W. T. MARTIN PERERA, Petitioner, and M. R. M. W. MADADOMBE, Respondent

009-NLR-NLR-V-73-W.-T.-MARTIN-PERERA-Petitioner-and-M.-R.-M.-W.-MADADOMBE-Respondent.pdf


H. N. G. FERNANDO, C.J.—Martin Perera v. Madadombe
25
1969 Present : H. N. G. Fernando, C.J., Slrimane, J., andSamerawickrame, J.W.T. MARTIN PERERA, Petitioner, and M. R. M. W. MADADOMBE,
Respondent
S. C. 34S/19SS—Application for a Mandate in the nature of a Writ of QuoWarranto under Section 42 of the Courts Ordinance
Local authorities—Election of a member of a local authority—Whether its validity canbe challenged on ground of general undue influence and/or general treating—Quo Warranto—Village Councils Act, s, Jo—State Council (Elections) Orderin Council, 1021, ss. 48, 74—Local Authorities Elections Ordinance {Cap. 262),ss. 9, 9 {l){k), JO, 24 to DO, 79, 81, S3—Interpretation of statutes—Introductionof a single section of an Act into another Act—Effect on interpreting the latterAct.
Gonoral undue influence.or general treating is not a ground under the LocalAuthorities Ordinance to challenge, by -way of Quo Warranto proceeding, thevalidity of the election of a member for the ward of a Village Council. Thoprinciple that an election must bo free, in the sense that votes of electors mustnot be influenced by general bribery or general undue influence, is not recognizedby the implications to be inferred from section C9 of tbo Local AuthoritiesElections Ordinance.
Piyadasa v. Goontsinha (42 N. L. R. 339) overruled.
Where a single Section of an Act is introduced into another Act, it must beread in tho sonse which it bore in the original Act from which it was taken.Accordingly, section 69 of the Local Authorities Elections Ordinance must begiven the same meaning os the “ model ” section 43 of the State Council (Elec-. tions) Order in Council, 1931, unless it can reasonably bear a different meaningin its own context.
Application for a writ of quo warranto on the respondent who was,at an election held in June 1963,declared eloeted as a member for thoWard of a Village Council.
Miss Maureen Seneviratne, with W. M. Oliver Perera and Miss NirmalaSandrasagara, for the petitioner.
Fritsz Kodagoda, with Neil Dias, for the respondent.
if. L. de Silva, Crown Counsel, for the Attomoy-General, on notice.
Cur. adv. vult.
December.4, 1969. H. N. G. Fernando, C.J.—
This is an application for issue of a Mandate in the nature of a Writ' of Quo WarTanto on the respondent who' was at an olection held in Juno1968 declared elected as a member for the Ward of a Village Council.lxxui—2
!•—J 13733—2,255 (5/70)
26
H. X. G. FEKYAXDO, C.J.—Martin Pcrcra v. Madadombe
Tho ground of the application for tho Writ is that tho election of therespondent was invalid as tho election was procured by general undueinfluence, general treating, and/or contravention of specific provisionsof tho Local Authorities Election Ordinance, Cap. 2C2. Xo argumentwas addressed to us that tho Writ should issue on tho third of thesegrounds.
In tho case of Perera v. Wichramatunga 1 an application for a Writ ofQuo Warranto against a Municipal Councillor averred grounds of unduoinfluence and general intimidation. Tho application was refused by aBench of two Judges, the Court holding that such averments "do notafford a logal ground for declaring on a Writ of Quo Warranto that thorespondent has no right to hold the office of member of tho ColomboMunicipal Council to which ho was elected at a general election Amoro precise statement of the reason was that Cap. 202 “ did not includeprovisions to invalidato an election on grounds of general corrupt orillegal practice. ” The decision just mentioned was followed by anotherBench of two Judges in an unreported ease (Application Xo. 40—S. C.Minutes of 15th Xovember, I960).
The present case has been listed before a Bench of three Judges becauseit appeared to mo desirable to settle the conflict between the two decisionsjust cited, and a series of earlier decisions bj1- single Judges holding thata Writ of Quo Warranto would lie against a member of a local authorityif his election is held to have been invalid on grounds such as generaltreating or general intimidation. In the case of Piijadasa v. Goonesinha2 ;Soertsz J. considered an objection that Quo Warranto does not lie to ;question a Municipal Election on the ground of either general undue .influence or general bribery. The objection there taken was foundedon tho fact that the Colombo Municipal Council (Constitution) Ordinance _(Cap. 194 of tho 1938 Edition) was silent in regard to general bribery andgeneral undue influence, and it was argued that it must be assumed thattho Legislature did not intend that the election could be impeached onsuch grounds. Soertsz J. however cited certain observations made inEnglish Election Cases that " freedom of election is at common lawabsolutely essential to tho validity of an election ”, and also that " itwould bo absurd and unnatural to contend that there could be a validelection which was not a free election ”; and ho himself proceeded tostate that "our Ordinance bases itself on the English principle when itpenalizes individual acts of bribery and of undue influence and thatpresupposes that wo here abhor an election procured by general briberyand general undue influence and regard it as obnoxious to tho law justas much as the inhabitants of England and other countries Thisdecision of Soertsz J. was followed in a number of other cases.*
1 (19S6) 69 X. L. JR. 176.* (1944) 45 N. L. R. 304.
* (1641) 42 N. L. R. 339.• (1951) 53 N. L. R. 154.
■ * (1941) 43 N-. Jj. R. 36. *(1945) 46 N. L. R. 522.
(1951) 53 N. L. R. 460,
H. N. G. FERXAXDO, C.J.—Marlin Pcrera v. MadaJombe
27
No examination was made during the argument of the present caso oftho relevant provisions of tho Ordinance under which tho election inGoonesinha's case was held; but bccauso Counsel for tho petitioner hasjustifiably relied on the decision in that case, wc havo to consider whethertho opinion expressed by Socrtsz J. should bo adopted in construing thelaw now contained in Cap. 2G2 of our Enactments.
Section 9 of Cap. 2G2 provides for tho disqualifications for membershipof any Local Authority, including a Village Council. Section 10 thereafterdeclares that " whero any member of a local authoritj- is, by reason oftho operation of any of tho provisions of Section 9, disqualified fromsitting or voting as a member of such authority, his seat or office shallipso facto become vacant Sub-scction (2) of s. 10 provides that “ wheretho soat or office of a member of a local authority becomes vacant byreason of the operation of tho provisions of sub-scction (1), the provisionsof the enactment by or under which such authority is constituted shallapply for the purpose of filling up the vacant scat or office in like inaimcr• os they would havo applied if such member had resigned his seat oroffice ”.
It seems fairly clear therefore that if a member of a local authority ^becomes disqualified for such membership at some time after his election,there is in Cap. 2G2 express provision to tho effect that ho will therebyvacato his scat, and also that, the vacancy must be filled under theprocedure prescribed in the relevant Statute for a case of resignation.In the case of a Village Council, that procedure is to be found in s. 15 ofthe Village Councils Act. That section provides that in tho event of amember of a Village Council resigning his office, a byc-cleetion shall beheld for the purpose of filling up that vacancy. Part IV of Cap. 2G2 willthen apply for the purjjose of the holding of tho bye-clection. Sincethere is thus express statutory provision for the unseating of a memberwho becomes dis-qualified after the time of his election, it docs not appearthat in such a case there will be a need cither for some person to seek, orfor this Court to grant, relief by way of a Writ of Quo Warranto.
It is not equally clear however whether s. 10 of Cap. 2G2 is applicablein a case in which a person has been elected as a member of a localauthority despite the fact that ho was disqualified at and before the timeof his election. In fact it maj- even be correct that's. 10 docs not providea perfectly efficient means of unseating a member who after his electionbecomes subject't o'somo disqualification. But one matter aV'lcast**isdefinitely stated in ss. 9 and 10 of Cap. 2G2, namely that a person who issubject to any of tho disqualifications specified in that section is notqualified to sit or to vote as a member of any local authority and willvacate his offico. In other words, it is made manifest that such a person 'cannot lawfully hold a scat or offico as a member of a local authority.That being so, tho jurisdiction of this Court to oust such a person fromthe seat or office by tho issuo of a Writ of Quo Warranto must undoubtedlybe exorcised if the Court is satisfied that no alternative and cfTectivO
^8H. N. G. FERNANDO, C.J.—hlartin Perera v. Madndomlc
procedure is provided by the relevant Statute law for ousting him. I amof opinion for these reasons that the jurisdiction of tho Court may benecessary and available in order to give full effect to tho provisions of ss. 9and 10 of Cap. 262. This opinion however is only a recognition of theprinciple of the English Common Law that, if a person who is disqualifiedby a Statute to hold a statutory office nevertheless usurps that office,the Writ of Quo Warranto was available to oust him. But the Writwould not be issued unless the Statute itself clearly disentitles a personfrom holding the office.
This discussion of ss. 9 and 10 serves to underline tho point that in thepresent case the Writ cannot issue, unless the provisions of Cap. 262make it clear that the election of a member of a local authority will beinvalid if his election was procured by general undue influence and/orgeneral treating.
The provisions of Cap. 262 which are relevant in this connection havenow to be considered. Section 24 provides that every election shallbe held in the manner hereinafter provided by this Ordinance ”, ands. 25 provides for the date of the holding of such an election. Thereafterss. 26 to 68 contain a series of requirements as to the manner in which anelection shall be held. There then follows s. 69, which it is convenientto cite in full:—
“ No election shall be invalid by reason of any failure to comply withthe provisions of this Ordinance relating to elections if it appears thatthe election was conducted in accordance with the principles laid downin such provisions, and that such failure did not affect the result of the•election. ”
Although s. 69 does not positively declare that an election will be invalidfor any specified reason, I can assume for present purposes that such adeclaration is implied in this section ; on this assumption the declarationthus implied may properly be stated thus :—
“ If there is in the case of any election a failure to comply with anyof the provisions of this Ordinance relating to elections, and
if it appears that the election was not conducted in accordance withthe principles laid down in such provisions, and
if it appears that thereby the result of the election was affected,the election shall be invalid. ”
In so far as the provisions of ss. 24 to 68 are concerned, it is not difficult .to point to some principles which are laid down in these sections, and Ibear in mind the fact that the principle of rules of law is not usuallystated in the rules themselves, but has to be derived from what is so6tatedl For example, when s. 26 requires that the Elections Officermust publish a notice of his intention to hold an election and fixa nomination day, the section recognises the principle that the electorsmust know that an election is pending and be able to exercise their right
H. N. G. FERNANDO, C.J.—Marlin Perera e. Madadombc29
to nominate candidates. Again, in the case of a contested election s. 38requires tho Elections Officer to publish a notice specifying the namesof the candidates, the date of the poll and the situation of the pollingstation, and thus recognises the principle that tho electors have theright to know for whom the3' may vote and when and where they mayexercise the franchise. When ss. 52 to 53A regulate tho issue of ballotpapers and the manner of voting by means of snch papers, they recognisethe principle that electors have the right to voto, and that they must bepermitted effectively to exercise that right. The provisions in ss. 59 to65 recognize the principle that tho vote of every elector who has effectivelyexercised his right has to bo duly taken into account for the purpose ofascertaining which candidate has received the majority of the votes andalso the principle that it is the will of the majority which must prevailaud bo declared at tho end of tho election.
On the assumption I have made as to the implications of s. 69, it canwell be clear to a Court that a particular election was not conducted inaccordance with one or other of tho principles to which I have referred,and if it further appears that tho result of the election was affected inconsequence, the Writ of Quo Warranto may issue on the ground thatthe member elected at the election was not. duly elected.
Returning now to the observations of Soertsz J., the question for ourdecision is whether the principle that an election must bo free, in thesense that votes of electors must not be influenced by bribery or intimida-tion, is recognised by and falls within the implication to he inferred froms. 69, and that a breach of that principle can invalidate an election.
The first condition in the declaration to be implied in s. 69 is that theremust, be a failure to comply with some provision of tho Ordinance. Thisoxprossion is appropriate i o a caso where a public oilicer docs not performail act or duty which some provision of the Ordinance requires him toperform, because ifso tho officer clearly fails to comply wit h that provision.But- the expression is inappropriate to a case where there has been briberyat an election; for every case of bribery constitutes a breach orcontravention of s. 79 of the Ordinance. There arc numerous instancesin our Statute law where the expression failure to comply (with a provisionof the Statute) occurs; but I know of no Statute in which it is usedotherwise than for tho purpose of referring to a ease where a person hasomitted to do some act required by law or has not done such an act in theproper manner or at the proper time. On the other hand, there areequally numerous instances of such expressions as commits a breach of ”or *’* contravenes ”, and such expressions are almost invariably used forthe purpose of referring to positivo acts done contrary to some statutoryprohibition. Having regard to the sense in which the expression “ failureto comply ” has been used by tho Legislature of t his country for a hundredyears, I greatly doubt whether in s. 69 of Cap.'262 that expression wasused to connote anything other than breaches of statutory duties. More-over, expressions in a statute must be given their plain meaning, asordinarily understood. I certainly do not agree that it is good English,
13733 (5/70)
30
H. X. 0. KKKX.A.VDO, C.J.—Martin I’crcra e. iladadombe
or oven technically correct English, to say of a voter who takes a bribothat- ha “ has failed to comply ” with s. 79 of Cap. 262, or to soy of amurderer that he “ has failed to comply with ” s. 296 of the PenalCode.
The second condition in the declaration to be implied in s. 69 is thatthe election was not conducted in accordance with some principle. It isperfectly clear that sections 24- to 68 of Cap. 262 deal with the conductof an election, and entrust various officers at different stages with theduty of conducting elections. If therefore any such officer does notcomply with some provisions of those sections, it may properly bo saidthat the election was nbt conducted in accordance with the principleswhich underlie those provisions. It. is thus manifest that s. 69 wasintended to apply in such a case. But can it properly bo said that thegiving and taking of bribes to and by voters forms part of the conductof an election ?'•
It is of course correct that different categories of persons participatein an election. The officials participate by holding or conducting theelection; tho candidates participate by offering themselves for electionand by doing tho acts necessary to be candidates, e. g. by presentingnomination papers and appointing polling agents and counting agents ;the electors participate by claiming ballot papers and thus casting theirvotes. To take the case of an elector, he can in no sense bo regarded as“conducting” an election; it is precisely because tho officials dulyconduct an election that an elector is able to participate in the electionby casting his vote. If such participation constitutes part of theconduct of the election, then equally the purchase of a ticket in a NationalLottery would constitute part of the conduct, of t he Lottery. Again, themotive which influences an elector to vote for a particular candidatecannot in my opinion bo properly regarded as a matter involved inthe conduct of the election, any more than the motive for a particularspeech at a meeting can be regarded as being involved in the conductof a meeting.
As for a candidate, it may in a limited sense be proper to say that heparticipates in the conduct of an election. The term election in the presentcontext means " choosing by vote ”, and the conducting of an electionis accordingly the conducting of the process by which electors are able tocast their votes. It is a-neccssary step in this process that persons shouldoffer themselves for the electors to make their choice. To this extent the. submission of a nomination paper by a candidate may be regarded aspart of the conduct ®f tho election. But just as much as the motive whichinfluences an elector to' vote for a particular candidato is not a part ofthe conduct of the-election, the more remote activity of influencing(whether by fair or illegal means) the choice of an elector forms no partof the conduct of an election.
I note in this connection that s. 24 of Cap. 262 refers to the mannerin which an election shall be held. Even if the word “ held ” may have awide connotation which can include within its scope the activity of influ-encing voters, the wotd conducted ” used in s. 69 does not ordinarily
H. N. G. KKRXAXDO, C.J.—Martin Perera v. Madadombt
31
have so wide a meaning. In s. 41 also, tho language is that the poll shallbe conducted, and the provisions of ss. 42 to 65 refer to matters properlywithin the scope of the conduct of the'poll. But hero again there is nojustification for regarding the motive of an elector or any matter whichinfluences that motive as being a part of tho conduct of the poll.
If it is permissible to imply from Section 69 of Cap. 262 an intentionof the Legislature that an Election will be invalid for some reason, then(as I have shown) tho language of tho section leads clearly to the inferencethat the contemplated reason for invalidity is that the election was notconducted by the proper officials in accordance with tho principles ofss. 24 to 67. Onco that inference is reached, a Court must hesitate toinstitute a search for some further hidden intention. “ YVhcro the litoralreading of a Statute …. produces an intelligible result ….there is no ground for reading in words or changing words according towhat may bo the supposed intention of Parliament ” (Lord Parker
C.J. in R v. Oakes.1
Tho argument for tho petitioner (adopting tho opinion of Soertsz J.)has been that, bccauso ss. 79 and 81 of Cap. 262 prohibit bribery orundue influence at an election, the principle of the English CommonLaw that an election is invalid on such grounds is recognised in our law.
I have thus far explained my reasons for the opinion that s. 69 of Cap.262 does not appear even by implication to recognize such a principle.Section S3 gives further support for that opinion, for its effect is that,upon conviction of tho offence of bribery or undue influence, a personbecomes disqualified from sitting or voting as a member of a local autho-.rity. Since this disqualification is adopted in s. 9 (1) (Jfc), the consequenceis that if a member is so convicted, he will by reason of s. 10 vacate hisseat. The Legislature has thus clearly declared its intention that theseat of a member becomes vacant if he is convicted of an offence of briberyor undue influence. In tho face of this express declaration, the omission ofthe Legislature to declare that an election is void on grounds of generalbribery or general treating is significant. As Goddard C.J. said in R v.Wimbledon Justices 2:—
“ Although in construing an Act of Parliament ' e Court mustalways try to givo effect to the intention of the Act and must looknot only at the remedy provided but also at the mischief aimed at,it cannot add words to a statute or read words into it which aro notthere, and, if the statute has created a specific offence, it is not fortho Court to find other offences which do not appear In tho statute. ”
In the present case, the relevant provisions of Cap. 262 clearly declarethat the respondent will lose his seat if he is convicted of an offence ofbribery or unduo influence, and thus (adapting the language of LordGoddard) it is not for the Court to find that he will also lose his seat ifacts of bribery or undue influence arc proved in a proceeding for a Writ of
(Juo Warranto.
» (1959) 2 Q.B. 351.
* (1953) 1 Q.B. 381.
32
H. N. G. EEK NANDO, C-T.—Martin Penra v. Afadadombe
During the course of the argument, I attempted more than once torefer to a rule of interpretation, the validity of which is to me self-erident.But Counsel for the petitioner impatiently disagreed with my opinionthat there is such a rule and that it is applicable in tho present case.Hence it is well to preface my discussion of this rule by citing the dictumof a J udge of undoubted eminence. In The Mayor of Porismovth v. Smith1Lord Blackburn said :—
"‘Where a single section of an Act is introduced into another Act,it must be read in tho sense which it bore in tho original Act fromwhich it was taken, and consequently it is perfectly legitimate to referto all the rest of the Act in order to ascertain what the sectionmeant, though those other sections arc not incorporated into thenew Act.”
In 1946, when Cap. 262 was enacted, our law relating to State CouncilElections Whs contained in the State Council (Elections) Order in Council,1931, and it is readily apparent that there was much borrowing from thatOrder in Council when the Local Authorities Elections Ordinance of1946 (now Cap. 262) was being drafted. Applying the rule as enunciatedby Lord Blackburn, s. 4S of the Order in Counil was introduced intoCap. 262 as s. 69, together with other Sections of the Order in Council,and it is therefore perfectly legitimate to refer to all the rest of that Orderin Council in order to ascertain what s. 69 of Cap. 262 means. Section69 must be given the same meaning as the “ model ” s. 4S of the Orderin Council, unless of course it can reasonably bear a different meaningin its own context..
The "first step in applying this rule of interpretation is to ascertainwhether the model section was intended to declare by implication thata State Council Election would be invalid by reason of general briberyor general undue influence, and for this purpose s. 74 of that Order becomesimmediately relevant—
** 74. The election of a candidate as a member shall be declaredto be void on an election petition on any of the following groundswhich may be proved to the satisfaction of the election Judge,viz.
(а)That by reason of general bribery, general treating, or general
intimidation, or other misconduct, or other circumstances,whether similar to those before enumerated or not, themajority of electors were or may have been prevented fromelecting the candidate whom they preferred ;
(б)Non-compliance with the provisions of this Order relating to
elections if it appears that the election was not conductedin accordance with the principles laid down in such provisionsand that such non-compliance affected the result of the" election ; ”
{1885) JO Arp. Cos. at p. 371.
H. N. G. FERXAXDO, C.J.—Martin Perera v. Madadombe
33
Section 74 (a) of the Order in Council thus expressly provided thata State Council election may be declared to be void on an electionpetition on the ground of general bribery or general intimidation. Sincethat was achieved in s. 74, there was no occasion for the Legislature toentertain any intention that section 48 should also have the effect thatan election will be void on such a ground. It is clear therefore that s. 48did not carry that implication.
The second step is to Inquire whether there is in the context of Cap. 262any provision which can permit a Court to give to its s. 69 a wider or diffe-rent meaning or implication than the meaning or implication of the modelsection. Such an enquiry has revealed not only that there is no provisionin Cap. 202 which might support the construction now sought to be placedon s. 69, but also that the Legislature in enacting Cap. 262 appears tohave- deliberately refrained from adopting the provision in s. 74 (a) of.the Order in Council that an election will be void on the ground of generalbribery or general undue influence.
Furthermore, the dictum of Lord Blackburn justifies reference in thepresent case to all the rest of the Order in Council. The Legislature ins. 74 first dealt in paragraph (a) with the avoidance of elections procuredby general bribery or general intimidation. Having first provided forsuch cases in paragraph (a), the Legislature must fairly be assumed tohave specified in paragraph (6) a second and distinct ground of avoidance,namely that an election was not conducted in accordance with certainprinciples. In thus referring to such principles, only after first disposing ofthe specific grounds of bribery and intimidation, the Legislature made itclear that the ground of a breach of principles did not include the groundsalready dealt with in paragraph, (a).
Moreover, the language of paragraph (6) of s. 74 of the Order in Councilwas substantially identical with that of s. 48 of the Order. If then para-graph (6) of s. 74 was not intended to apply in cases of general briberyor general intimidation, equally the same language in s. 4S of the Orderwas not intended to apply whether directly or by implication to any suchcases.
The “ perfectly legitimate ” references which have now been made tothe provisions of the State Council (Elections) Order in Council haveserved to confirm the construction of s. 69 of Cap. 262 which I havealready reached without reference to those provisions ; if s. 4S of theOrder in Council could not apply in a case of general bribery or generalintimidation, then equally the rule enunciated by Lord Blackburn requiresme to construe s. 69 of Cap. 262 in the same sense.
There is lastly the contention on which Counsel for the. petitionerprincipally relied, that the Court should not now' depart from theconstruction of Soertsz J. in Gooncsinha’s case, namely that the prohibitionby Statute in Ceylon of individual acts of bribery or undue influenceat elections was sufficient to establish the recognition by our law of theEnglish principle that general bribry or general intimidation will invali-date an election. This contention is essentially a resort to the maximstare decisis and/or to the maxim communis error facit ius.
34H. X. G. FERNANDO. C-T.—Martin Perm v. Madadombe
The principles which govern the application of these maxims have beenstated instructively in judgments w hich I now cite :—
“ …. if wc find a uniform interpretation of a statute upon
a question materially affecting property, and perpetually recurring,and which has been adhered to without interruption it would beimpossible for us to introduce the precedent- of disregarding thatinterpretation. Disagreeing with it would thereby be shaking rightsand titles which have been founded through so many years upon theconviction that that interpretation is the legal and proper one, and isone which will not be departed from” (Lord Westbury in (1871). L.R. 5English & Irish Appeals, p. 304 at 320).
“ Firstly, the construction of a statute of doubtful meaning oncelaid down and accepted for a long period of time ought not to be alteredunless your Lordships could say positively that it was wrong andproductive of inconvenience. Secondly, that the decision upon whichtitle to propertj' depends or which by establishing principles of con-struction otherwise form the basis of contracts ought to receive thesame protection. Thirdly, decisions affecting the general conduct of. affairs, so that their alteration would mean that taxes had beenunlawfully imposed or exemption unlawfully obtained, paymentsneedlessly made or the position of the public materially affected, oughtin the same way to continue.” (Lord Buckmaster in (1919) A.C. 815at p. 874).
“ There is well-established authority for the view that a decisionof long standing, on the basis of which many persons will in the courseof time have arranged their affairs, should not lightly be disturbedby a superior court not strictly bound itself by the decision.” (LordEvershed, M.R.in 1958, 1 Ch. at p. 603).
I am quite satisfied that the principles thus stated afford no groundfor now holding that the decision of Soertsz J. in Goonesinha’s case mustbe accepted by the present Bench, despite its own opinion that that-decision was wrong.
If I may adopt the language of Lord Evershed, the petitioner in theinstant case can succeed only “ on the basis that many persons have arrangedtheir affairs ” on the decision in Goonesinghe’s case. But it is absurd tocontend that anyone’s affairs were arranged on the basis that a writ oFquo warranto will lie to challenge on some ground the validity of theelection of a member of a local authority.
The application is dismissed with costs fixed at Rs. 105.
SnmiANE, J.—
I agree.
Samehawickbame, J.—I agree..
Application dismissed.