamps. The Panagoda Army Camp was not an authorized place ofdetention, and therefore, the detention order was bad in law, andsince the detention under that order was not in accordance with theprocedure established by Regulation 19, it was in transgression of
Article 13(1) of the Constitution. The Army Detention Camp,Panagoda, was listed as an authorized place of detention in GazetteExtraordinary No. 806/6 published on the 15th of February 1994.Admittedly, the order of the Secretary of Defence listing thePanagoda Camp as an authorized place of detention is dated the 1stof October 1993; however, until it was published in the Gazette asrequired by Regulation 19(4). it had no force or, avail: it was at therelevant time, no more than a private proposal of the Secretary, andthe Army Camp at Panagoda, during the period of time relevant tothe matter before us. fell into the category of unauthorized, secretplaces of detention at which no person arrested under Regulation 18could be lawfully detained.
Regulation 17(1) empowers the Secretary where he is satisfiedupon the material submitted to him or upon such additional materialas may be called for by him, with respect to any person, that with aview to prevent such person inter alia, from acting in any mannerprejudicial to the national security or to maintenance of public order, itis necessary to do so, the Secretary may make order that suchperson be taken into custody and detained in custody for a periodnot exceeding three months …" Regulation 17(3) provides that "Anyperson detained in pursuance of an order made under paragraph (1)of this regulation shall be deemed to be in lawful custody and shallbe detained in such place as may be authorized by the Secretaryand in accordance with instructions issued by him …". The detentionof a person at any place designated by the Secretary in a DetentionOrder issued by him does not make such a place one that is'authorized by him'. Places 'authorized' by the Secretary for thepurposes of Regulation 17 are such places as are specified by himas authorized, and of which public notice is given in the Gazette. Thisis very obviously the intention, for Regulation 19(4) provides asfollows: "The Secretary shall cause to be published in the Gazettea list, with the addresses of all places authorized by him as placesof detention for the purposes of Regulations 17 and 19 …”.Regulation 19(4) issued on the 17th of June 1993 clearly, in plainwords, indicated that secrecy was to be displaced by publicity andopenness: The Secretary to the Ministry of Defence in the exercise ofthe powers conferred on him by Regulation 17(1) may order thedetention of persons at specified places provided that he had givennotification in the Gazette of those places. He cannot lawfully orderthat a person be detained at any other place. It is no defence that theSecretary at the relevant time was contemplating or had privatelydecided, that the Army Detention Camp at Panagoda was a suitableplace for keeping persons in custody. The Army Camp at Panagoda,as we have seen, was not, at the time the Detention Order was issuednor during the period covered by that Order, namely a period of threemonths from 19th October 1993, a place authorized by the Secretaryin accordance with the law.
The law takes a serious view of detention at unauthorized places:Regualtion 19(8) provides that "No person shall be detained at anyplace other than a place of detention authorized by the Secretary andwhere any person had been detained contrary to this regulation theperson or persons responsible for such detention shall be guilty of anoffence under these regulations.”
Senior Superintendent of Police Hemachandra states in paragraph9 of his affidavit that Wimalenthiran was handed over to the CriminalInvestigation Department by the Army on the 14th of December 1993and was ‘thereafter detained at the Criminal InvestigationDepartment in pursuance of a Detention Order issued by the 3rdRespondent in terms of the powers vested in him under theprovisions of Regulation 17(1) …”. This was not the case, for on the14th of December 1993 the Detention Order in operation was the oneissued on the 29th of October 1993 in which the place of detentiondesignated by the Secretary was the Panagoda Army Camp. In termsof Regulation 1?(3) “Any person detained in pursuance of an ordermade under paragraph (1) of… Regulation (17)… shall be detainedin such place as may be authorized by the Secretary and inaccordance with instructions issued by him …” Admittedly, as wehave seen, the Panagoda Army Camp was not an ‘authorized’ placeof detention when the Detention Order was made; but it wasnevertheless the designated place of detention; and therefore,Wimalenthiran was not held, as required by Regulation 17(3), *inaccordance with instructions issued by" the Secretary. Thus even the
Secretary defence, let alone members of Wimalenthiran’s family, bylooking at the Detention Order would not have been able to saywhere the person ordered to be detained was between the 14th ofDecember 1993 and the 31st of December 1993. It was in theDetention Order dated the 1st of January 1994 that the place ofdetention is accurately designated.
The Detention Orders dated the 29th of October 1993, 1st January1994 and 8th April 1994 were issued by the Secretary to the Ministryof Defence. Regulation 17(1) empowers the Secretary to the Ministryof Defence to order the detention of a person with a view topreventing such person from acting in any manner prejudicial to thenational security or to the maintenance of public order. However,Regulation 17(1) confers the power “where the Secretary is satisfiedupon the material submitted to him, or upon such further material asmay be called for by him" that “it is necessary” to order the arrest anddetention of the person. The Secretary of the Ministry of Defence isthe third respondent. He did not state either in the DetentionOrders or in an affidavit that he was satisfied upon the materialsubmitted to him or upon such further material as may have beencalled for by him, that with a view to preventing Wimalenthiran fromacting in any manner prejudicial to the national security or to themaintenance of public order, it was necessary to order his arrest anddetention.
Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that Wimalenthiranwas arrested without grounds that justified the entertainment of areasonable suspicion and that therefore the arrest in the first placewas not in conformity with Regulation 18(1). Nor werg there grounds,he submitted, for the making of a, preventive detention order. Therewas no explanation whatsoever by learned counsel who representedhim why the Secretary issued the Detention Orders in the matterbefore us. All that we have is an affidavit from Senior SuperintendentHemachandra in which it is vaguely stated that "Consequent tofurther investigations and the material revealed thereby … VijayamWimalenthiran was further detained at the Army Camp at Panagodain pursuance of a detention order issued by the 3rd respondent interms of the powers vested in him under the provisions of Regulation
17(1) … 2R3'; and that"… Wimalenthiran was handed over to theCriminal Investigation Department by the Sri Lanka Army on 14.12.93and thereafter detained at the Criminal Investigation Department inpursuance of a detention order issued by the 3rd respondent …2R4”; and that “Wimalenthiran was further detained at the CriminalInvestigation Department in pursuance of a detention order issued bythe 3rd respondent… 2R6.* No evidence was placed before us as tothe material that was placed before the Secretary that enabled him toarrive at his decision. All we have is a bald assertion in the DetentionOrders, that the Secretary was of the opinion that it was necessary todetain Wimalenthiran and the equally unhelpful explanations ofSenior Superintendent Hemachandra as to the reasons for thedetention of Wimalenthiran.
The Secretary may be said to be “satisfied* if his decision isreasonable in the sense that it is or can be supported with goodreasons or at any rate be a decision which a reasonable personmight reasonably reach. (Per Denning MR in Secretary of State v.Tameside1"*’> Where the Secretary’s Order is challenged, as it hasbeen in the matter before us, he must take steps to have therelevant material placed before the Court and establish hisaverment by ‘proof positive1 that he was ‘satisfied* in the relevantsense. (E.g. see Kalyani Perera v. Siriwardena (supra); Fernando v.Silva and Others<H), Hirdaramani v. Ratnavale(,2> cited with approvalin Sasanasiritissa Thero v. De Silva and Others (,3>; Malinda ChannaPieris v. Attorney-General (supra)). If the information could not havebeen made public, the Court should have been so informed. Hadthe Court been informed, it would have indicated the procedure tobe followed that would, on the one hand have enabled the Court toassess whether there was material upon which the Secretary couldhave been satisfied, while on the other, ensuring confidentiality inthe public interest. The accepted procedure is that the material ismade available to the Chief Justice who will make the informationavailable to the Judges nominated to hear the matter. (SeeLeelaratne v. Cyril Herath and Others ,M>). According to the Journalentry of the 5th of July 1994, learned counsel for the petitionerstated that he had “no objection to any material which is of aconfidential nature being disclosed by the respondents only to the
Court." However, no material was placed before this Court toestablish that the Secretary was "satisfied" in the relevant sensebefore he made the Detention Orders. On the other hand, as wehave seen, the Human Rights Task Force in its report received bythis Court on the 24th of March 1994 stated as follows:
"With regard to the arrest and detention of the petitioner the ArmyIntelligence Unit has been unable to give a plausible explanation.The petitioner has been in detention for 142 days without beingproduced to a Court of Law. We were therefore obliged to directthe Secretary, Ministry of Defence, to revoke the detention orderand release the petitioner from custody."
Learned State Counsel in his memorandum to this Court,explaining the reasons for the inability of the Attorney-General even inJune 1994 to indict Wimalenthiran, nevertheless stated that theundertaking to indict the prisoner “was given following a confessionmade by the petitioner stating that he was a member of a suicidesquad directed by the LTTE to assissinate the late PresidentRanasinghe Premadasa.” In his affidavit dated the 21st of November1994, Senior Superintendent Hemachandra does not state thatWimalenthiran was a member of a suicide squad, but merely that hewas "closely associated with” three groups of persons who had been“entrusted with the task of assissinating the President and that he hadcollected and supplied information relating to the movements of the…late President." In any event, on what material were theseconclusions based? When were they discovered? Was the materialplaced before and considered by the Secretary to the Ministry ofDefence? I do not know, for the respondents failed to place anymaterial before the Court on those matters.
The Supreme Court has on more than one occasion reminded theSecretary to the Ministry of Defence that he should be able to statethat he himself came to form the opinion, and that the Secretarywould not be acting in conformity with the requirements of Regulation17{1) by acting mechanically as a rubber stamp at the behest of thepolice and signing Detention Orders without exercising his personaljudgment in each case. (E.g. See Weerakoon v. Weeraratne (l51;
Sasanasiritissa Thero and Others v. De Silva and Others, (supra)-,Malinda Channa Pieris and Others v. Attorney-General and Others,(supra). I am of the view that in the absence of materials to establishthat the Secretary was "satisfied”, and in the absence of even astatement to the effect that he was satisfied set out in an affidavit, thatthe Secretary was not in fact "satisfied” and that he had actedmechanically in issuing the detention orders.
There remains for consideration the question whether there was aviolation of Article 13(2) of the Constitution which provides that:
“Every person held in custody, detained or otherwise deprived ofpersonal liberty shall be brought before the judge of the nearestcompetent court according to procedure established by law, andshall not be further held in custody, detained or deprived ofpersonal liberty except upon and in terms of the order of suchjudge made in accordance with procedure established by law.”
Regulation 19(2) provides that a person taken into custody inpursuance of the provisions of Regulation 18:
‘may for the purposes of the offence in relation to which suchperson was arrested be kept in detention … for a period notexceeding sixty days reckoned from the date of his arrest under thatregulation, and should at the end of the period be released unlesssuch person is detained under the provisions of Regulation 17, or isproduced before a court of competent jurisdiction … Provided,however, that when any person is arrested in pursuance ofRegulation 18 in any administrative district outside the Northernand Eastern Provinces in respect of any offence committed in anysuch area, he shall not be detained under these provisions for aperiod in excess of seven days and unless detained under theprovisions of Regulation 17, shall be produced before a Magistratebefore the expiry of such period of detention as is hereinafterprovided or released from custody.’
Wimalenthiran’s position was that he was arrested on the 2nd ofOctober 1993 at No. 56, Old Moor Street in the presence of his father.
Learned Counsel for the respondents repeatedly stated that if thefather was present, an affidavit by the father should have been filed,and that in the absence of such an affidavit the respondents’assertion that he was arrested on the 2nd of October 1993 should berejected. Mr. Goonesekere's simple explanation was that when theson was arrested, the father 'bolted' without trace of his whereabouts.Besides, there is other evidence supporting the version that the arrestwas on the 2nd of October. In the petition and affidavit filed byMr. Vinayagamoorthy, Attorney-at-Law, on behalf of VijayamWimalenthiran, it is stated that Wimalenthiran was taken into custodyat "a lodge at No. 56, Old Moor Street" and thereafter detained in abuilding behind the Indian High Commission. The respondents’maintain that the arrest was made at a check point at Kotahena onthe 23rd of October 1993 at 1730 hours. According to the Director ofthe Criminal Investigation Department, “the corpus was taken intocustody on 23.10.93 at Navaraj Lodge, Colombo 13 by Sergeant K.Gunadasa of the Sri Lanka Army." According to Gunadasa’sstatement Wimalenthiran was arrested on the 23rd of October 1993 at1730 hours and Arulrajah was arrested at Kotahena at a check pointon the 24th of October 1993. According to the reports of AmnestyInternational referred to above, Arulrajah was arrested on 2ndOctober 1993. Learned Counsel for the respondents suggested thatWimalenthiran had obtained his date from the Amnesty Internationalreport. However, the 2nd of October was the date specified in theapplication to this Court embodying the instructions given byWimalenthiran to his Attorney-at-Law. That application is datedthe 31st of January and bears the date stamp of this Court marked‘1994 – 1-31." The Amnesty International report was issued inFebruary 1994. The report was submitted by Wimalenthiran with hisaffidavit of the 3rd of December 1994. The Amnesty Internationalaccount of the case of Arulrajah, both with regard to the date ofarrest, the places of detention at various times, and the sequence ofevents, corroborates the version of his co-prisoner – Wimalenthiran.There is no reason why Amnesty International should have inventedthe dates mentioned by them.
On the other hand, there was an understandable reason why the1st, 2nd and 3rd respondents should insist that the arrest was on the
23rd of October: If the respondents admitted that the arrest tookplace on tfie 2nd of October, they would not have been able toexplain the detention of Wimalenthiran from 2nd October – 23rdOctober, for they had no detention order covering that period.Learned Counsel for the respondents stated that it would have beenpossible for the Detention Orders to have been dated from the 2nd ofOctober: the necessary implication that dates are capable ofmanipulation is, to say the least, disturbing. According to the affidavitof Mr. Vinayagamoorthy dated the 31st of January 1994,Wimalenthiran was held at the secret place of detention by the sea tillthe 11th of December and then transferred to the Army Camp atFanagoda. On the 15th of December he was handed over to the CID.This is the sequence of events reported by Amnesty International withregard to Wimalenthiran’s co-prisoner, Arulrajah. The AmnestyInternational report states that Arulrajah was arrested on the 2nd ofOctober and detained at the army camp behind the Indian HighCommission until he was transferred “on or about 10 December" toPanagoda Camp and handed over to the CID “on or about 15December". I am of the view that Wimalenthiran was arrested on the2nd of December 1993.
The period of detention specified in the Order issued in terms ofRegulation 19(2) was seven days. In terms of the proviso toRegualtion 19(2) any person arrested outside the Northern andEastern Province in respect of any offence committed in such areashall not be detained for a period in excess of seven days, andunless detained under the provisions of Regulation 17, shall beproduced before a Magistrate before the expiry of such period asis hereinafter provided or released from custody. DetentionOrders under Regulation 17 were therefore issued on 29th of October1993, 1st January and 8th April 1994 to enable Wimalenthiran to bekept in detention without being produced before a Magistrate. SinceWimalenthiran was arrested on the 2nd of October, 1993, it was nodefence that Detention Orders under Regulation 17 had been issuedcovering the period 29th October 1993 till 23rd April 1994 when hewas produced before a Magistrate. In my view, in terms of Regulation19(3), since, as we have seen, there was no reasonable cause forfurther detention, Wimalenthiran should have been produced beforea Magistrate within forty-eight hours after the arrest on 2nd October1993; or if, as the respondents contend, there was reasonable causefor detention, then within seven days from the 2nd of October 1993.Having failed to bring Wimalenthiran before a Magistrate within theprescribed time, whether the relevant time was forty-eight hours orseven days, the 1st, 2nd and 3rd respondents acted in violation of hisConstitutional rights guaranteed by Article 13(2).
For the reasons explained in my judgment, I declare that VijayamWimalenthiran's fundamental rights under Article 13(1) and Article13(2) of the Constitution were violated by the 1st, 2nd and 3rdrespondents.
The State shall pay Vijayam Wimalenthiran a sum of Rs. 25,000/-as compensation and a sum of Rs. 5,000/- as costs.
WIJETUNGA, J. -1 agree.ANANDACOOMARASWAMY, J. – I agree.
Relief Granted.