013-NLR-NLR-V-59-WARLIS-Appellant-and-SCOTT-Respondent.pdf
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L. W. de SILVA, A.J.— lVarli-s v. Scott
1957Present: L. W. de Silva, A.J.
WARLIS, Appellant, and SCOTT, RespondentS. G. 1,380—M. C. K7/run eg ala, 25,448
Charge—Duplicity—Particulars of offence—Motor Traffic Act, No. 14 of 1951,s. 153 (2)—Criminal Procedure Code, s. 109.
A charge of driving recklessly or in a dangerous niannor in breach of section153 (2) of the Motor Traffic Act is not bad for duplicity or for want of particularsof the manner of the commission of tho offence within tho meaning of section 169of tho Criminal Proccdur© Code.
Edwin Singho v. S. I., Police, Kadawalla (195G) 57 N. L. R. 355, distin-guished.
jAlPPEAL from a judgment of the Magistrate’s Court, Kurunegala.
T. B. Dissanayake, for accused-appellant.
A. G. de Zoysa, Crown Counsel, for the Attorney-General.
Cur. adv. vult.
July 19, 1957. X>. W. de Silva, A.J.—.
The appellant was tried on two charges framed under the Motor TrafficAct No. 14 of 1951 and was convicted on the first charge which has allegedthat he did on August 21, 1956—-
“ Being the driver of bus No. XC 2405 drive the same on a publicroad to wit:along Alawwa-Narammala Road recklessly or in a
dangerous manner in breach of section 153 (2) of the Motor TrafficAct No. 14 of 1951 and thereby committed an offence punishable undersection 219 (1) ”
L. W. do SILVA, A.J.— H'or/is t>.
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of the said Act. Section 153 (2) is as follows :—
“ Xo person shall drive a motor vehicle on a highway recklessly or ina dangerous manner or at a dangerous speed. ”
The two points taken on the appellant's behalf are as follows : (1) thecharge sets out two distinct offences in the alternative and is thereforebad for duplicity ; (2) the charge is bad in that it docs not set out parti-culars of the manner in which the offence was committed. Learnedcounsel for the appellant, relying on the judgment in Edwin Singho v.S. I. Police, Kadauatla l, contended that the appellant was entitled to anacquittal. Learned Crown Counsel contended that that case was wronglydecided.
In that case, two charges had been framed under sections 153 (2) and153 (3) of the Motor Traffic Act. The first charge, which alone has abearing on this appeal, alleged that the accused drove a motor bus“ recklessly or in a dangerous manner or at a dangerous speed in breachof section 153 (2) It appears to have been assumed that the firstcharge was in respect of three different offences. The judgment makesit clear that no other point of view was put forward or considered, andSansoni J. citing a number of local and English decisions held that thecharges framed in the alternative were bad for duplicity. He set aside theconviction taking into account the important consideration that itwould not be clear upon a conviction or an acquittal of what offencethe accused had been found guilty or acquitted. He also held that theomission to set out the details of each offence in the charge as required bysection 169 of the Criminal Procedure Code had occasioned a failure ofjustice.
The two English cases followed by Sansoni J. in Edwin Singho'a case 1are P. v. W if mot 2 and R. v. Surrey Justices, ex -parte Wilhcrick 3. InWilmot’s case 2, the charge, after setting out the date and place, allegedthat the accused
“ Drove a motor car recklessly, or at a speed or in a manner whichwas dangerous to the public, having regard to all the circumstancesof the case, including the nature, condition and use of the road and theamount of traffic which was actually at the time, or which might reason-ably have been expected to be, on the said load. ”
The count was an exact copy of section 11 (1) of the Road Traffic Act,1930, and it is not surprising that the charge was held bad for duplicity.
In Witherick’s case 3, the information charged the accused with drivinga motor vehicle on a road “ without due care and attention or withoutreasonable consideration for other persons using the road contrary tosection 12 of the Road Traffic Act, 1930 ”. It was held that the convictionwas bad for duplicity since the section created two separate offences.
I do not think the reasoning of Sansoni J. and the cases cited by himapply to the facts of this case. The charge here is in two alternativesconnoted by recklessly or in a dangerous manner. The charge in Edwin
{1956) 57 N. B. If. 355.1 24 Cr. App. P. 63,
1 {1932) 1 K. B. 450.
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ir. W. de SILVA, A.J .— Wants v. Scott
Singho’s case.1 alleged the accused drove his vehicle recklessly or in adangerous manner or at a dangerous speed. It is thus apparent that .theaccused might-have done one or two things without the other, and theview was taken that distinct offences were indicated. The present chargeis not open to that objection. Driving recklessly or in a dangerousmanner in my opinion connotes the commission of one offence in alter-native ways. The charge sets out the ?nan7ierin which the appellant drovehis vehicle, and there is no uncertainty about it. I am of the opinion thatthe charge was correctly framed and the appellant was rightly convicted.
The second objection also fails. Section 169 of the Criminal ProcedureCode states that when the nature of the case is such that the particularsmentioned in the last two preceding sections do not give the accusedsufficient notice of the matter with which he is charged, the charge shallalso contain such particulars of the -manner in which the alleged offencewas committed as -will be sufficient for (hat purpose. There is nothing inthe nature of this case which requires particulars of the manner in whichthe offence was committed. The manner is manifest in the charge.The Magistrate has found that the appellant drove the vehicle withoutany regard to the car which was moving in the opposite direction on theextreme left of the road and against which the appellant knocked his bus.The evidence further established that the appellant’s bus had passed thepoint of impact and halted well on the left side of the road on the grass.The car was found almost in the drain after the impact. It is thus quiteplain that one offence was committed and at one spot. In Edwin Singho’scase 1, there was evidence of three separate incidents at three differentplaces on the highway, and Sansoni J. observed that, in fairness to theaccused, he should have been given particulars of the manner in whichthe alleged offences were committed as required by section 169 of the' Criminal Procedure Code..
In view of the conclusion I have reached, there can be no question ofwhat offence the appellant has been found guilty.
The appeal is dismissed.•
_. Appeal dismissed.
1 (1950) 57 N. I;. R. 355.-