004-NLR-NLR-V-57-WILLIAM-SINGHO-Appellant-and-REV.-DHAMMAJOTHI-ISTHAWEERA-Respondent.pdf
GUXASE KARA J.—-William Singho v. Dhcimmajothi Isthauecia1955Present: Gunasekara J. and Sansoni J.
WILLIAM SIXGHO, Appellant, and REV. DHA3JDIAJOTHIISTHAWEERA, Respondent
.S'. O. 215—D. G., Badulla, 10.4S1,
JJuddhisl Temporalities Ordinance (Cap. 222)—Section 23—Abandonment of robesbhikkhu—Pudgalika property—Devolution.
Under Section 23 of tUcT Buddhist Temporalities Ordinance uninheritpudgalika property acquired by a bhikkhu for his exclusive personal use anot alienated by him during his lifetime becomes, on his death, the propertytho temple to which ho belonged, even though he abandoned tho robes andbecame a layman.
_/lPPEAL from a judgment of the District Court, Badulla.
Cyril E. S. Perera, Q.C., with E. R. S. R. Coomaraswamy and Day aPerera, for the plaintiff appellant.
N.E. Weerasooria, Q.G., with K. G. de Silva and./. A. D. de Silva, for thodefendant respondent.
.Cur. adv. vult.
May 12, 1955. Gl'nasekar.-v J.—
This is an .appeal from a judgment of the District Court of Badulladismissing an action for declaration of title to an undivided half shareof a paddy field.
The original owner of the field sold it on the 12tli January, 1915, to twoblukkhus, Dhammananda Unnanse and Saranankara Unnanse, of whomthe former was the chief incumbent of a temple and the latter was hispupil. In 1934 Saranankara abandoned the robes and became a layman,resuming his original name of Wijesekara Miuliyanselage Appuhamy.In February, 1930, he married one Bandara Mcnike, and he died in Aprilof that year. On the otli May, 1951, Bandara Menike purported to sellto the appellant an undivided half share of the field, claiming to haveinherited it from her deceased husband Appuhamy. In the meantimeDhammananda Unnanse had died in 1945 and the respondent hadsucceeded him as the chief incumbent of the temple. The respondent,who was in possession of the entire field claiming to possess it for thetemple, refused to let the appellant take possession of the half shareclaimed by him upon the transfer from Bandara Menike, and the appellantthereupon instituted the action that gives rise to this appeal.
The grounds urged in support of the appeal are that the evidence liasestablished that the half share in question was pudgalika propertyacquired by Saranankara Unnanse for his exclusive personal use and thatupon his death it formed part of the estate that passed to his heirs. Thelearned judge’s finding is that the field had been purchased for the benefitof tho tomplo and its produce had always been used exclusively for thatpurpose-, but that even if the half share had been acquired by Saranankara
Unnanso for Iiis personal use liis heirs coulcl not inherit it in view of thoprovisions of section 23 of the Buddhist Temporalities Ordinance(Cap. 222). In terms of this section,
£! All pudgalika property that is acquired by any individual bhikkhufor his exclusive personal use, shall, if not alienated by such bhikkhu.during his lifetime, be deemed to be the property of the templo to whichsuch bhikkhu belonged unless such property had been inherited by suchbhikkhu. ”
It is contended for the appellant that the learned judge has interpretedthis section erroneously and that it applies only to property acquired bya person who was a bhikkhu both at the time of tho acquisition and at thetime of his death. As I read the section, what it provides is that propertywhich is not the property of a temple shall be deemed to be such propertyif it satisfies these conditions :
that it is pudgalika property that has been acquired by a bhikkhu
of that temple for his exclusive personal use ;
that it has not been alienated by him during his lifetime : and
that it is not property that had been inherited by him.
The argument that there is a further condition that must be satisfied isbased upon tho expressions " if not alienated by such bhikkhu during hislifetime ” and ‘ the temple to which such bhikkhu belonged ”. It iscontended that these references to a " bhikklui ” connote that the onlyproperty contemplated in the section is the proper13' of a person who wasa bhikkliu at the time of his death. I do not agree. It seems to me thatthere is nothing more in the expression ” such bhikkhu ” than a referenceto the person who acquired the propert3r. I should imagine that if morewas intended b3r the legislature that intention would have been expressed,in unambiguous language.
There appears to be no ground for interfering with the judgment of thedistrict court. The appeal must be dismissed with costs.
Appeal dismissed.
Saxsoxi J.—I agree.