Simon v. The Commissioner of National Housing
1972Present:Walgampaya, J., and Wimalaratne, J.W. D. SIMON and 3 others, Appellants, and THE COMMISSIONEROF NATIONAL HOUSING and 3 others, RespondentsS. C. 629j71—Application for a Writ of Certiorari underSection 42 of the Courts Ordinance
Protection of Tenants (Special Provisions) Act No. 28 of 1970—Section 5 (2)—Ejectment of a tenant other than by order of Court—Tenant's complaint toCommissioner—Inquiry held by Commissioner—Procedure—Natural justice—Inquiry of a quasi-judicial nature—Bias of the inquiring officer—Proof—Difference between “ real likelihood ” test and ‘ reasonable suspicion " test—Certiorari.
On 9th July 1971 a tenant of certain premises complained to the Commissionerof National Housing that she had been ejected from the premises by her landlordin contravention of the provisions of section 5(1) of the Protection of Tenants(Special Provisions) Act. Thereupon an Assistant Commissioner commencedan inquiry in terms of section 5 (2) of the Act. On. 15th October 1971, whichwas the sixth date of the inquiry, Counsel for the landlord objected to theAssistant Commissioner continuing with tho inquiry on the ground of biason tho part, of that officer. . It was alleged that on 9th October the tenant,and on 10th October the tenant's Counsel, had been having private talks withthe inquiring officer in his room concerning the pending inquiry.
Held, that, when conducting an inquiry of a quasi-judicial nature, the inquiringofficer, such as a Commissioner holding an inquiry under section 5 (2) (a) ofthe Protection of Tenants (Special Provisions) Act No. 28 of 1970, must complywith' the well known rules of natural justice. One of these rules is that hemust be disinterested and unbiased! But a decision of the inquiring officeris not liable to be quashed by the Supreme Court on the ground merely of thereasonable suspicion of the party aggrieved unless'it is proved that there wasa real likelihood that the inquiring officer was biased against the party aggrieved.
Held further, (i) that, when an Assistant Commissioner decides at an inquiryheld by him under soction 6 (2) (a) of the Protection of Tenants (SpecialProvisions) Act that a tenant has been deprived of his right to use the premises,the decision may be communicated to the landlord in the form of an Orderby another Assistant Commissioner.
(ii) that the Commissioner is not bound by the rules of evidence and procedureapplicable to a trial before a Court.
Application for a Writ of Certiorari.
R. S. R. Coomarastcamy, with N. Satyendra, S. C. B. Walgampayaand Mias P. de Alwis, for the petitioners.
Musthapha, State Counsel, for the 1st, 2nd and 3rd respondents.
W. Jayewardene, with Oamini Dissanayake, for the 4th respondent..
Cur. adv. mtU.
■472 WIMALARATNE, J. —Simon v. The Commissioner of National Housing
July 19, 1972. Wimalaratne, J.—
The petitioners 3eek in these proceedings a Mandate in the natureof a Writ of Certiorari to quash certain proceedings held by the 2ndrespondent, M. J. Silva, Asst. Commissioner of National Housing,and an Order dated 16.10.71 made by the 3rd respondent S. Chelliah,Asst. Commissioner of National Housing, under Section 5 (2) of theProtection of Tenants (Special Provisions) Act No. 28 of 1970, directingthem to hand over possession of premises No. 244, Jubilee Post Junction,Mirihana, to the 4th respondent, Rita Rat nay ate.
The 4th respondent complained to the Commissioner of NationalHousing on 9.7.71 that she, the tenant of these premises, was forciblyejected by the landlord and some others in contravention of Section5 (1) of the Act. When such a complaint is made the Commissioner isempowered, by section 5 (2) (a) of the Act, to hold an inquiry for thepurpose of deciding the question whether or not such tenant has beenejected from such premises. After entertaining the 4th respondent’scomplaint Rl, the 3rd respondent visited and inspected the premiseson 10.7.71 in the presence of the 4th respondent, the 1st petitioner(the landlord), his son the 2nd petitioner, intended son-in-law the 3rdpetitioner and the 4th petitioner, brother of the 3rd petitioner. The3rd respondent informed the parties that a proper inquiry would beheld later.
Section 5 (2) (6) provides that the landlord and the person ejectedshall be given an opportunity of being heard at such inquiry. TheCommissioner’s decision on the question “ shall be final and conclusive,and shall not be called in question in any Court, whether by way ofWrit, Order, Mandate or otherwise ”.
The Petitioners were, by letter PI, summoned for an inquiry. Theinquiry commenced on 12.8.71 before the 3rd respondent. Thepetitioners were represented by Advocate Miss Maureen Seneviratne,and the 4th respondent by Advocate Mr. S. Parameswaran. At theoutset Counsel for the petitioners objected to the 3rd respondent holdingthe inquiry on the ground that he had inspected the premises on 10.7.71.The inquiry was thereupon held before the 2nd respondent, commencingon 20.8.71, on which date certain issues were formulated, after whichthe 4th respondent gave evidence. The resumed dates of inquiry,namely 11th September, 18th September, 25th September and 9thOctober were devoted mainly to the cross-examination of 4th respondentby Counsel for the petitioners, and to legal arguments on the admissibilityof certain items of evidence which Counsel sought to elicit incross-examination.
WTMALARATlvE, J.—Simon v. The Commissioner of National Housing 473
On the next date of inquiry, namely 15th October, Counsel for thepetitioners objected to the 2nd respondent continuing with the inquiryand formulated her objections in the following terms :—
“ (a) that on 9th October, after the inquiry was adjourned,my clients have received information that approximately 15minutes after I left the inquiry hall, you came out of theinquiry hall with Mrs. Rita Ratnayake and told her on thecorridor “ Don’t worry. I shall not allow her to go on indefi-. nitely Saying this you walked towards your room with Mrs.Rita Ratnayake.-
(6) that on 10th October, Advocate Mr. S. Parameswaran,Counsel for Mrs. Rita Ratnayake, had entered your room andwas engaged in conversation with you for approximately twoand half hours.
I shall support the alorementioned statements with evidencebefore the proper authority.
It is a fundamental rule that justice should not only be donebut manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done.
My clients in the circumstances are convinced that they willnot have a fair hearing before you. ”
The record Z (at page 43) shows that Counsel also stated " I withdrawfrom the inquiry with my clients ”. The 2nd respondent ruled thatthe inquiry would proceed. Thereupon Counsel walked out with herclients^ the petitioners. After a short adjournment the inquiry wasresumed. The 4th respondent was re-examined and the 3rd respondentChelliah also gave evidence regarding his inspection of 10th July, beforeCounsel closed his case for the 4th respondent. The inquiring officerthereupon recorded the evidence of two other Asst. CommissionersSamaranayake and Kapugeekiyana, and after answering the. issueBearlier formulated, made order that 4th respondent shall be entitledto have the use and occupation of the premises restored to her andthat 1st petitioner and every other person holding under him of thesaid premises shall vacate and deliver vacant possession to the4th respondent.
This order waB communicated by the 3rd respondent Chelliah to thepetitioners by document P7 dated 16.10.71. It is this order and theproceedings held before the 2nd respondent M. J. Silva from 20.8.71 to15.10.71 that the petitioners seek to have declared null and void. Intheir petition the petitioners plead that the order contained in P7 isillegal and made contrary to the principles of natural justice in that—
the order has been made by the 3rd respondent, who did nothold the inquiry;
the 2nd respondent should not have conducted the inquiry inview of the objections taken by Counsel and referred to earlier ;
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474 WIMAX.ARATNE, J.—Simon v. The Commissioner of National Bousing
the petitioners have not been informed of the findings madeagainst them by the 2nd respondent; and
the order P7 impliedly directs them to do an illegal act, namelyto eject all persons in occupation of the premises because thepetitioners are neither the landlords of those persons, nor theowners of the premises.
Ground (6) above is the main ground on which arguments have beenadduced before us. It is conceded for the respondents that theCommissioner holding an inquiry under Section 5 (2) (a) of the Protectionof Tenants (Special Provisions) Act performs functions quasi-judicialin nature. It is a rule of law that in conducting such an inquiry hemust comply with the well known rules of natural justice. One ofthose rules is that he must be disinterested and unbiased. In orderto establish the charge of bias against M. J. Silva the petitioners relyupon an affidavit of one Daya Weerasekera, dated 15.10.71, which isthe document P4. In that document Weerasekera refers to twoincidents—
On 9.10.71 he was present at the Housing Department from9 a.m. to 3.30 p.m. waiting to be called for an inquiry to whichhe had been summoned. Approximately 15 minutes after CounselMis3 Seneviratne had left the inquiry room he saw M. J. Silvacoming out of the same room in the company of Rita Ratnayakeand her lawyer. Whilst passing him he overheard M. J. Silvasay “ Don’t worry. I shall not allow her to go on indefinitely
On 10.10.71 (Sunday) he was again in the same Departmentfrom 9.30 a.m. to 3 p.m. waiting till he was called to give evidence.He saw Advocate Parameswaran entering M. J. Silva’s room andengaging in a conversation which lasted approximately 2£ hours.He himself had occasion to enter that room in order to take atelephone call; just then the conversation stopped.
This is the only evidence relied upon by the petitioners in proof ofthe allegation of bias against the 2nd respondent. As against this thereare the affidavits of Advocate Parameswaran, of the 2nd respondentand of the 4th respondent. In his affidavit marked “ X ”, AdvocateParameswaran denies the incident of he 9th; he says that he, the4th respondent and her husband left the inquiry hall together, and2nd respondent did not on that occasion speak to them. That statementis supported by the affidavits of the 2nd and 4th respondents. Withregard to the incident of the 10th Advocate Parameswaran’s versionis that he went to the Housing Department for the purpose of inspectingthe proceedings of the previous day.' A little after 11 a.m. when hewas passing M. J. Silva’s office the latter called him in and asked himwhy he was there. Just then a cup of tea was brought in by a peonand M. J. Silva offered him this cup of tea and ordered anotherfor himself. They were engaged in a casual conversation for about10 minutes and he left thereafter. He emphatically denies that he
WXMALARATNE, J.—Simon v. The Commissioner of National Housing 475
discussed with M. J. Silva anything pertaining to the inquiry. M. J.Silva’s affidavit regarding the incident of the 10th is substantially thesame. Advocate Parameswaran was accompanied on that date by aPolice Constable Ramapillai who has also made an affidavit, markedY. He corroborates Parameswaran regarding the duration of theirstay in the Housing Department.
Learned Counsel for the petitioners invites us to act upon theaffidavit of Daya Weerasekera, a person said to be disinterested in theresult of this inquiry. If he is believed, Counsel contends it would meanthat the inquiring officer by reason of his words, deeds and associationwith a party to the proceedings made himself suspected of partisanship,On a careful consideration of the affidavit, in the light of the surroundingcircumstances, I have como to the conclusion that it is unsafe to quashthe proceedings on that affidavit alone.
Weerasekera made his affidavit five days after the incident of the10th. Weerasekera must have met Mr. Hilton Seneviratne, Proctor,on the 10th or soon thereafter, because on his own affidavit, he steppedinto M. J. Silva’s room to convey an urgent telephone message on behalfof,Mr. Hilton Seneviratne. The delay of five days in making his affidavitappears to me to be inordinate, under the circumstances.
When Miss Seneviratne stated her objections before M. J. Silva onthe 10th it would appear that she did not have with her Weerasekera’saffidavit. There are at least two discrepancies between what she toldM. J. Silva and what: Weerasekera has put down in the affidavit P4.According to P4-M. J. Silva came out of the inquiry room with RitaRatnayake and her Counsel, but from what Miss Seneviratne statedthe impression one gets is that M. J. Silva and Rita Ratnayake cameout of the room alone. Again, according to P4 Weerasekera was inthe Housing Department on the 10th from 9.30 a.m. but Miss Seneviratne’astatement was that Advocate Parameswaran had entered M. J. Silva’sroom at about 9 a.m. It is therefore a safe inference that Weerasekeramade the affidavit P4 only after Miss Seneviratne stated her objectionson the 10th and after she walked out of the inquiry room withthe petitioners.
Weerasekera has not been seen or heard by us. He is said to bedisinterested, but the opposite party has not had an opportunity ofcross-examining him and if possible establishing his interest. Not asingle statement in P4 is corroborated by other evidence. On the otherhand the counter affidavits filed on behalf of the respondentscontradicted Weerasekera on many material particulars. One of thecounter affidavits is from an Advocate of this Court, against whomnothing has been urged, except that he has been counsel for the 4threspondent.
For all these reasons I have come to the conclusion that the petitionershave not proved the incident of the 9th. With regard to the incidentof the 10th, what has been established is that Advocate Parameswaran
476WIMALAP.ATNE, J.—Simon v. The Commissioner of National Housing
met M. J. Silva quite by chance when he went to the Housing Departmentat about 11 a.m. He had a conversation with M. J. Silva for about20 minutes, in the course of which he was offered and drank a cup of'tea. There was no discussion about the pending inquiry.
Do these facts accepted by us as established constitute " bias ” onthe part of M. J. Silva ? As stated earlier in this judgment M. J. Silvawas a person holding an inquiry of a quasi judicial nature. The mainprinciples evolved with regard to the conduct of Judges and Magistrateshave been applied with appropriate modifications, to the exercise of'judicial and quasi-judicial functions by bodies other than Courts andin this case we prefer to apply the same standard as we wouldto a Judge performing judicial functions. Even where the evidenceadduced has pointed strongly to the inference that an adjudicator wasin fact biased, the Courts have confined themselves to determiningwhether a real likelihood of bias has been established. And this questionis to be answered by inferences drawn from the circumstances S. A.de Smith in Judicial Review of Administrative Action (2nd Edition)p. 243.
It is however contended on behalf of the petitioners that Courts haveoften quashed decisions on the strength of the reasonable suspicionof the party aggrieved, without having made any finding that a reallikelihood of bias in fact existed. This “ suspicion n test derived supportfrom the well known judgment of Lord Hewart C.J., in R v. SussexJustices. Ex. p. Mc.Carthy 1 (1924) 1 K B. 259 “ A long line of casesshows that it is not merely of some importance but is of fundamentalimportance that justice should not only be dona, but should manifestlyand undoubtedly be seen to be done …. Nothing is to be'donewhich creates even a suspicion that there has been an improper,interference with the course of justice ”.
However, in R v. Camborne Justices, Ex. p. Pearce 2 (1954) 2 A.E.R850 Slade J. had this observation to make (at p. 853) “ While endorsingand fully maintaining the integrity of the principle reasserted by LordHewart, C.J., this Court feels that the continued citation of it in casesto which it is not applicable may lead to the erroneous impression thatit is more important that justice should appear to be done than thatit should in fact be done ”. The Court applied the “ real likelihood ”of bias test and held that where a member of a County Council sat asClerk to Justices in cases where the prosecution was conducted on behalfof the Council of which he was a member, there was no real likelihoodof bias.
In Regina v. Barnsley Licensing Justices3 (1960) 2 Q. B. 1G7an application for a spirit licence at a drug store was granted to aCo-operative Society by seven Licensing Justices, six of whom were *
* (lost) 3 A. E. R. 850.
(1934) 1 K. B. 259.
* (1960) 2 Q. B. 167.
WIMAXARATNE, J.—Simon v. The Commissioner of National Housing 477
members of the Co-operative Society. An Order was sought to quash thedecision of the justices, and Devlin L. J. said “ I cannot imagine anythingmore unsatisfactory from the public point of view than applicationsof this sort being dealt with by a bench which was so composed, ..
But, in my judgment, it is not the test. We have not to inquire whatimpression might be left in the minds of the present applicants or inthe minds of the public generally. We have to satisfy ourselves thatthere was a real likelihood of bias ….“ Real likelihood ”
depends on the impression which the Court gets from the circumstancesin which the justices were sitting. Do they give rise to a real likelihoodthat the justices were biased ? at p. 187.
Two other decisions have been referred to in the course of the argument.In Metropolitan Properties Co. (F.G.C.) Ltd. v. Lannon1 (1968) 3 WeeklyLaw Reports 694, the Chairman of a Rent Assessment Committee wasalso a Solicitor who advised in disputes with landlords. Although theCourt of Appeal held that the fact relating to the Chairman’s connectionwith tenants was such as to give the reasonable impression that hewas biased, even though there was no actual bias on his part, LordDenning M.R. observed “ The Court does not look to see if there was areal likelihood that he would or did in fact favour one side at the expenseof the other. The Court looks at the impression which would be givento other people …. The Court will not inquire whether hedid, in fact, favour one side unfairly, suffice it that reasonable peoplemight think he did. The reason is plain enough. Justice must berooted in confidence : and confidence is destroyed when right-mindedpeople go away thinking :‘ The Judge was biased ’ ” at p.- 707.
In Hannam v. Bradford City Council2 (1970) 2 A.E.R. 690 the“ suspicion ” test was applied again in a case where three governors ofa school sat on a Sub-Committee appointed to inquire into the dismissalof a teacher. The decision of the Sub-Committee was later approvedby the full Council of the governors. Sachs L. J. took the view thatno materially different results were produced by the application of thereal likelihood of bias test urged by Counsel for the Council and the teatapplied by the County Court Judge whether a reasonable man wouldsay that a real danger of bias existed, and he said “ If there is such adifference I uphold the latter and respectfully adhere to the school ofthought adopted in Lannon'a case, for the reasons there given by LordDenning M.R. ” at p. 694.
“ In so far as the ‘ real likelihood ’ and the * reasonable suspicion ’tests are inconsistent with each other ” submits de Smith (at p. 246)“ the former is normally to be preferred ; the reviewing Court shouldmake an objective determination, on the basis of the whole evidencebefore it, whether there was a real likelihood that the inferior tribunalwould be biased ”. It is the same view that T. S. Fernando, J. took in
1 (1938) W. L. R. 694.
(1970) 9 A. S. R. 690.
478 WXMALARATNE, J.—Simon *. The Commissioner of National Bousing
In re Batnagopal1 (1968) 70 New Law Reports 409 when he said “ Theproper test to be applied is, in my opinion, an objective one and I wouldformulate it somewhat on the following lines:Would a reasonable
man, in all the circumstances of the case, believe that there was a reallikelihood of the Commissioner being biased against him ? I agreewith the respondents’ Counsel that the burden on a person seeking toshow reasonable cause is to satisfy this objective test on a balance ofprobability ” at p. 436. No doubt that was a case where the personcomplaining of bias was a person who had been called upon to showcause for his refusal to be Bworn as a witness under section 12 (1) of theCommissions of Inquiry Act (Cap. 393), but the principle enunciatedwould, in our view, also apply to persons complaining of bias on thepart of a person acting in a quasi-judicial capacity.
In order to demonstrate that under all the circumstances of thiscase there was no real likelihood of bias on the part of M. J. Silva therecord of the proceedings from 20.8.71 to 15.10.71 were subjected tocareful analysis by learned Counsel for the 4th respondent. He submitsthat far from being biased against the petitioners, M. J. Silva had givenwide latitude to Counsel for the petitioners, latitude to the extent thathe could be criticised for allowing the course of the inquiry to be divertedfrom the issues that were involved to an inquiry into a numberof irrelevant matters. A reading of the proceedings shows that Counselfor the petitioners had been given a very wide latitude when she cross-examined the 4th respondent for nearly three days, and when the onlysubstantial issue the 2nd respondent had to decide was the questionas to whether the 4th respondent had been ejected from the premises.Most of the objections taken by Counsel for the 4th respondent wereoverruled and Counsel for the petitioners succeeded in asking fromthe 4th respondent almost all the questions that were objected to. Theproceedings considered as a whole leave no room whatsoever for theview that there was a real likelihood of bias on the part of M. J. Silvaagainst the petitioners.
The complaint that Advocate Mr. Parameswaran saw M. J. Silvaalone in the latter’s office room is to be viewed in the light of M. J. Silva’saffidavit that Advocate Miss Seneviratne had also occasion to see himalone in his office room on 7.9.71 to seek a postponement of the inquiryon the ground that she was engaged elsewhere on that day. I do notthink that Advocate Mr. Parameswaran went to M. J. Silva’s officeroom on the 10th in order to influence him. For the reasons statedabove I take the view that the petitioners have not establishedground (6).
Another ground (c) relied upon is that the petitioners have not beeninformed upto date of the findings made against them by the2nd respondent. This ground may conveniently be taken up withground (a) that the order has been made by the 3rd respondent who
1 (1098) 10 N. L. B. 409.
WMALARATNE. J.—Simon v. The Oommieeioner of National Bousing 479
did not himself conduct the inquiry. What the law contemplatesis a decision by the Commissioner that a tenant or person in occupationof premises has been ejected and a written communication bythe Commissioner to every person in occupation of the premises in theform of an order that they shall vacate the premises on a specified dateand deliver possession thereof to the person ejected. By virtue ofSection 14, “ Commissioner ” includes an “ Assistant Commissioner ”.One Assistant Commissioner, namely the 2nd respondent, has decidedthat the 4th respondent has been ejected, meaning thereby that shehas been deprived, by using direct or indirect methods, of her fightto use the premises. That decision has been communicated in theform of an Order P7 by another Assistant Commissioner, namely the3rd respondent, who is the officer in charge of all matters relating tothe implementation of the provisions of the Act. The 3rd respondenthas only performed the administrative act of communicating the order,and we see nothing irregular in that procedure.
It has also been pointed out that whereas M. J. Silva’s Order wasthat the 1st petitioner and every other person holding under him shallvacate the premises and deliver possession to the 4th respondent, theorder communicated in P7 is that every person who is presently inoccupation shall vacate the premises and that 4th respondent who hasbeen forcibly ejected be restored to the occupation of the premises.The 3rd respondent’s Order seems to me to be in conformity with Section5 (2) (c) (ii) of the Act, and with the answers to the issues formulatedat the inquiry. Grounds (a) and (c) also fail.
Yet another objection formulated as ground (d) is that the3rd respondent has by the said order impliedly directed the petitionersto do an illegal act, namely to eject all persons now in occupation. Theycomplain that they are unable to implement this order since presentlythere are persons who are in lawful occupation of the premises whowere not parties to the inquiry and the petitioners are not the landlordsof such persons. The simple answer to this argument is thatthe petitioners are not called upon to eject the persons presently inoccupation. The Commissioner has, by virtue of the powers vestedin him under Section 5 (2) (o) (ii) ordered them to be ejected. On failureto comply with such order the Commissioner seeks to enforce the orderby instituting proceedings in the Magistrate’s Court under Section 6.There is therefore no illegal act which the petitioners have been calledupon to perform.
Although the ground was not taken in their petition, learned Counselfor the petitioners has complained that the inquiring officer has notcomplied with the rules of procedure and evidence. He has attackedthe procedure adopted by M. J. Silva after petitioners’ Counsel withdrewfrom the inquiry. M. J. Silva had called as witnesses two AssistantCommissioners Samaranayake and Kapugeekiyana to give evidence ofwhat they discovered on a perusal of the information book of the
480 WIMALARATNE, J.—Simon v. The Commissioner oj National Housing
Mirihana Police Station, a procedure in complete violation ofthe provisions of the Evidence Ordinance. It has been argued thatproceedings before the Commissioner are judicial proceedings beforea “ Court ” within the meaning of Section 2 (1) of the Evidence Ordinanceand that the Evidence Ordinance applies to such proceedings.
Before the enactment of this statute, a tenant illegally dispossessedof property had to resort to his common law remedy enforceable inthe ordinary Courts. It is common knowledge that that procedureis cumbersome, and does not provide speedy relief. It is in order toprovide a less cumbersome procedure and a speedy remedy thatParliament enacted this law “ to prevent landlords from ejecting tenantsby resort to threats, violence and harassment …. and to providefor matters incidental thereto or connected therewith . The jurisdictionto decide the question as to whether a tenant had been forcibly ejectedwas vested in an administrative officer and his powers were defined inSections 5, 6 and 7. Where a statute is silent as to the procedure to befollowed by him in determining the truth or falsity of a given allegation,it is for him to determine the procedure to be followed as he thoughtbest, but with due regard to the principles of natural justice—The University of Ceylon' v. Fernando1 (1960) 61 New Law Reports 505.As was stated by Lord Loveburn in Board of Education v. Rice 2 (1911)A.C. 179 the Commissioner was not bound to treat the matter as ifit were a trial ; it was only lawful for him to examine any witnessesif he thought fit to do so, but he could obtain information in anywayhe thought best. If it was the intention of Parliament that theCommissioner was to be bound by the rules of evidence and procedureapplicable in a trial before a Court, then Parliament need not haveremoved the jurisdiction of the Courts and vested in an administrativeofficer the question of deciding whether a tenant had been unlawfully-ejected. To equate an inquiry before the Commissioner to a trial beforea Court would be to pull the language of Parliament to pieces and todefeat the very purpose for which the legislation was enacted.
The application of the Petitioners is refused with costs payable tothe four respondents as follows :—Rs. 105. to 1-3 Respondents andRs. 105 to 4th Respondent.
Walqampaya, J.—I agree.
1 (I960) 61 N. L. R. SOS.
(1911) A. a. 179.
W. D. SIMON and 3 others, Appellants, and THE COMMISSIONER OF NATIONAL HOUSING a